1926年薛定谔的哥本哈根之行

在量子物理学的发展史中,1926年是一个很可注意的年头。那年的上半年,薛定谔(E.Schrodinger)在苏黎世提出并发展了他那种形式的“波动力学”,证明这种力学和大约一年以前出世的海森伯的“矩阵力学”在数学上具有等价性。到了这时,人们大多意识到整理出一套相对完整的微观力学的时机已经近在眼前了。从那以后,理论开始沿着两个相辅相成的方向急速前进:(1)理论对各种微观体系(原子、分子等等)的具体应用;(2)数学表述形式的物理诠释和哲学指向。可以说,薛定     

论“仪器”概念的定义

玻尔和海森堡在有关物理学哲学问题的许多著作中不住地强调,认清仪器在微观粒子物理学中原则上新的认识论作用,就要求整个科学世界观的革命,并抛弃关于物体是客观存在的唯物主义原理,以及关于物体的属性在同仪器的相互作用之外是可以识论的唯物主义原理。但是,无论是玻尔还是海森堡,对于仪器的概念都没有给出任何令人满意的解释,因而他们对微观世界观察过程的分析也不能使人信服。一、问题的哲学依据通常在叙述量子力学的基本概念时,把仪器的概念大致归结如下,如果一个物体同另一个物体相互作     

论力学与物理学的视阈差异

由于经典力学尤其是牛顿力学的成功,在物理学领域中的一些重要概念,甚至是整个物理学领域乃至于人们看待世界的方式都被深深地打上了力学的烙印。这是准确理解与传播以量子论为代表的微观思想的视阈陷阱。视阈的层次性与薛定谔之猫的后续工作和物理学的发展表明:(1)在新的事实或经验现象面前,原有视阈需要转换;(2)在物理学领域中的问题主题从来就不是经典意义上的关于"物质运动"及其规律的学问,而是揭示、描述经验现象及其所隐含的信息(属性等)的科学。假如上帝之手是一个实在之物,没有上帝之手就没有力学,而有了上帝之手就没有物理学。     

力学原理的真理性反思——以虚功原理为例

在虚功原理的具体语境中,关于数学证明是否可能的探讨引出了力学原理的真理性地位问题。把虚功原理的发展历史看作是概念的明晰化过程,拉格朗日正是利用前人的基本概念进行了还原模型证明。但是,证明过程中仍然出现了无限小位移、平衡等模糊概念,引起普安索、雅可比等众多科学家的批判。不同的是,普安索主张采用回避模糊概念、退回纯几何问题的方法获得证明,而雅可比认为力学原理只是假定与自然一致的约定,不可能存在严格的数学证明。最后进一步深化雅可比的约定思想,无法证明的力学原理既不是必然真理,也不是偶然真理,而是一种协调真理。     

数学虚构主义与不完全性问题

数学虚构主义在当代数学哲学中是一支影响很大的反实在论。这篇文章讨论的虚构主义主要是启发性的虚构主义、算子(或元)-虚构主义、对象-虚构主义和比喻性的-虚构主义。这几种虚构主义都面临着不完全性的问题,虚构主义者对此提出了不同的回应。这篇文章在指出这些回应不成功的基础上,提出一种新的解决不完全性问题策略:释义性办法,就不完全问题,对各种形式的虚构主义提出一个统一的辩护。     

词汇系统、真理和不可通约性--库恩的"结构之后的路"

不可通约性是库恩科学哲学思想的一个核心论题，同时也招致相当多的误解和责难。库恩在《科学革命的结构》发表之后就一直致力于该论题的阐明和澄清。从视觉格式塔和语言使用过程中的意艾变化，到局部不可通约性。再到词汇系统或者分类学范畴，库恩联系知识进化与生物进化的共时性类比等问题，对于不可通约性进行深入的分析，并结合对真理符合论的批评，提出一种新的真理现。“结构之后的路”实际上就是库恩努力澄清不可通约性论题之路。     

论科学理论之还原：兼评L.贝塔朗菲的反还原论观念

科学理论是否有可能实现还原?关于这个问题的两种对立意见,即所谓“还原论”和“反还原论”的对立,实际上是古已有之的。但只有当近代科学日益走向成熟以后,这种对立和争论才明朗起来和尖锐起来。牛顿的科学纲领是明确地主张还原论的,因为它要求“从力学原理中导出其余自然现象”。但牛顿纲领所主张的还原论,只是还原论的一种特殊形态,即机械还原论。机械还原论要求对物理学、化学乃至生物学的理论作力学的还原,即还原为     

