The ontology of artefacts: the hard problem

We examine to what extent an adequate ontology of technical artefacts can be based on existing general accounts of the relation between higher-order objects and their material basis. We consider two of these accounts: supervenience and constitution. We take as our starting point the thesis that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, that is, that they are both material bodies and functional objects. We present two criteria for an adequate ontology of artefacts, ‘Underdetermination’ (UD) and ‘Realizability Constraints’ (RC), which address aspects of the dual nature thesis. Assessing supervenience accounts, we find them either wanting with respect to these criteria or insufficiently informative. Next, we argue that a recent application of Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view to artefacts cannot (yet) meet our criteria, although the broader view leaves room for improvement. Based on our evaluation of the most promising candidates, we conclude that so far general metaphysical views fail to address the most salient features of artefacts. Although they can account for the fact that artefacts have a ‘dual nature’, they do not offer the conceptual resources needed to describe the relation between these natures; this relation raises a hard problem in metaphysics.     

Transfer and templates in scientific modelling

The notion of template has been advocated by Paul Humphreys and others as an illuminating unit of analysis in the philosophy of scientific modelling. Templates are supposed to have the dual functions of representing target systems and of facilitating quantitative manipulation. A resulting worry is that wide-ranging cross-disciplinary use of templates might compromise their representational function and reduce them to mere formalisms. In this paper, we argue that templates are valuable units of analysis in reconstructing cross-disciplinary modelling. Central to our discussion are the ways in which Lotka-Volterra models are used to analyse processes of technology diffusion. We illuminate both the similarities and differences between contributions to this case of cross-disciplinary modelling by reconstructing them as transfer of a template, without reducing the template to a mere formalism or a computational model. This requires differentiating the interpretation of templates from that of the models based on them. This differentiation allows us to claim that the LV models of technology diffusion that we review are the result of template transfer - conformist in some contributions, creative in others.     

Dual-Nature and collectivist frameworks for technical artefacts: a constructive comparison

This paper systematically compares two frameworks for analysing technical artefacts: the Dual-Nature approach, exemplified by the contributions to Kroes and Meijers (2006), and the collectivist approach advocated by Schyfter (2009), following Kusch (1999). After describing the main tenets of both approaches, we show that there is significant overlap between them: both frameworks analyse the most typical cases of artefact use, albeit in different terms, but to largely the same extent. Then, we describe several kinds of cases for which the frameworks yield different analyses. For these cases, which include one-of-a-kind artefacts and defect types, the Dual-Nature framework leads to a more attractive analysis. Our comparison also gives us the opportunity to respond to Vaesen’s (2010, this issue) critical paper. We do so by distinguishing two readings of the Dual-Nature framework and pointing out that on the sustainable, weaker reading, Vaesen’s considerations supplement the framework rather than offering an alternative to it.