The Lost Papers of Robert Boyle

Although the volume of the surviving papers of Robert Boyle is substantial (over 20,000 leaves), a considerable amount of the written material left by Boyle at his death in 1691 has not survived in the Boyle archive. This paper gauges the scale and identity of these losses using the surviving inventories made by the Rev. Henry Miles in the 1740s when he was collecting and sorting Boyle's literary remains in conjunction with Thomas Birch's preparation of his 1744 Life and Works of Boyle. These detailed lists (edited as appendices to this paper), together with other sources, indicate losses due to a variety of reasons, some deliberate, others accidental. The losses involved the disposal of both items judged (in the eighteenth century) to be peripheral to Boyle's archive and, ironically, those in the most finished state from Boyle's hand, which were perhaps abortively destined for the Birch edition. These losses have significantly altered the character of the Boyle Papers, and thus the view of Boyle that is derived from them.     

The roots of the silver tree: Boyle,alchemy, and teleology

Though Robert Boyle called final causes one of the most important subjects for a natural philosopher to study, his own treatise on the subject, the Disquisition about Final Causes, has received comparatively little scholarly attention. In this paper, I explicate Boyle's complex argument against the use of teleological explanations for inanimate bodies, such as metals. The central object of this argument is a mysterious allusion to a silver plant. I claim that the silver plant is best understood as a reference to alchemical product: the Arbor Dianae, an offshoot of George Starkey's recipe for the Philosophers' Stone. Then, I show how the context of alchemy not only clarifies Boyle's argument but also places it within a wider dialectic about matter and teleology. I then contrast the parallel arguments of Boyle and John Ray on the question of whether metals have divine purposes and show that the difference is explained by Boyle's belief in the transmutation of metals.     

Atomism and ‘subtlety’ in Francis Bacon's philosophy

Francis Bacon's reflections on atomism have generally been misunderstood because they have never been systematically studied in relation to the speculative chemical philosophy which he developed in the interval between about 1592 and his death in 1626. This philosophy, in many respects unknown to historians until quite recently, was the only body of positive science which Bacon ever accepted. The speculative philosophy was, on the whole, chemical and non-mechanical, and consequently not consistent with atomist doctrines. In fact, Bacon never at any time accepted the principal atomist tenets. It is therefore necessary to explain why he was interested in atomism at all. Of the several reasons for his interest one (hitherto unrecognised) is especially important—namely, his belief that the speculative and atomic philosophies had affinities. In particular, he believed that of all the ancient philosophies atomism alone approached the ideals associated with the key notion of ‘subtlety’—ideals represented in their highest form (as he imagined) in the speculative philosophy.     

The rise of cryptographic metaphors in Boyle and their use for the mechanical philosophy

This paper tracks the development of Boyle's conception of the natural world in terms of the popular “book of nature” trope. Boyle initially spoke of the creatures and phenomena of nature in a spiritual and moral register, as emblems of divine purpose, but gradually shifted from this ideographic view to an alphabetical account, which at times became posed in explicitly cryptographic terms. I explain this transition toward cryptographic metaphors in terms of Boyle's social and intellectual milieu and their concordance with the reductive and conjectural character of the mechanical philosophical program.     

A word of the Empirics: the ancient concept of observation and its recovery in early modern medicine

The genealogy of observation as a philosophical term goes back to the ancient Greek astronomical and medical traditions, and the revival of the concept in the Renaissance also happened in the astronomical and medical context. This essay focuses primarily on the medical genealogy of the concept of observation. In ancient Greek culture, an elaboration of the concept of observation (tērēsis) first emerged in the Hellenistic age with the medical sect of the Empirics, to be further developed by the ancient Sceptics. Basically unknown in the Middle Ages, the Empirics' conceptualisation of tērēsis trickled back into Western medicine in the fourteenth century, but its meaning seems to have been fully recovered by European scholars only in the 1560s, concomitantly with the first Latin translation of the works of Sextus Empiricus. As a category originally associated with medical Scepticism, observatio was a new entry in early modern philosophy. Although the term gained wide currency in general scholarly usage in the seventeenth century, its assimilation into standard philosophical language was very slow. In fact, observatio does not even appear as an entry in the philosophical dictionaries until the eighteenth century--with one significant exception, the medical lexica, which featured the lemma, reporting its ancient Empiric definition, as early as 1564.     

