逻辑学语境下的科学实用主义

作为实用主义的鼻祖,皮尔士首先和主要是一位逻辑学家.他的实用主义从根本上讲是一种逻辑学说,要求从逻辑学理论上对其进行解读.审视科学实用主义同逻辑学的内在的、历史的联系及其形而上的蕴含,可以更清晰地认识实用主义理论的本真意义.     

Hermeneutic strategies in Gerd Buchdahl’s Kantian philosophy of science

Gerd Buchdahl’s international reputation rests on his masterly writings on Kant. In them he showed how Kant transformed the philosophical problems of his predecessors and he minutely investigated the ways in which Kant related his critical philosophy to the contents and methods of natural science. Less well known, if only because in large part unpublished, are the writings in which Buchdahl elaborated his own views on the methods and status of the sciences. In this paper I examine the roles of hermeneutics in Buchdahl’s reconstruction of Kant’s philosophical system and in his own ‘transcendental methodological’ approach to the philosophy of science. The first section looks at Buchdahl’s views on the theory and practice of historical interpretation and at the Husserlian hermeneutic scheme of reduction and realisation that he used in his later accounts of the philosophies of science of Kant and himself. The second section concentrates on Buchdahl’s treatment of the grounds of science in Kant; and the third on the hermeneutic strategies Buchdahl employed in articulating and justifying his own views. The paper closes with reflections on the impact and importance of Buchdahl’s interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy in relation to the sciences and of his own hermeneutically based philosophy of science.     

论以技术为中介的科学认识的变化

现代科学研究的技术中介日益加重,作者以康德的认识论为参照论述了技术介入后的科学认识的三种变化:一是人对观察的认知体验与对观察的信念巨大的分离;二是科学知识的判断过程完全走向工具的外化阅读之上;三是康德那里自然的合目的性先天调节原则因科学的技术基础的复杂化而转化为技术进化本身的目的性,造成科学变革受技术基础的牵制.     

Kant on anatomy and the status of the life sciences

This paper contributes to recent interest in Kant's engagement with the life sciences by focusing on one corner of those sciences that has received comparatively little attention: physical and comparative anatomy. By attending to remarks spread across Kant's writings, we gain some insight into Kant's understanding of the disciplinary limitations but also the methodological sophistication of the study of anatomy and physiology. Insofar as Kant highlights anatomy as a paradigmatic science guided by the principle of teleology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, a more careful study of Kant's discussions of anatomy promises to illuminate some of the obscurities of that text and of his understanding of the life sciences more generally. In the end, it is argued, Kant's ambivalence with regard to anatomy gives way to a pessimistic conclusion about the possibility that anatomy, natural history, and, by extension, the life sciences more generally might one day become true natural sciences.     

Helmholtz's Kant revisited (Once more). The all-pervasive nature of Helmholtz's struggle with Kant's Anschauung

In this analysis, the classical problem of Hermann von Helmholtz's (1821–1894) Kantianism is explored from a particular vantage point, that to my knowledge, has not received the attention it deserves notwithstanding its possible key role in disentangling Helmholtz's relation to Kant's critical project. More particularly, we will focus on Helmholtz's critical engagement with Kant's concept of intuition [Anschauung] and (the related issue of) his dissatisfaction with Kant's doctrinal dualism. In doing so, it soon becomes clear that both (i) crucially mediated Helmholtz's idiosyncratic appropriation and criticism of (certain aspects of) Kant's critical project, and (ii) can be considered as a common denominator in a variety of issues that are usually addressed separately under the general header of (the problem of) Helmholtz's Kantianism. The perspective offered in this analysis can not only shed interesting new light on some interpretive issues that have become commonplace in discussions on Helmholtz's Kantianism, but also offers a particular way of connecting seemingly unrelated dimensions of Helmholtz's engagement with Kant's critical project (e.g. Helmholtz's views on causality and space). Furthermore, it amounts to the rather surprising conclusion that Helmholtz's most drastic revision of Kant's project pertains to his assumption of free will as a formal condition of experience and knowledge.     

Natural history and the formation of the human being: Kant on active forces

In his 1785-review of the Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, Kant objects to Herder's conception of nature as being imbued with active forces. This attack is usually evaluated against the background of Kant's critical project and his epistemological concern to caution against the “metaphysical excess” of attributing immanent properties to matter. In this paper I explore a slightly different reading by investigating Kant's pre-critical account of creation and generation. The aim of this is to show that Kant's struggle with the forces of matter has a long history and revolves around one central problem: that of how to distinguish between the non-purposive forces of nature and the intentional powers of the mind. Given this history, the epistemic stricture that Kant's critical project imposes on him no longer appears to be the primary reason for his attack on Herder. It merely aggravates a problem that Kant has been battling with since his earliest writings.     

论康德的“普世伦理”观

普世伦理又译作全球伦理,一直是人类探讨道德的核心问题。康德从先天的形式出发,通过自由意志、道德规律、人是目的和普遍立法等形式为普世伦理的发展奠定了基本基调和纯粹理性形式,促进了普世伦理思想的发展。     

Poincaréan intuition revisited: what can we learn from Kant and Parsons?

This paper provides a comprehensive critique of Poincaré’s usage of the term intuition in his defence of the foundations of pure mathematics and science. Kant’s notions of sensibility and a priori form and Parsons’s theory of quasi-concrete objects are used to impute rigour into Poincaré’s interpretation of intuition. In turn, Poincaré’s portrayal of sensible intuition as a special kind of intuition that tolerates the senses and imagination is rejected. In its place, a more harmonized account of how we perceive concrete objects is offered whereby intuitive knowledge is consistently a priori whatever the domain of application.     

公共理性的“困境”及其解决——剖析康德与罗尔斯的论证

人们经常使用＂公共理性＂这个词,但对其含义或许并未深究。康德和罗尔斯分别对＂理性的公共运用＂和＂公共理性＂做了界定和说明,前者肯定理性的公共运用对于启蒙的重要意义,并对这种公用坚信不疑;后者则认为表面上存在公共理性的＂悖谬＂。前者以意志自由为逻辑起点,巧妙地消解公共理性的悖谬;后者为了达到同样的目的假设了秩序良好的公民社会。相对而言,康德的论证更具先验论证的色彩,而罗尔斯的论证却营造了实用主义的背景。借助他山之石,我们或将吸取其思想,对中国现实问题之思考具有借鉴意义。