无律则一元论再思考——关于心身殊型同一论与心身随附性的一个新看法

在《心理事件》一文中,戴维森提出了一种关于心-身问题的非还原物理主义观点——无律则一元论.无律则一元论认为心身之间是殊型同一关系,并且不存在严格的心理-物理规律.随后,戴维森引入随附性来进一步解释心身殊型同一论.金在权对此表示怀疑.我们将论证,首先戴维森这个做法可以避开金在权的质疑；其次,即使可以避开金在权的质疑,心身随附性仍需要进一步说明；最后,即使心身随附性有问题,心身殊型同一论仍有可能继续坚持下去.     

强、弱随附性概念探析

随附性是个意蕴丰富的哲学概念,金在权依据不同的模态强度区分了强随附性和弱随附性。但是,金在权对随附性的双条件句描述犯有错误,而且他的必然性没有一致地给出弱随附性和强随附性的跨世界解释。区分强、弱随附性的关键是认识随附性的依赖与决定关系的不对称性,从这一角度可以对强、弱随附性中出现的"必然"给出合理说明,也能够以此修正强、弱随附性的划分。     

审美随附性：挑战与回应

审美随附性概念最好地解释了审美属性对于非审美属性的依赖关系。审美随附性不仅可以为我们的审美判断和活动提供形而上学的本体论依据，还可以为我们决定审美判断正确与否提供客观的认识论依据。然而，审美随附性概念也面临着一系列的挑战，主要有关于审美判断成立条件的语境挑战、基础属性范围界定的滑坡论证的挑战和艺术作品原创性的挑战，这些挑战有可能动摇审美判断的客观基础。我们可以通过扩大随附性的基础属性的范围，诉诸审美属性和非审美属性的“共同可感知性”或“共同可分辨性”以及对形而上学和认识论问题的区分来回应上述挑战，捍卫审美随附性概念和审美判断的客观基础。     

论金在权的条件还原主义及其理论困境——基于因果排斥性问题的讨论

金在权首先提出用以支撑因果排斥性问题的随附性论证。该论证揭露了非还原物理主义蕴含的内在矛盾。同时,金在权论证认为,条件还原主义可以成为融洽解决因果排斥性问题的还原物理主义形式。然而,作为具备极为弱化的物理主义立场的条件还原主义而言,它能否……自洽地解决因果排斥性问题依然值得讨论,因为用以支撑因果排斥性问题的随附性论证本身蕴含着强物理主义立场。     

论金在权的条件还原主义及其理论困境——基于因果排斥性问题的讨论

金在权首先提出用以支撑因果排斥性问题的随附性论证。该论证揭露了非还原物理主义蕴含的内在矛盾。同时,金在权论证认为,条件还原主义可以成为融洽解决因果排斥性问题的还原物理主义形式。然而,作为具备极为弱化的物理主义立场的条件还原主义而言,它能否……自洽地解决因果排斥性问题依然值得讨论,因为用以支撑因果排斥性问题的随附性论证本身蕴含着强物理主义立场。     

心灵何以具有自然因果性——以戴维森为例对自然化理论的探究

本文通过具体分析戴维森解决"心理因果性问题"的方案以及金在权等人对他的批评,指出了后者对戴维森的一些误解。我们将说明,戴维森的"无律则一元论"实际上并不会面对金在权"排除论证"的直接冲击。就此而言,把戴维森称为"非还原"的物理主义者,这种做法其实并不恰当。从基本的思想倾向上来看,戴维森的自然主义思想比物理主义更为宽泛,其精神更接近于麦克道威尔以及斯特劳森等人的自然观。概略地说,这类自然观的核心就在于,他们既希望将人类理性(或"理性空间")纳入到一个统一的自然图景之中,又想要确保心灵相对于物理世界的独立性和意义。     

反事实不蕴含下向因果性（英文）

自从金在权用随附论证向非还原物理主义提出挑战以来,后者不竭余力地想要解决排斥问题。在他们当中,反事实的自治方案找到了一条出路,即通过消除下向因果来解决排斥问题。然而,钟磊提出,结合随附性原则和反事实的因果理论就会导致下向因果。在本文中,我将通过对随附和反事实因果的概念分析说明,根据大卫·刘易斯的因果定义,如果钟磊想要证明他的结论,他需要更多的步骤。接着,我将证明这种新版本的论证无法实现钟磊的目标,因而,不能被视作有效的。     