薛定谔科学哲学思想述评

埃尔温·薛定谔(Erwin Schrodinger,1887—1961)是著名的奥地利籍理论物理学家,诺贝尔奖金获得者。在本世纪物理学革命风起云涌的年代里,他创立了非相对论性波动力学,特别是薛定谔方程,成功地构造了原子力学的数学框架,“奠定了近代量子力学的基础。”但是,薛定谔还是一位哲学家,一位根本意义上的哲学家——智慧的热爱者和追求者。他崇尚理性,热爱科学,毕生致力于人类对自然和自身的理解,追求科学的统一;他瞩目于哲学认识论研究的基本课题,对人类思维过程及其规律作深刻的反思,写下了《生命是什么——活细胞的物理学观》(1944)《科学与人道主义——当代的物理学》(1951)、     

量子力学的两个研究纲领

拉卡托斯的科学研究纲领方法论认为,科学是靠不同的研究纲领竞争淘汰而发展的。这些研究纲领由指导性的“硬核”和保护性的“辅助假设”组成。本文借用“科学研究纲领”概念,在近年科学史家研究的基础上,考察爱因斯坦和玻尔不同的量子纲领及其对薛定谔波动力学和海森伯矩阵力学创立的影响。值得指出的是,早在拉卡托斯之前,爱因斯坦和玻尔就用过纲领(programme)来分析科学的发展,描述自己的科学目标和方法。爱因斯坦认为,从牛顿的“力学纲领”到麦克斯     

罗素的否定性事实思想及其转变

否定性事实问题一方面与真理符合论紧密相关,另一方面又涉及到认知主体如何理解否定的问题,因而是逻辑哲学中的一个重要问题。罗素对这个问题有两种对立的观点。在逻辑原子主义时期,罗素认为没有否定性事实就无法解释肯定性假命题和否定性真命题,因此否定性事实是存在的。在转向中立一元论后,罗素将否定联结词转换为主体的认知状态,并认为包含"不"的判断语句的真值是由认知主体在一定条件下具有的感觉所确定,因此否定性事实并不存在。当代学者巴克和杰戈对否定性事实的存在性提出了新的论证,这为批判地看待罗素在否定性事实问题上的思想转变提供了新的视角。     

Quantum Mechanics in a New Light

Although the present paper looks upon the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics as a calculus of correlations, it goes beyond a purely operationalist interpretation. Having established the consistency of the correlations with the existence of their correlata (measurement outcomes), and having justified the distinction between a domain in which outcome-indicating events occur and a domain whose properties only exist if their existence is indicated by such events, it explains the difference between the two domains as essentially the difference between the manifested world and its manifestation. A single, intrinsically undifferentiated Being manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial relations. This atemporal process implies a new kind of causality and sheds new light on the mysterious nonlocality of quantum mechanics. Unlike other realist interpretations, which proceed from an evolving-states formulation, the present interpretation proceeds from Feynman’s formulation of the theory, and it introduces a new interpretive principle, replacing the collapse postulate and the eigenvalue–eigenstate link of evolving-states formulations. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between regions of space, this principle implies that the spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world is incomplete. Applied to alternatives involving distinctions between things, it warrants the claim that, intrinsically, all fundamental particles are identical in the strong sense of numerical identical. They are the aforementioned intrinsically undifferentiated Being, which manifests the macroworld by entering into reflexive spatial relations.     

从材料力学与材料性能学的内涵看改称力学性能的问题

材料力学与材料性能学本无从属关系,但材料机械性能改称材料力学性能后,自然成了材料力学的一部分,同时又引起另一种相反的误解。这种关系相互混淆及其因果值得研讨。分析可知,仍定名“材料机械性能”有利于澄清这种概念性问题。     

Ephemeral Properties and the Illusion of Microscopic Particles

Founding our analysis on the Geneva-Brussels approach to quantum mechanics, we use conventional macroscopic objects as guiding examples to clarify the content of two important results of the beginning of twentieth century: Einstein?CPodolsky?CRosen??s reality criterion and Heisenberg??s uncertainty principle. We then use them in combination to show that our widespread belief in the existence of microscopic particles is only the result of a cognitive illusion, as microscopic particles are not particles, but are instead the ephemeral spatial and local manifestations of non-spatial and non-local entities.     

Formalism, Ontology and Methodology in Bohmian Mechanics

The relationship between mathematical formalism, physical interpretation and epistemological appraisal in the practice of physical theorizing is considered in the context of Bohmian mechanics. After laying outthe formal mathematical postulates of thetheory and recovering the historical roots ofthe present debate over the meaning of Bohmianmechanics from the early debate over themeaning of Schrödinger's wave mechanics,several contemporary interpretations of Bohmianmechanics in the literature are discussed andcritiqued with respect to the aim of causalexplanation and an alternative interpretationis proposed. Throughout, the over-arching aimis to exhibit the connections betweenmathematical, ontological and methodologicalquestions in physical theory and to reflect onthe rationality of physical theorizing in lightof the present case.     

