Altruism through beard chromodynamics

The evolution of altruism, a behaviour that benefits others at one's own fitness expense, poses a darwinian paradox. The paradox is resolved if many interactions are with related individuals so that the benefits of altruism are reaped by copies of the altruistic gene in other individuals, a mechanism called kin selection. However, recognition of altruists could provide an alternative route towards the evolution of altruism. Arguably the simplest recognition system is a conspicuous, heritable tag, such as a green beard. Despite the fact that such genes have been reported, the 'green beard effect' has often been dismissed because it is unlikely that a single gene can code for altruism and a recognizable tag. Here we model the green beard effect and find that if recognition and altruism are always inherited together, the dynamics are highly unstable, leading to the loss of altruism. In contrast, if the effect is caused by loosely coupled separate genes, altruism is facilitated through beard chromodynamics in which many beard colours co-occur. This allows altruism to persist even in weakly structured populations and implies that the green beard effect, in the form of a fluid association of altruistic traits with a recognition tag, can be much more prevalent than hitherto assumed.     

Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism

The existence of cooperation and social order among genetically unrelated individuals is a fundamental problem in the behavioural sciences. The prevailing approaches in biology and economics view cooperation exclusively as self-interested behaviour--unrelated individuals cooperate only if they face economic rewards or sanctions rendering cooperation a self-interested choice. Whether economic incentives are perceived as just or legitimate does not matter in these theories. Fairness-based altruism is, however, a powerful source of human cooperation. Here we show experimentally that the prevailing self-interest approach has serious shortcomings because it overlooks negative effects of sanctions on human altruism. Sanctions revealing selfish or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact. These findings challenge proximate and ultimate theories of human cooperation that neglect the distinction between fair and unfair sanctions, and they are probably relevant in all domains in which voluntary compliance matters--in relations between spouses, in the education of children, in business relations and organizations as well as in markets.     

The coevolution of choosiness and cooperation

Explaining the rise and maintenance of cooperation is central to our understanding of biological systems and human societies. When an individual's cooperativeness is used by other individuals as a choice criterion, there can be competition to be more generous than others, a situation called competitive altruism. The evolution of cooperation between non-relatives can then be driven by a positive feedback between increasing levels of cooperativeness and choosiness. Here we use evolutionary simulations to show that, in a situation where individuals have the opportunity to engage in repeated pairwise interactions, the equilibrium degree of cooperativeness depends critically on the amount of behavioural variation that is being maintained in the population by processes such as mutation. Because our model does not invoke complex mechanisms such as negotiation behaviour, it can be applied to a wide range of species. The results suggest an important role of lifespan in the evolution of cooperation.     

Egalitarianism in young children

Human social interaction is strongly shaped by other-regarding preferences, that is, a concern for the welfare of others. These preferences are important for a unique aspect of human sociality-large scale cooperation with genetic strangers-but little is known about their developmental roots. Here we show that young children's other-regarding preferences assume a particular form, inequality aversion that develops strongly between the ages of 3 and 8. At age 3-4, the overwhelming majority of children behave selfishly, whereas most children at age 7-8 prefer resource allocations that remove advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. Moreover, inequality aversion is strongly shaped by parochialism, a preference for favouring the members of one's own social group. These results indicate that human egalitarianism and parochialism have deep developmental roots, and the simultaneous emergence of altruistic sharing and parochialism during childhood is intriguing in view of recent evolutionary theories which predict that the same evolutionary process jointly drives both human altruism and parochialism.     

Altruistic punishment in humans.

Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.     

交互式遗传算法中收敛性及用户评估质量的提高

交互式遗传算法（IGA）有一个明显的缺点，即用户在交互过程中，对每代的所有个体都要进行评估，当个体的数量较大，进化代数较多时，用户容易疲劳。针对这一问题本文提出了三种解决方法：第一，利用粗糙集（rough set)理论作为信息提取技术，有效地提高交互式遗传算法的收敛性，降低进化代数。第二，引进一个自主式遗传操作过程，以缓解用户在交互过程中的疲劳性。第三，利用相似距离值这个新概念提高用户对个体评估的精确度。最后在人脸图形上进行实验的结果表明，本文所提的三种方法可以有效的缓解交互式遗传算法过程中用户疲劳问题。     

利他主义人口模型与性别差异的探讨

在单性利他主义理论研究的基础上，通过引入性别比率，建立新的数学模型，得到有着性别差异的的人口公式中利他主义进化的充分条件，从而说明雌性利他主义在利他主义的进化过程中所起的作用。     