还原模型与功能主义——兼评金在权的还原的物理主义

首先对内格尔的经典还原模型和金在权的功能还原模型做了比较,并指出,内格尔模型是在认识论或方法论的层面提出的,而金在权模型是在实践论或本体论的层面提出的;因此,这两个还原模型不是对立的,而是互补的。接着深入到个别事件的内部结构,对金在权的局部还原理论做出分析和评价,并指出其困境和出路。在金在权的三元有序组的事件结构的基础上提出四元有序组的事件结构,据此对功能意义和功能结构作出区分,进一步揭示了功能整体与其实现者之间的随附性关系。最后强调功能实在论的本体论立场,并借助实体-偶性和原因-结果这两对先验范畴对功能实在论和随附性概念给以形而上学的说明和辩护。     

从塔尔斯基式符合论到不可定义论——戴维森真理论的心路历程

戴维森的真理论经历了一个从"塔尔斯基式符合论"最终到"不可定义论"的心路历程.早期他反对传统的事实符合论,赞同塔尔斯基的满足符合论,后来转向一种融贯式符合论;受罗蒂的批评,戴维森呈现出一种"客观性实用论"的真理观;最后戴维森以对霍维奇的冗余论的批判为例,认为任何人都没有也不可能提出一个一般性的真之定义,主张"真之不可定义"的思想.通过这一历程,戴维森表明了真之概念的有用性、客观性、实践性和基始性特点,从而为其真之语义论立场提供了有力的理论论证.     

试论研究戴维森真之理论的一个新视角——以柯卡姆区分研究真的三种计划为出发点

戴维森的真之理论一直是学界关注的主题之一。但由于其真值条件语义理论的重大影响,他的真之理论往往被当作其意义理论的工具。事实上,这种理解有失偏颇。柯卡姆提出的关于研究真的三种计划的区分,即形而上学的计划、辩护计划和言谈-行动计划,有助于我们从一个全新的视角理解戴维森的真之理论。这种视角不但能帮助我们避免研究戴维森的真之理论可能造成的混乱,突出其真之理论的整体性,还能帮助我们理解真在戴维森整个理论体系中的核心地位。     

论生物自然主义对因果排斥性问题的消解

在当代物理主义背景之下,作为具有时代特征的心理因果性问题——因果排斥性问题成为当前流行的各类非还原物理主义理论必须面对的重要挑战。约翰.塞尔提出的生物自然主义为解决因果排斥性问题提供了出路:他反对传统的观念二元论,避免二元论同物理主义对心-物概念的绝对区分,在坚持对心理状态的自然化解释的前提下,对非还原物理主义所容纳的五个基本原则进行了重新阐释,从而消解了二元论同物理主义矛盾下蕴含的因果排斥性问题。     

Reduction and Understanding

Reductionism, in the sense of the doctrine that theories on different levels of reality should exhibit strict and general relations of deducibility, faces well-known difficulties. Nevertheless, the idea that deeper layers of reality are responsible for what happens at higher levels is well-entrenched in scientific practice. We argue that the intuition behind this idea is adequately captured by the notion of supervenience: the physical state of the fundamental physical layers fixes the states of the higher levels. Supervenience is weaker than traditional reductionism, but it is not a metaphysical doctrine: one can empirically support the existence of a supervenience relation by exhibiting concrete relations between the levels. Much actual scientific research is directed towards finding such inter-level relations. It seems to be quite generally held that the importance of such relations between different levels is that they are explanatory and give understanding: deeper levels provide deeper understanding, and this justifies the search for ever deeper levels. We shall argue, however, that although achieving understanding is an important aim of science, its correct analysis is not in terms of relations between higher and lower levels. Connections with deeper layers of reality do not generally provide for deeper understanding. Accordingly, the motivation for seeking deeper levels of reality does not come from the desire to find deeper understanding of phenomena, but should be seen as a consequence of the goal to formulate ever better, in the sense of more accurate and more-encompassing, empirical theories. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

随附性/排除论证的限度

金在权基于随附性/排除论证排除了自主的心理性质。对随附性/排除论证的3种批评意见——该论证存在不自洽性、否定心理性质的因果效力是不合理的、该论证的普遍化将导致一切宏观性质失去因果效力——或者曲解了金在权的本意,或者超出了物理主义的框架,从而超出了论证的前提。随附性/排除论证能够在物理主义内部形成对自主心理性质的消解,但不能形成对突现论的反驳。     

Participating in the Meaning of Life, a Contributor’s Critique

The aim of this contribution is to critically examine the metaphysical presuppositions that prevail in (Stewart in Found Sci 15(4):395–409, 2010a) answer to the question “are we in the midst of a developmental process?” as expressed in his statement “that humanity has discovered the trajectory of past evolution and can see how it is likely to continue in the future”.     

