Maxwell's role in turning the concept of model into the methodology of modeling

This is a contribution towards a history and philosophy of modeling in its early stages in electromagnetism. In 1873, James Clerk Maxwell (1831–1879) hinted at the methodology of modeling at the end of his Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism. We focus on Maxwell's impact on physicists who immediately followed him, specifically Oliver Lodge (1851–1940) and George Francis FitzGerald (1851–1901). We begin with the role that the scientific concept of model played in the late nineteenth century, as assessed by Ludwig Boltzmann (1844–1906). We then discuss the role of hypothesis as a methodology, the appeal to (dynamical) illustration, and the way Maxwell applied model and working model in his studies of electromagnetism. We show that for Maxwell these key terms were kept distinct, but Lodge did not maintain these distinctions and, in this regard, FitzGerald followed Lodge. Notwithstanding Lodge's influence, Fitzgerald modified Maxwell's theory based on the mechanical model he designed, thereby implicitly taking the first step towards modeling. This methodology consists in drawing consequences from the (mechanical) model to the (electrodynamic) theory and modifying the latter in light of the functioning of the former. At the core of our argument is the thesis that it was a methodological novelty to move from the concept of model to the methodology of modeling. The introduction of modeling as a new methodology into physics in the late nineteenth century was a major event which deserves proper recognition.     

History of science and science combined: solving a historical problem in optics—the case of Galileo and his telescope

Archive for History of Exact Sciences - The claim that Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) transformed the spyglass into an astronomical instrument has never been disputed and is considered a...     

Maxwell’s contrived analogy: An early version of the methodology of modeling

The term “analogy” stands for a variety of methodological practices all related in one way or another to the idea of proportionality. We claim that in his first substantial contribution to electromagnetism James Clerk Maxwell developed a methodology of analogy which was completely new at the time or, to borrow John North’s expression, Maxwell’s methodology was a “newly contrived analogue”. In his initial response to Michael Faraday’s experimental researches in electromagnetism, Maxwell did not seek an analogy with some physical system in a domain different from electromagnetism as advocated by William Thomson; rather, he constructed an entirely artificial one to suit his needs. Following North, we claim that the modification which Maxwell introduced to the methodology of analogy has not been properly appreciated. In view of our examination of the evidence, we argue that Maxwell gave a new meaning to analogy; in fact, it comes close to modeling in current usage.     

Symmetry and asymmetry in electrodynamics from Rowland to Einstein

Halfway through the paper in which he laid down the foundations for the theory of special relativity, Einstein concludes that “the asymmetry mentioned in the Introduction … disappears.” Making asymmetry disappear has proved to be one of Einstein's many significant moves in his annus mirabilis of 1905. This elimination of asymmetry has led many commentators to claim that Einstein was motivated by either an aesthetic or an epistemic argument which gives priority to symmetry over asymmetry. Following closely the development of electrodynamics in the period from 1880 to 1905 and the usage of the related terms reciprocity and symmetry, we suggest a different way of understanding Einstein's motivation and the path he took. In contrast to the received view, we argue that Einstein responded to a debate in the literature on electrodynamics and that he was concerned neither with an aesthetic nor with an epistemic argument; rather, his reasoning was physical in the best sense, and most original. We will show that by providing a new perspective on the relation between electricity and magnetism, Einstein succeeded in bringing the discussion of symmetry in electrodynamics to an end.     

Magnification: how to turn a spyglass into an astronomical telescope

According to the received view, the first spyglass was assembled without any theory of how the instrument magnifies. Galileo, who was the first to use the device as a scientific instrument, improved the power of magnification up to 30 times. How did he accomplish this feat? Galileo does not tell us what he did. We hold that such improvement of magnification is too intricate a problem to be solved by trial and error, accidentally stumbling upon a complex procedure. We construct a plausibility argument and submit that Galileo had a theory of the telescope. He could develop it by analogical reasoning based on the phenomenon of reflection in mirrors—as it was put to use in surveying instruments—and applied to refraction in sets of lenses. Galileo could appeal to this analogy and assume Della Porta’s theory of refraction. He could thus turn the spyglass into a revolutionary scientific instrument—the telescope.     

On Kepler's awareness of the problem of experimental error

This paper is an account of Kepler's explicit awareness of the problem of experimental error. As a study of the Astronomia nova shows, Kepler exploited his awareness of the occurrences of experimental errors to guide him to the right conclusion. Errors were thus employed, so to speak, perhaps for the first time, to bring about a major physical discovery: Kepler's laws of planetary motion. ‘Know then’, to use Kepler's own words, ‘that errors show us the way to truth.’ With a survey of Kepler's revolutionary contribution to optics, the paper demonstrates that Kepler's awareness of the problem of experimental error extended beyond discrepancies between calculations and observations to types of error which pertain to observations and instruments. It emerges that Kepler's belief in the unity of knowledge and physical realism, facilitated—indeed created—the right philosophical posture for comprehending the problem of error in an entirely novel way.     

Towards a typology of experimental errors: An epistemological view

This paper is concerned with the problem of experimental error. The prevalent view that experimental errors can be dismissed as a tiresome but trivial blemish on the method of experimentation is criticized. It is stressed that the occurrence of errors in experiments constitutes a permanent feature of the attempt to test theories in the physical world, and this feature deserves proper attention. It is suggested that a classification of types of experimental error may be useful as a heuristic device in studying the nature of these errors. However, the standard classification of systematic and random errors is mathematically based does not focus on the causes of the errors, their origins, or the contexts in which they arise. A new typology of experimental errors is therefore proposed whose criterion is epistemological. This typology reflects the various stages that can be discerned in the execution of an experiment, each stage constituting a category of a certain type of experimental error. The proposed classification consists of four categories which are illustrated by historical cases.