Parochial altruism in humans

Social norms and the associated altruistic behaviours are decisive for the evolution of human cooperation and the maintenance of social order, and they affect family life, politics and economic interactions. However, as altruistic norm compliance and norm enforcement often emerge in the context of inter-group conflicts, they are likely to be shaped by parochialism--a preference for favouring the members of one's ethnic, racial or language group. We have conducted punishment experiments, which allow 'impartial' observers to punish norm violators, with indigenous groups in Papua New Guinea. Here we show that these experiments confirm the prediction of parochialism. We found that punishers protect ingroup victims--who suffer from a norm violation--much more than they do outgroup victims, regardless of the norm violator's group affiliation. Norm violators also expect that punishers will be lenient if the latter belong to their social group. As a consequence, norm violations occur more often if the punisher and the norm violator belong to the same group. Our results are puzzling for evolutionary multi-level selection theories based on selective group extinction as well as for theories of individual selection; they also indicate the need to explicitly examine the interactions between individuals stemming from different groups in evolutionary models.     

Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations

To explain the evolution of cooperation by natural selection has been a major goal of biologists since Darwin. Cooperators help others at a cost to themselves, while defectors receive the benefits of altruism without providing any help in return. The standard game dynamical formulation is the 'Prisoner's Dilemma', in which two players have a choice between cooperation and defection. In the repeated game, cooperators using direct reciprocity cannot be exploited by defectors, but it is unclear how such cooperators can arise in the first place. In general, defectors are stable against invasion by cooperators. This understanding is based on traditional concepts of evolutionary stability and dynamics in infinite populations. Here we study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. We show that a single cooperator using a strategy like 'tit-for-tat' can invade a population of defectors with a probability that corresponds to a net selective advantage. We specify the conditions required for natural selection to favour the emergence of cooperation and define evolutionary stability in finite populations.     

Aggression by polyembryonic wasp soldiers correlates with kinship but not resource competition

Kin selection theory predicts that individuals will show less aggression and more altruism towards relatives. However, recent theoretical developments suggest that with limited dispersal, competition between relatives can override the effects of relatedness. The predicted and opposing influences of relatedness and competition are difficult to approach experimentally because conditions that increase average relatedness among individuals also tend to increase competition. Polyembryonic wasps in the family Encyrtidae are parasites whose eggs undergo clonal division to produce large broods. These insects have also evolved a caste system: some embryos in a clone develop into reproductive larvae that mature into adults, whereas others develop into sterile soldier larvae that defend siblings from competitors. In a brood from a single egg, reproductive altruism by soldiers reflects clone-level allocation to defence at the cost of reproduction, with no conflict between individuals. When multiple eggs are laid into a host, inter-clone conflicts of interest arise. Here we report that soldier aggression in Copidosoma floridanum is inversely related to the genetic relatedness of competitors but shows no correlation with the level of resource competition.     

群智演化协同计算的研究进展与趋势

群体智能是通过聚集群体智慧协同求解大规模复杂问题的智能方法,其思想最初源于对自然界中社会性生物群体智能行为的模拟。群体生物通过分工合作、相互协调、协同演化,可涌现出整体性的智能行为,完成复杂任务,具有高度的自组织、自适应、自学习能力。受此启发,国内外学者运用数学和计算机工具对群体智能行为进行模拟,从不同角度发展了一系列群体智能涌现与演化的机理和模型。近年来,随着互联网的发展,人类社会基于物联网的群智协同和演化现象进一步拓宽了群智演化计算的范畴,呈现出广阔的应用前景,也对群智演化的理论模型和应用提出了新挑战。2017年,《新一代人工智能发展规划》明确将群体智能列为需重点发展的人工智能理论与技术方向之一。文章将从生物群体、智能体群体和人类社会群体等不同视角,从群智演化协作的模型和机理、群智演化协作的组织结构、群智演化协同决策及群智演化协同计算的应用等角度,总结群智演化计算的主要研究问题,对国内外的最新研究进展进行综述和对比分析,并对该方向未来的发展趋势和主要科学问题进行展望。     

Testing Hamilton's rule with competition between relatives

Hamilton's theory of kin selection suggests that individuals should show less aggression, and more altruism, towards closer kin. Recent theoretical work has, however, suggested that competition between relatives can counteract kin selection for altruism. Unfortunately, factors that tend to increase the average relatedness of interacting individuals--such as limited dispersal--also tend to increase the amount of competition between relatives. Therefore, in most natural systems, the conflicting influences of increased competition and increased relatedness are confounded, limiting attempts to test theory. Fig wasp taxa exhibit varying levels of aggression among non-dispersing males that show a range of average relatedness levels. Thus, across species, the effects of relatedness and competition between relatives can be separated. Here we report that--contrary to Hamilton's original prediction but in agreement with recent theory--the level of fighting between males shows no correlation with the estimated relatedness of interacting males, but is negatively correlated with future mating opportunities.     

Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish mutualism

Humans are highly social animals and often help unrelated individuals that may never reciprocate the altruist's favour. This apparent evolutionary puzzle may be explained by the altruist's gain in social image: image-scoring bystanders, also known as eavesdroppers, notice the altruistic act and therefore are more likely to help the altruist in the future. Such complex indirect reciprocity based on altruistic acts may evolve only after simple indirect reciprocity has been established, which requires two steps. First, image scoring evolves when bystanders gain personal benefits from information gathered, for example, by finding cooperative partners. Second, altruistic behaviour in the presence of such bystanders may evolve if altruists benefit from access to the bystanders. Here, we provide experimental evidence for both of the requirements in a cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus. These cleaners may cooperate and remove ectoparasites from clients or they may cheat by feeding on client mucus. As mucus may be preferred over typical client ectoparasites, clients must make cleaners feed against their preference to obtain a cooperative service. We found that eavesdropping clients spent more time next to 'cooperative' than 'unknown cooperative level' cleaners, which shows that clients engage in image-scoring behaviour. Furthermore, trained cleaners learned to feed more cooperatively when in an 'image-scoring' than in a 'non-image-scoring' situation.     

道德心理学的基本理论问题

道德由道德认知、道德情感和道德行为三个成分组成。道德心理学领域主要有四种理论,即精神分析理论、社会学习理论、认知发展理论和进化心理学理论。这些理论对道德心理学的一些基本理论问题的观点不同。这些问题包括:什么是道德,道德具有怎样的结构,环境因素和个体特点对道德的产生和发展具有怎样的影响,道德发展具有连续性还是阶段性,道德认知和道德行为具有何种联系。     

论身体羞感的价值体系

羞感是人类特有的情感现象,是人的本质属性之一。羞感的生物学价值、道德价值、美学价值和社会价值是个体及其个体价值的一种自我保护感,它可以有效地阻止无爱的性行为,抑制性本能的冲动,是造就高贵而且可能的人的类型的重要辅助力。     

Host-parasite 'Red Queen' dynamics archived in pond sediment

Antagonistic interactions between hosts and parasites are a key structuring force in natural populations, driving coevolution. However, direct empirical evidence of long-term host-parasite coevolution, in particular 'Red Queen' dynamics--in which antagonistic biotic interactions such as host-parasite interactions can lead to reciprocal evolutionary dynamics--is rare, and current data, although consistent with theories of antagonistic coevolution, do not reveal the temporal dynamics of the process. Dormant stages of both the water flea Daphnia and its microparasites are conserved in lake sediments, providing an archive of past gene pools. Here we use this fact to reconstruct rapid coevolutionary dynamics in a natural setting and show that the parasite rapidly adapts to its host over a period of only a few years. A coevolutionary model based on negative frequency-dependent selection, and designed to mimic essential aspects of our host-parasite system, corroborated these experimental results. In line with the idea of continuing host-parasite coevolution, temporal variation in parasite infectivity changed little over time. In contrast, from the moment the parasite was first found in the sediments, we observed a steady increase in virulence over time, associated with higher fitness of the parasite.     

某大桥引桥承载能力分析

某大桥的引桥经过多年的运营出现了一些病害,为摸清该桥的承载能力以及使用性能,基于通用有限元程序软件进行理论计算,同时根据理论计算结果作为控制内力进行现场检测试验,试验结果表明该桥引桥部分使用性能较好,承载能力满足有关规范的要求。     

Social evolution: kin preference in a social microbe

Kin recognition helps cooperation to evolve in many animals, but it is uncertain whether microorganisms can also use it to focus altruistic behaviour on relatives. Here we show that the social amoeba Dictyostelium purpureum prefers to form groups with its own kin in situations where some individuals die to assist others. By directing altruism towards kin, D. purpureum should generally avoid the costs of chimaerism experienced by the related D. discoideum.     

论王国维之“古雅”

不同于中国传统古典文论的概念，王国维的“古雅”以西方美学范畴为基础。在《古雅之在关学上之位置》一文中，王国维区别了“第一形式”和“第二形式”。其“古雅”概念主要是指“第二形式”，是对美的对象的表现形式，是双重形式，也就是“形式之美之形式之美”，并在此基础上指出“古雅”和“优美”、“崇高”的互补性。对“古雅”的判断是经验的、后天的，个人和时代的不同也同样制约着对“古雅”的判定。而这种判定同时又需要一种“修养力”。