On the epistemological foundations of the law of the lever

In this paper I challenge Paolo Palmieri’s reading of the Mach—Vailati debate on Archimedes’ proof of the law of the lever. I argue that the actual import of the debate concerns the possible epistemic (as opposed to merely pragmatic) role of mathematical arguments in empirical physics, and that construed in this light Vailati carries the upper hand. This claim is defended by showing that Archimedes’ proof of the law of the lever is not a way of appealing to a non-empirical source of information, but a way of explicating the mathematical structure that can represent the empirical information at our disposal in the most general way.     

John Wheeler’s Desert Island: The conservatism of non-empirical physics

This paper argues that non-empirical physics, as paradigmatically embodied by string theory, is a conservative research program, in spite of appearances. John Wheeler's 1950s research program of "daring conservatism" is identified as another non-empirical research program that checks all the same boxes as string theory. This case study is used to further analyze the connection between conservatism and a non-empirical approach. It is concluded that the prime difficulty of non-empirical physics is not that it involves unbridled speculation, but that the lack of empirical input prevents it from achieving revolutionary progress.     

Crustal layering, simplicity, and the oil industry: The alteration of an epistemic paradigm by a commercial environment

This paper proposes that the gradual alteration of the predominant epistemic paradigm in crustal seismology in the interwar period—namely, simplicity—came about because of the strong influence of a particular commercial environment, i.e. the oil industry. I begin by demonstrating the interwar predominance of Jeffreys’ ‘simplicity postulate’ and his probabilistic epistemology, highlighting the espousal by several seismologists (Bullen, Stoneley, Byerly), whose crustal models drew on mathematical idealisations. Next, I demonstrate that the renunciation of simplicity in the 1930s came about too quickly, and, above all, too heterodoxically to have been the result of new geological evidence. Rather, I argue, the paradigm shift among seismologists was a result of the significant rise in seismic exploration generated by the oil industry. Driven by market demands, American petroleum companies pioneered new technologies, organised research initiatives, and trained young geophysicists who, through the fusion of experimentalism and field experience, brought about fundamental progress in earthquake seismology. Remarkably, historians of science have almost entirely failed to recognise the interwar primacy of the simplicity paradigm as well as its subsequent renunciation. More importantly, they have failed to acknowledge the role the oil industry played in contributing to this renunciation and to the development of new paradigms in seismology.     

The role of heuristic appraisal in conflicting assessments of string theory

Over the last three decades, string theory has emerged as one of the leading hopes for a consistent theory of quantum gravity that unifies particle physics with general relativity. Despite the fact that string theory has been a thriving research program for the better part of three decades, it has been subjected to extensive criticism from a number of prominent physicists. The aim of this paper is to obtain a clearer picture of where the conflict lies in competing assessments of string theory, through a close reading of the argumentative strategies employed by protagonists on both sides. Although it has become commonplace to construe this debate as stemming from different attitudes to the absence of testable predictions, we argue that this presents an overly simplified view of the controversy, which ignores the critical role of heuristic appraisal. While string theorists and their defenders see the theoretical achievements of the string theory program as providing strong indication that it is ‘on the right track’, critics have challenged such claims, by calling into question the status of certain ‘solved problems’ and its purported ‘explanatory coherence’. The debates over string theory are therefore particularly instructive from a philosophical point of view, not only because they offer important insights into the nature of heuristic appraisal and theoretical progress, but also because they raise deep questions about what constitutes a solved problem and an explanation in fundamental physics.     

A comparison of two models of scientific progress

Does science progress toward some goal or merely away from primitive beginnings? Two agent-based models are built to explain how possibly both kinds of progressive scientific change can result from the interactions of individuals exploring an epistemic landscape. These models are shown to result in qualitatively different predictions about what the resulting system of science should be like.     

Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions between sociology and epistemology

The aim of the paper is to clarify Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions. We propose to discriminate between a scientific revolution, which is a sociological event of a change of attitude of the scientific community with respect to a particular theory, and an epistemic rupture, which is a linguistic fact consisting of a discontinuity in the linguistic framework in which this theory is formulated. We propose a classification of epistemic ruptures into four types. In the paper, each of these types of epistemic ruptures is illustrated by examples from physics. The classification of epistemic ruptures can be used as a basis for a classification of scientific revolutions and thus for a refinement of our view of the progress of science.     

