Wolves in sheep’s clothing: three new cases of aggressive mimicry in Red Sea coral reef fishes

ABSTRACT

Here we document three cases of mimicry in coral reef fishes not previously reported in the literature involving two groupers (Epinephelus leucogrammicus and Plectropomus marisrubri) and a soapfish (Diploprion drachi) as mimics, and two wrasses (Larabicus quadrilineatus and Cheilinus quinquecinctus) and a blenny (Meiacanthus nigrolineatus) as models. All three cases are of aggressive mimicry, with a predatory species mimicking a harmless one, and in one of the cases, the mimicry is also Müllerian, where both the predator and harmless species are unpalatable.     

The material theory of induction and the epistemology of thought experiments

John D. Norton is responsible for a number of influential views in contemporary philosophy of science. This paper will discuss two of them. The material theory of induction claims that inductive arguments are ultimately justified by their material features, not their formal features. Thus, while a deductive argument can be valid irrespective of the content of the propositions that make up the argument, an inductive argument about, say, apples, will be justified (or not) depending on facts about apples. The argument view of thought experiments claims that thought experiments are arguments, and that they function epistemically however arguments do. These two views have generated a great deal of discussion, although there hasn't been much written about their combination. I argue that despite some interesting harmonies, there is a serious tension between them. I consider several options for easing this tension, before suggesting a set of changes to the argument view that I take to be consistent with Norton's fundamental philosophical commitments, and which retain what seems intuitively correct about the argument view. These changes require that we move away from a unitary epistemology of thought experiments and towards a more pluralist position.     

Permissible idealizations for the purpose of prediction

Every model leaves out or distorts some factors that are causally connected to its target phenomenon—the phenomenon that it seeks to predict or explain. If we want to make predictions, and we want to base decisions on those predictions, what is it safe to omit or to simplify, and what ought a causal model to describe fully and correctly? A schematic answer: the factors that matter are those that make a difference to the target phenomenon. There are several ways to understand differencemaking. This paper advances a view as to which is the most relevant to the forecaster and the decision-maker. It turns out that the right notion of differencemaking for thinking about idealization in prediction is also the right notion for thinking about idealization in explanation; this suggests a carefully circumscribed version of Hempel’s famous thesis that there is a symmetry between explanation and prediction.     

The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem: Mathematization as Exploration

This paper discerns two types of mathematization, a foundational and an explorative one. The foundational perspective is well-established, but we argue that the explorative type is essential when approaching the problem of applicability and how it influences our conception of mathematics. The first part of the paper argues that a philosophical transformation made explorative mathematization possible. This transformation took place in early modernity when sense acquired partial independence from reference. The second part of the paper discusses a series of examples from the history of mathematics that highlight the complementary nature of the foundational and exploratory types of mathematization.     

Kant on anatomy and the status of the life sciences

This paper contributes to recent interest in Kant's engagement with the life sciences by focusing on one corner of those sciences that has received comparatively little attention: physical and comparative anatomy. By attending to remarks spread across Kant's writings, we gain some insight into Kant's understanding of the disciplinary limitations but also the methodological sophistication of the study of anatomy and physiology. Insofar as Kant highlights anatomy as a paradigmatic science guided by the principle of teleology in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, a more careful study of Kant's discussions of anatomy promises to illuminate some of the obscurities of that text and of his understanding of the life sciences more generally. In the end, it is argued, Kant's ambivalence with regard to anatomy gives way to a pessimistic conclusion about the possibility that anatomy, natural history, and, by extension, the life sciences more generally might one day become true natural sciences.     

Taming theory with thought experiments: Understanding and scientific progress

I claim that one way thought experiments contribute to scientific progress is by increasing scientific understanding. Understanding does not have a currently accepted characterization in the philosophical literature, but I argue that we already have ways to test for it. For instance, current pedagogical practice often requires that students demonstrate being in either or both of the following two states: 1) Having grasped the meaning of some relevant theory, concept, law or model, 2) Being able to apply that theory, concept, law or model fruitfully to new instances. Three thought experiments are presented which have been important historically in helping us pass these tests, and two others that cause us to fail. Then I use this operationalization of understanding to clarify the relationships between scientific thought experiments, the understanding they produce, and the progress they enable. I conclude that while no specific instance of understanding (thus conceived) is necessary for scientific progress, understanding in general is.     

Some Open Problems in Parameterized Complexity Related to the Work of Jianer Chen

This short paper highlights some open problems related to the work of Jianer Chen in the area of parameterized/multivariate algorithmics.     

Dynamic Dominating Set and Turbo-Charging Greedy Heuristics

The main purpose of this paper is to exposit two very different, but very general, motivational schemes in the art of parameterization and a concrete example connecting them. We introduce a dynamic version of the DOMINATING SET problem and prove that it is fixed-parameter tractable（FPT）. The problem is motivated by settings where problem instances evolve. It also arises in the quest to improve a natural greedy heuristic for the DOMINATING SET problem.