形而上的“价值”与形而下的“用法”——索绪尔与后期维特根斯坦意义理论比较研究

在西方哲学的语言转向中,索绪尔和维特根斯坦在语言哲学领域中分别作出了不同贡献。在意义理论中,两者既有相同之处,也有相异之处。相同之处在于二者都提出了对命名论的批判、都恪守整体主义的意义观,相异之处在于二者对于判定意义的标准不同,索绪尔提出了形而上的"价值"决定论,维特根斯坦提出了形而下的"用法"决定论,而二者意义观的不同是他们语言观差异的体现。     

Leibniz and Newton on Space

This paper reexamines the historical debate between Leibniz and Newton on the nature of space. According to the traditional reading, Leibniz (in his correspondence with Clarke) produced metaphysical arguments (relying on the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles) in favor of a relational account of space. Newton, according to the traditional account, refuted the metaphysical arguments with the help of an empirical argument based on the bucket experiment. The paper claims that Leibniz’s and Newton’s arguments cannot be understood apart from the distinct dialectics of their respective positions vis-à-vis Descartes’ theory of space and physics. Against the traditional reading, the paper argues that Leibniz and Newton are operating within a different metaphysics and different conceptions of “place,” and that their respective arguments can largely remain intact without undermining the other philosopher’s conception of space. The paper also takes up the task of clarifying the distinction between true and absolute motion, and of explaining the relativity of motion implied by Leibniz’s account. The paper finally argues that the two philosophers have different conceptions of the relation between metaphysics and science, and that Leibniz’s attempt to base physical theory on an underlying metaphysical account of forces renders his account of physics unstable.     

强纲领对逻辑合理性的误批判

“强纲领”是埃丁堡科学知识社会学学派提出的研究知识社会成因的社会学形而上学理论。巴里.巴恩斯和大卫.布鲁尔是这个学派的理论家。他们把自己的纲领定位在“相对主义知识观”上,其批判的矛头直指科学哲学研究中的理性主义。他们的一个重要观点是,反对逻辑的合理性是人类理性活动的普遍合理性的标准。然而,他们的论证是有问题的。     

数学、物理学及形而上学的分立与统一——莱布尼茨实体学说剖析

数学、物理学与形而上学原则是研究莱布尼茨实体学说的三种理论视角与思维层级。莱布尼茨承认数学意义的广延、必然性分析有其合理意义,但认为单纯的广延是不实在的复合物;他承认笛卡尔、牛顿物理学意义的绝对运动及运动量守恒有助于解释机械论,但认为运动是不实在的,是力的派生状态。他承认古希腊、经院哲学的形式对于终极因的意义,但形式不能用于解释具体的运动。数学、物理学与形而上学原则统一于莱布尼茨神秘理性主义之中。     

从心-身问题看功能主义的困境

主流功能主义在心-身问题上试图保留物理主义的基本立场,但又反对把心理状态还原为物理状态。这种非还原的物理主义是以“多重实现”为事实根据的。金在权提出功能还原模型,并通过局部还原将多重实现化解为一重实现,进而转向还原的物理主义。然而,金在权的功能还原理论对于心灵哲学最为重要的研究对象即意识却是无能为力的。     

Digestive Enzyme Secretion, Intuition, and the History of Science: Part II

A companion paper explored the role of intuition in the genesis of an alternative theory for the secretion of pancreatic digestive enzymes, looking through the lens of three philosophers/historians of science. Gerald Holton, the last scholar, proposed that scientific imagination is shaped by a number of thematic presuppositions, which function largely below awareness. They come in pairs of opposites that alternately gain cultural preeminence. The current paper examines three thematic presuppositions inherent to both the generally accepted model for digestive enzyme secretion and most consciousness-centered views of higher-level cognition—discreteness, reduction, and simplicity. Since they often build on each other, together they are referred to as the simplicity worldview. Also considered are the three opposite thematic assumptions inherent to both the alternative model for digestive enzyme secretion and intuition-friendly views of higher-level cognition—the continuum, holism, and complexity—together referred to as the complexity worldview. The article highlights the potential importance to scientific knowledge of this currently less favored worldview.