Quantum Particles as Conceptual Entities: A Possible Explanatory Framework for Quantum Theory

We put forward a possible new interpretation and explanatory framework for quantum theory. The basic hypothesis underlying this new framework is that quantum particles are conceptual entities. More concretely, we propose that quantum particles interact with ordinary matter, nuclei, atoms, molecules, macroscopic material entities, measuring apparatuses,  in a similar way to how human concepts interact with memory structures, human minds or artificial memories. We analyze the most characteristic aspects of quantum theory, i.e. entanglement and non-locality, interference and superposition, identity and individuality in the light of this new interpretation, and we put forward a specific explanation and understanding of these aspects. The basic hypothesis of our framework gives rise in a natural way to a Heisenberg uncertainty principle which introduces an understanding of the general situation of ‘the one and the many’ in quantum physics. A specific view on macro and micro different from the common one follows from the basic hypothesis and leads to an analysis of Schrödinger’s Cat paradox and the measurement problem different from the existing ones. We reflect about the influence of this new quantum interpretation and explanatory framework on the global nature and evolutionary aspects of the world and human worldviews, and point out potential explanations for specific situations, such as the generation problem in particle physics, the confinement of quarks and the existence of dark matter.     

The Foundational Role of Ergodic Theory

The foundation of statistical mechanics and the explanation of the success of its methods rest on the fact that the theoretical values of physical quantities (phase averages) may be compared with the results of experimental measurements (infinite time averages). In the 1930s, this problem, called the ergodic problem, was dealt with by ergodic theory that tried to resolve the problem by making reference above all to considerations of a dynamic nature. In the present paper, this solution will be analyzed first, highlighting the fact that its very general nature does not duly consider the specificities of the systems of statistical mechanics. Second, Khinchin’s approach will be presented, that starting with more specific assumptions about the nature of systems, achieves an asymptotic version of the result obtained with ergodic theory. Third, the statistical meaning of Khinchin’s approach will be analyzed and a comparison between this and the point of view of ergodic theory is proposed. It will be demonstrated that the difference consists principally of two different perspectives on the ergodic problem: that of ergodic theory puts the state of equilibrium at the center, while Khinchin’s attempts to generalize the result to non-equilibrium states.     

郑玄与胡克定律——兼与仪德刚博士商榷

从材料力学的原理出发，解读和阐明郑玄的发现，证明郑玄和胡克的表述是等价的，但都有些不足，并认为郑玄具备发现弹性定律的条件，从而否定了仪德刚等人的观点。     

Quantum Mechanics and Realism

Quantum mechanics is usually presented as a challenge to scientific realism, but I will argue that the details of quantum mechanics actually support realism. I will first present some basic quantum mechanical concepts and results, including the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) experiment and Bell's theorem, and do it in a way that everyone can understand. I will then use the physics to inform the philosophy, showing that quantum mechanics provides evidence to support epistemological realism.     

Counterfactuals and Non-locality of Quantum Mechanics: The Bedford–Stapp Version of the GHZ Theorem

In the paper, the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given by Bedford and Stapp (1995), and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it appeals to the unwarranted principle of “elimination of eliminated conditions” (EEC). As an additional way of showing unreasonableness of the assumption (EEC), it is argued that yet another alleged and highly controversial proof of non-locality of QM, using the Hardy example, can be made almost trivial with the help of (EEC). Finally, a general argument is produced to the effect that the locality condition in the form accepted by Stapp and Bedford is consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions for the GHZ case under the assumption of indeterminism. This result undermines any future attempts of proving the incompatibility between the predictions of quantum theory and the idea of no faster-than-light influence in the GHZ case, quite independently of the negative assessment of the particular derivation proposed by Stapp and Bedford.     

Schwinger and the Ontology of Quantum Field Theory

An epistemological interpretation of quantum mechanics hinges on the claim that the distinctive features of quantum mechanics can be derived from some distinctive features of an observational basis. Old and new variations of this theme are listed. The program has a limited success in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The crucial issue is how far it can be extended to quantum field theory without introducing significant ontological postulates. A C*-formulation covers algebraic quantum field theory, but not the standard model. Julian Schwinger’s anabatic methodology extended a strict measurement-based formulation of quantum mechanics through field theory. His extension also excluded the quark hypothesis and the standard model. Quarks and local gauge invariance are postulates that go beyond the limits of an epistemological interpretation of quantum mechanics. The ontological significance ascribed to these advances depends on the role accorded ontology.