浅析大学英语教学的生态多元化评价

本文试图用生态价值观,原理和方法来探索大学英语教学的多元化评价模式和作为教学和评价活动的主体——教师和学生,在教学活动中如何得到自由,快乐,和谐的共同发展,促进他们在评价活动中的互动发展,关注其中的情感互动,使评价手段和体系向人性化发展。     

浅析工业设计大众化的发展之路

文章从产品审美多元化、使用价值人性化、产品设计商业化3方面论述了工业设计的大众化，试图探讨在信息、科技日趋发达的社会，作为大众生活必需的工业设计应该以怎样的一种状态更合理的存在。     

A Framework of Value-Focused Systems Thinking

Values and value judgments should be tackled explicitly and directly in theory and practice. To do so, systems intervention as a communication process has to be designed in pursuit of the systemic and critical cause. This paper proposes a framework of value-focused systems thinking. The interdependence of values and techniques, and the theory of communicative competence, are briefly discussed as philosophical underpinnings. A methodology is outlined consisting of a reconstruction, judgment, and action cycle revolving around communication design.     

在《物理教学论》课程中对学生实施发展性评价的研究

本文论述了对学生进行发展性评价的基本内涵和基本理念,发展性评价的目的是促进学生的全面和谐发展。详细阐述了在《物理教学论》课程中实施发展性评价的基本做法和取得的效果,在发展性评价基本理念的的引导下,对学生的学习进行了有效的评价和激励,学生的学习也取得了较为理想的效果。     

Scepticism,relativism, and the structure of epistemic frameworks

This paper has four aims: first, to outline the role of the sceptical problem of the criterion in the principal argument for epistemic relativism; second, to establish that methodist and particularist responses to the problem of the criterion do not, by themselves, constitute successful strategies for resisting epistemic relativism; third, to argue that a more fruitful strategy is to attempt to evaluate epistemic frameworks on the basis of the epistemic resources that they have in common; and finally, to make the case that finding this common ground will necessarily involve determining how it is that a framework’s constituent epistemic methods depend on one another for not only their warrant, but for their application.     

Understanding Pluralism in Climate Modeling

To study Earth’s climate, scientists now use a variety of computer simulation models. These models disagree in some of their assumptions about the climate system, yet they are used together as complementary resources for investigating future climatic change. This paper examines and defends this use of incompatible models. I argue that climate model pluralism results both from uncertainty concerning how to best represent the climate system and from difficulties faced in evaluating the relative merits of complex models. I describe how incompatible climate models are used together in ‘multi-model ensembles’ and explain why this practice is reasonable, given scientists’ inability to identify a ‘best’ model for predicting future climate. Finally, I characterize climate model pluralism as involving both an ontic competitive pluralism and a pragmatic integrative pluralism.     

Pluralism and the legitimation of systems science

The central message of this paper is that methodological pluralism is essential for the continued legitimation of systems science. This statement is supported by a critique of our notion of complexity. Our traditional view of complexity focuses upon the natural world of object relations and thereby excludes complexities of moral decision making and subjectivity. However, we are now beginning to realize that these realms of complexity are not independent of one another. Indeed, our ability to cope adequately with many of the problems we are currently facing, especially global problems, depends on being able to understand the systemic relationships between all three. Interestingly, we find that different methods have evolved to handle the different forms of complexity. Therefore, if our inquiries are going to have any legitimacy in tackling some of the major issues of today, we must indeed embrace methodological pluralism.     

A tale of three theories: Feyerabend and Popper on progress and the aim of science

In this paper, three theories of progress and the aim of science are discussed: (i) the theory of progress as increasing explanatory power, advocated by Popper in The logic of scientific discovery (1935/1959); (ii) the theory of progress as approximation to the truth, introduced by Popper in Conjectures and refutations (1963); (iii) the theory of progress as a steady increase of competing alternatives, which Feyerabend put forward in the essay “Reply to criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam” (1965) and defended as late as the last edition of Against method (1993). It is argued that, contrary to what Feyerabend scholars have predominantly assumed, Feyerabend's changing attitude towards falsificationism—which he often advocated at the beginning of his career, and vociferously attacked in the 1970s and 1980s—must be explained by taking into account not only Feyerabend's very peculiar view of the aim of science, but also Popper's changing account of progress.     

Value management and model pluralism in climate science

Non-epistemic values pervade climate modelling, as is now well documented and widely discussed in the philosophy of climate science. Recently, Parker and Winsberg have drawn attention to what can be termed “epistemic inequality”: this is the risk that climate models might more accurately represent the future climates of the geographical regions prioritised by the values of the modellers. In this paper, we promote value management as a way of overcoming epistemic inequality. We argue that value management can be seriously considered as soon as the value-free ideal and inductive risk arguments commonly used to frame the discussions of value influence in climate science are replaced by alternative social accounts of objectivity. We consider objectivity in Longino's sense as well as strong objectivity in Harding's sense to be relevant options here, because they offer concrete proposals that can guide scientific practice in evaluating and designing so-called multi-model ensembles and, in fine, improve their capacity to quantify and express uncertainty in climate projections.