Boyle’s teleological mechanism and the myth of immanent teleology

According to recent commentators, medieval natural philosophers endorsed immanent teleology, the view that natural agents possess immanent active powers to achieve certain ends. Moreover, some scholars have argued that Robert Boyle, despite his intentions, failed to eliminate immanent teleology from his natural philosophy. I argue in this paper that it is not at all clear that immanent teleology was widely endorsed in the medieval period. Moreover, I argue that a proper understanding of immanent teleology, and why it was rejected by mainstream medieval natural philosophers, reveals that Boyle did not fail to eliminate immanent teleology from his natural philosophy. I conclude that any attempt to describe the break between medieval and early modern natural philosophy in terms of a break with immanent teleology is likely not on target.     

‘The long-lost truth’: Sir Isaac Newton and the Newtonian pursuit of ancient knowledge

In the 1720s the antiquary and Newtonian scholar Dr. William Stukeley (1687-1765) described his friend Isaac Newton as ‘the Great Restorer of True Philosophy’. Newton himself in his posthumously published Observations upon the prophecies of Daniel, and the Apocalypse of St. John (1733) predicted that the imminent fulfilment of Scripture prophecy would see ‘a recovery and re-establishment of the long-lost truth’. In this paper I examine the background to Newton’s interest in ancient philosophy and theology, and how it related to modern natural philosophical discovery. I look at the way in which the idea of a ‘long-lost truth’ interested others within Newton’s immediate circle, and in particular how it was carried forward by Stukeley’s researches into ancient British antiquities. I show how an interest in and respect for ancient philosophical knowledge remained strong within the first half of the eighteenth century.     

Historicism and the failure of HPS

This paper suggests that the failure to integrate history and philosophy of science properly may be explained by incompatible metaphysics implied by these fields. Historians and sociologists tend to be historicists, who assume that all objects of research are variable in principle, while philosophers look for permanent and essential qualities. I analyse, how the historicists and essentialist approaches differ with regard to the research objects of general history, history of science and science itself. The implied historicism makes some radical pronouncements by Latour on ontological variance understandable. I will also consider, whether there could be something like a historicist philosophy of science. The historicisation of the natural world proves most challenging, but both certain traditional disciplines and some recent advances in physical and life sciences indicate compatibility with historicism. One should note that historicism does not alter how ‘truth’ is understood. Historicism does not question the reality of objects either; only their eternality.     

Hippocrates’ complaint and the scientific ethos in early modern England

Among the elements of the modern scientific ethos, as identified by R.K. Merton and others, is the commitment of individual effort to a long-term inquiry that may not bring substantial results in a lifetime. The challenge this presents was encapsulated in the aphorism of the ancient Greek physician, Hippocrates of Kos: vita brevis, ars longa (life is short, art is long). This article explores how this complaint was answered in the early modern period by Francis Bacon’s call for the inauguration of the sciences over several generations, thereby imagining a succession of lives added together over time. However, Bacon also explored another response to Hippocrates: the devotion of a ‘whole life’, whether brief or long, to science. The endorsement of long-term inquiry in combination with intensive lifetime involvement was embraced by some leading Fellows of the Royal Society, such as Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke. The problem for individuals, however, was to find satisfaction in science despite concerns, in some fields, that current observations and experiments would not yield material able to be extended by future investigations.     