Generative models: Human embryonic stem cells and multiple modeling relations

Model organisms are at once scientific models and concrete living things. It is widely assumed by philosophers of science that (1) model organisms function much like other kinds of models, and (2) that insofar as their scientific role is distinctive, it is in virtue of representing a wide range of biological species and providing a basis for generalizations about those targets. This paper uses the case of human embryonic stem cells (hESC) to challenge both assumptions. I first argue that hESC can be considered model organisms, analogous to classic examples such as Escherichia coli and Drosophila melanogaster. I then discuss four contrasts between the epistemic role of hESC in practice, and the assumptions about model organisms noted above. These contrasts motivate an alternative view of model organisms as a network of systems related constructively and developmentally to one another. I conclude by relating this result to other accounts of model organisms in recent philosophy of science.     

The benefits of acquiring interactional expertise: Why (some) philosophers of science should engage scientific communities

Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for and addressing the need to do work that is socially and scientifically engaged. However, we currently lack well-developed frameworks for thinking about how we should engage other expert communities and what the epistemic benefits are of doing so. In this paper, I draw on Collins and Evans' concept of ‘interactional expertise’ – the ability to speak the language of a discipline in the absence of an ability to practice – to consider the epistemic benefits that can arise when philosophers engage scientific communities. As Collins and Evans argue, becoming an interactional expert requires that one ‘hang out’ with members of the relevant expert community in order to learn crucial tacit knowledge needed to speak the language. Building on this work, I argue that acquiring interactional expertise not only leads to linguistic fluency, but it also confers several ‘socio-epistemic’ benefits such as the opportunity to cultivate trust with scientific communities. These benefits can improve philosophical work and facilitate the broader uptake of philosophers' ideas, enabling philosophers to meet a variety of epistemic goals. As a result, having at least some philosophers of science acquire interactional expertise via engagement will likely enhance the diversity of epistemic capacities for philosophy of science as a whole. For some philosophers of science, moreover, the socio-epistemic benefits identified here may be more important than the ability to speak the language of a discipline, suggesting the need for a broader analysis of interactional expertise, which this paper also advances.     

State of the field: Are the results of science contingent or inevitable?

This paper presents a survey of the literature on the problem of contingency in science. The survey is structured around three challenges faced by current attempts at understanding the conflict between “contingentist” and “inevitabilist” interpretations of scientific knowledge and practice. First, the challenge of definition: it proves hard to define the positions that are at stake in a way that is both conceptually rigorous and does justice to the plethora of views on the issue. Second, the challenge of distinction: some features of the debate suggest that the contingency issue may not be sufficiently distinct from other philosophical debates to constitute a genuine, independent philosophical problem. And third, the challenge of decidability: it remains unclear whether and how the conflict could be settled on the basis of empirical evidence from the actual history of science. The paper argues that in order to make progress in the present debate, we need to distinguish more systematically between different expressions that claims about contingency and inevitability in science can take. To this end, it introduces a taxonomy of different contingency and inevitability claims. The taxonomy has the structure of an ordered quadruple. Each contingency and each inevitability claim contains an answer to the following four questions: (how) are alternatives to current science possible, what types of alternatives are we talking about, how should the alternatives be assessed, and how different are they from actual science?     

The epistemic value of good sense

This paper examines competing interpretations of Pierre Duhem’s theory of good sense recently defended by David Stump and Milena Ivanova and defends a hybrid reading that accommodates the intuitions of both readings. At issue between Stump and Ivanova is whether Duhemian good sense is a virtue theoretic concept. I approach the issue from the broader perspective of determining the epistemic value of good sense per se, and argue for a mitigated virtue theoretic reading that identifies an essential role for good sense in theory choice. I also show that many important issues in both philosophy of science and ‘mainstream’ value driven epistemology are illuminated by the debate over the epistemic value of good sense. In particular, philosophical work on the nature of cognitive character, rule governed rationality and the prospects of epistemic value t-monism are illuminated by virtue theoretic readings of Duhemian good sense.     

Does environmental science crowd out non-epistemic values?