Locke on measurement

Like many virtuosi in his day, the English philosopher John Locke maintained an active interest in metrology. Yet for Locke, this was no mere hobby: questions concerning measurement were also implicated in his ongoing philosophical project to develop an account of human understanding. This paper follows Locke's treatment of four problems of measurement from the early Drafts A and B of the Essay concerning Human Understanding to the publication of this famous book and its aftermath. It traces Locke's attempt to develop a natural or universal standard for the measure of length, his attempts to grapple with the measurement of duration, as well as the problems of determining comparative measures for secondary qualities, and the problem of discriminating small differences in the conventional measures of his day. It is argued that the salient context for Locke's treatment of these problems is the new experimental philosophy and its method of experimental natural history.     

Boyle on science and the mechanical philosophy: a reply to Chalmers

Robert Boyle thought that his scientific achievements in pneumatics and chemistry depended on, and thus provided support for, his mechanical philosophy. In a recent article in this journal, Alan Chalmers has challenged this view. This paper consists of a reply to Chalmers on two fronts. First it tries to specify precisely what ‘the mechanical philosophy’ meant for Boyle. Then it goes on to defend, against Chalmers, the view that Boyle's science does support his natural philosophy.     

What We Can Learn from a Diagram: The Case of Aristarchus's On The Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon

By using the example of a single proposition and its diagrams, this paper makes explicit a number of the processes in effect in the textual transmission of works in the exact sciences of the ancient and medieval periods. By examining the diagrams of proposition 13 as they appear in the Greek, Arabic, and Latin traditions of Aristarchus's On the Sizes and Distances of the Sun and Moon, we can see a number of ways in which medieval, and early modern, scholars interpreted their sources in an effort to understand and transmit canonical ancient texts. This study highlights the need for modern scholars to take into consideration all aspects of the medieval transmission in our efforts to understand ancient practices.     

Introduction to the special issue Hermann Weyl and the philosophy of the ‘New Physics’

This Special Issue Hermann Weyl and the Philosophy of the ‘New Physics’ has two main objectives: first, to shed fresh light on the relevance of Weyl's work for modern physics and, second, to evaluate the importance of Weyl's work and ideas for contemporary philosophy of physics. Regarding the first objective, this Special Issue emphasizes aspects of Weyl's work (e.g. his work on spinors in n dimensions) whose importance has recently been emerging in research fields across both mathematical and experimental physics, as well as in the history and philosophy of physics. Regarding the second objective, this Special Issue addresses the relevance of Weyl's ideas regarding important open problems in the philosophy of physics, such as the problem of characterizing scientific objectivity and the problem of providing a satisfactory interpretation of fundamental symmetries in gauge theories and quantum mechanics. In this Introduction, we sketch the state of the art in Weyl studies and we summarize the content of the contributions to the present volume.     

Reasons for relativism: Feyerabend on the ‘Rise of Rationalism’ in ancient Greece

This paper argues that essential features of Feyerabend's philosophy, namely his radicalization of critical rationalism and his turn to relativism, could be understood better in the light of his engagement with early Greek thought. In contrast to his earlier, Popperian views he came to see the Homeric worldview as a genuine alternative, which was not falsified by the Presocratics. Unlike socio–psychological and externalist accounts my reading of his published and unpublished material suggests that his alternative reconstruction of the ancient beginnings of the Western scientific tradition motivate and justify his moderate Protagorean relativism.     

Galileo and the problem of infinity

During the period before the Greek revolution of 1821, and especially during the years between 1750 and 1821, there were two ways in which European scientific thought was propagated in Greece. The first is traditional. It comes from ancient Greece and, through Byzantium, reaches the period before the Greek revolution. It makes known the thought of Aristotle, Democrititus, and others on ‘natural philosophy’. The second way comes from Europe. The Greek scholars of the period before the Greek revolution, and especially at the end of the eighteenth century, tried to bring to and propagate in Greece the spirit ofthe European Enlightenment, They tried to make known to the Greek people the scientific achievements of Newton, Descartes, Lavoisier, and Laplace. Scientific knowledge is an important weapon against superstition, and Greek students had to learn about science to become free persons in an independent Greek state.