While no one denies that science depends on epistemic values, many philosophers of science have wrestled with the appropriate role of non-epistemic values, such as social, ethical, and political values. Recently, philosophers of science have overwhelmingly accepted that non-epistemic values should play a legitimate role in science. The recent philosophical debate has shifted from the value-free ideal in science to questions about how science should incorporate non-epistemic values. This article engages with such questions through an exploration of the environmental sciences. These sciences are a mosaic of diverse fields characterized by interdisciplinarity, problem-orientation, policy-directedness, and ubiquitous non-epistemic values. This article addresses a frequently voiced concern about many environmental science practices: that they ‘crowd out’ or displace significant non-epistemic values by either (1) entailing some non-epistemic values, rather than others, or by (2) obscuring discussion of non-epistemic values altogether. With three detailed case studies – monetizing nature, nature-society dualism, and ecosystem health – we show that the alleged problem of crowding out emerges from active debates within the environmental sciences. In each case, critics charge that the scientific practice in question displaces non-epistemic values in at least one of the two senses distinguished above. We show that crowding out is neither necessary nor always harmful when it occurs. However, we do see these putative objections to the application of environmental science as teaching valuable lessons about what matters for successful environmental science, all things considered. Given the significant role that many environmental scientists see for non-epistemic values in their fields, we argue that these cases motivate lessons about the importance of value-flexibility (that practices can accommodate a plurality of non-epistemic values), transparency about value-based decisions that inform practice, and environmental pragmatism.     

Inevitability,contingency, and epistemic humility

This paper offers an epistemological framework for the debate about whether the results of scientific enquiry are inevitable or contingent. I argue in Sections 2 and 3 that inevitabilist stances are doubly guilty of epistemic hubris—a lack of epistemic humility—and that the real question concerns the scope and strength of our contingentism. The latter stages of the paper—Sections 4 and 5—address some epistemological and historiographical worries and sketch some examples of deep contingencies to guide further debate. I conclude by affirming that the concept of epistemic humility can usefully inform critical reflection on the contingency of the sciences and the practice of history of science.     

Packaging Radium,Selling Science: Boxes,Bottles and Other Mundane Things in the World of Science

This article discusses the intersection of science and culture in the marketplace and explores the ways in which radium quack and medicinal products were packaged and labelled in the early twentieth century US. Although there is an interesting growing body of literature by art historians on package design, historians of science and medicine have paid little to no attention to the ways scientific and medical objects that were turned into commodities were packaged and commercialized. Thinking about packages not as mere containers but as multifunctional tools adds to historical accounts of science as a sociocultural enterprise and reminds us that science has always been part of consumer culture. This paper suggests that far from being receptacles that preserve their content and facilitate their transportation, bottles and boxes that contained radium products functioned as commercial and epistemic devices. It was the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act that enforced such functions. Packages worked as commercial devices in the sense that they were used to boost sales. In addition, ‘epistemic’ points to the fact that the package is an artefact that ascribes meaning to and shapes its content while at the same time working as a device for distinguishing between patent and orthodox medicines.     

Background independence: Lessons for further decades of dispute

Background independence begins life as an informal property that a physical theory might have, often glossed as ‘doesn't posit a fixed spacetime background’. Interest in trying to offer a precise account of background independence has been sparked by the pronouncements of several theorists working on quantum gravity that background independence embodies in some sense an essential discovery of the General Theory of Relativity, and a feature we should strive to carry forward to future physical theories. This paper has two goals. The first is to investigate what a world must be like in order to be truly described by a background independent theory given extant accounts of background independence. The second is to argue that there are no non-empirical reasons to be more confident in theories that satisfy extant accounts of background independence than in theories that don't. The paper concludes by drawing a general moral about a way in which focussing primarily on mathematical formulations of our physical theories can adversely affect debates in the metaphysics of physics.     

A second look at the colors of the dinosaurs

In earlier work, I predicted that we would probably not be able to determine the colors of the dinosaurs. I lost this epistemic bet against science in dramatic fashion when scientists discovered that it is possible to draw inferences about dinosaur coloration based on the microstructure of fossil feathers (Vinther et al., 2008). This paper is an exercise in philosophical error analysis. I examine this episode with two questions in mind. First, does this case lend any support to epistemic optimism about historical science? Second, under what conditions is it rational to make predictions about what questions scientists will or will not be able answer? In reply to the first question, I argue that the recent work on the colors of the dinosaurs matters less to the debate about the epistemology of historical science than it might seem. In reply to the second question, I argue that it is difficult to specify a policy that would rule out the failed bet without also being too conservative.     

Value management and model pluralism in climate science

Non-epistemic values pervade climate modelling, as is now well documented and widely discussed in the philosophy of climate science. Recently, Parker and Winsberg have drawn attention to what can be termed “epistemic inequality”: this is the risk that climate models might more accurately represent the future climates of the geographical regions prioritised by the values of the modellers. In this paper, we promote value management as a way of overcoming epistemic inequality. We argue that value management can be seriously considered as soon as the value-free ideal and inductive risk arguments commonly used to frame the discussions of value influence in climate science are replaced by alternative social accounts of objectivity. We consider objectivity in Longino's sense as well as strong objectivity in Harding's sense to be relevant options here, because they offer concrete proposals that can guide scientific practice in evaluating and designing so-called multi-model ensembles and, in fine, improve their capacity to quantify and express uncertainty in climate projections.     

Inference to the hypothesis of extended cognition

This paper examines the justification for the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC). HEC claims that human cognitive processes can, and often do, extend outside our head to include objects in the environment. HEC has been justified by inference to the best explanation (IBE). Both advocates and critics of HEC claim that we can infer the truth value of HEC based on whether HEC makes a positive or negative explanatory contribution to cognitive science. I argue that IBE cannot play this epistemic role. A serious rival to HEC exists with a differing truth value, and this invalidates IBEs for both the truth and the falsity of HEC. Explanatory value to cognitive science is not a guide to the truth value of HEC.     

Physically locating the present: A case of reading physics as a contribution to philosophy

By means of an example, special relativity and presentism, I argue for the importance of reading history of physics as a contribution to philosophy, and for the fruitfulness of this approach to doing integrated history and philosophy of science. Within philosophy of physics, presentism is widely regarded as untenable in the light of special relativity. I argue that reading Newton's Principia as a contribution to philosophy reveals a law-constitutive approach to the unity of what there is, from which an alternative approach to presentism within physics emerges. This view respects the methodological and epistemological commitments of philosophy of physics in “taking special relativity seriously”, but proposes an alternative approach to the status of spacetime (as epistemic) and to the ground of what is real (law-constitution). While this approach to presentism does not preserve all of the contemporary presentist desiderata, it offers the possibility that the spatiotemporal extent of an existing thing is less than its entire history as represented in the block universe. I argue that the approach warrants further philosophical investigation.     

Incredulity towards Lyotard: a critique of a postmodernist account of science and knowledge

Philosophers of science have paid little attention, positive or negative, to Lyotard’s book The postmodern condition, even though it has been popular in other fields. We set out some of the reasons for this neglect. Lyotard thought that sciences could be justified by non-scientific narratives (a position he later abandoned). We show why this is unacceptable, and why many of Lyotard’s characterisations of science are either implausible or are narrowly positivist. One of Lyotard’s themes is that the nature of knowledge has changed and thereby so has society itself. However much of what Lyotard says muddles epistemological matters about the definition of ‘knowledge’ with sociological claims about how information circulates in modern society. We distinguish two kinds of legitimation of science: epistemic and socio-political. In proclaiming ‘incredulity towards metanarratives’ Lyotard has nothing to say about how epistemic and methodological principles are to be justified (legitimated). He also gives a bad argument as to why there can be no epistemic legitimation, which is based on an act/content confusion, and a confusion between making an agreement and the content of what is agreed to. As for socio-political legitimation, Lyotard’s discussion remains at the abstract level of science as a whole rather than at the level of the particular applications of sciences. Moreover his positive points can be accepted without taking on board any of his postmodernist account of science. Finally we argue that Lyotard’s account of paralogy, which is meant to provide a ‘postmodern’ style of justification, is a failure.     

Ordinary language philosophy,explanation, and the historical turn in philosophy of science

Taking a cue from remarks Thomas Kuhn makes in 1990 about the historical turn in philosophy of science, I examine the history of history and philosophy of science within parts of the British philosophical context in the 1950s and early 1960s. During this time, ordinary language philosophy's influence was at its peak. I argue that the ordinary language philosophers' methodological recommendation to analyze actual linguistic practice influences several prominent criticisms of the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation and that these criticisms relate to the historical turn in philosophy of science. To show these connections, I primarily examine the work of Stephen Toulmin, who taught at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, and Michael Scriven, who completed a dissertation on explanation under Gilbert Ryle and R.B. Braithwaite in 1956. I also consider Mary Hesse's appeal to an ordinary language-influenced account of meaning in her account of the role of models and analogies in scientific reasoning, and W.H. Watson's Wittgensteinian philosophy of science, an early influence on Toulmin. I think there are two upshots to my historical sketch. First, it fills out details of the move away from logical positivism to more historical- and practice-focused philosophies of science. Second, questions about linguistic meaning and the proper targets and aims of philosophical analysis are part and parcel of the historical turn, as well as its reception. Looking at the philosophical background during which so-called linguistic philosophers also had a hand in bringing these questions to prominence helps us understand why.