Locating the ‘culture wars’ in laboratory animal research: national constitutions and global competition

The increasingly global scope of biomedical research and testing using animals is generating disagreement over the best way to regulate laboratory animal science and care. Despite many common aims, the practices through which political and epistemic authority are allocated in the regulations around animal research varies internationally, coming together in what can be identified as different national constitutions. Tensions between these periodically erupt within the laboratory animal research community as a ‘cultural war’ between those favouring centralised control and those advocating local flexibility. Drawing on long-term engagement with key events and actors in these policy debates, I propose these national differences in the constitution of animal research can be understood through the intersection of two key variables: i) the location of institutional responsibility to permit research projects and ii) the distribution of epistemic authority to shape research practices. These variables are used to explain the development of different policy frameworks in the UK, Europe, and the USA, and identify where there is convergence and divergence in practice. Concluding, I suggest the way these approaches are combined and enacted in different countries reflects different national civic epistemologies, which are coming into conflict in the increasingly global networks of laboratory animal science.     

The benefits of acquiring interactional expertise: Why (some) philosophers of science should engage scientific communities

Philosophers of science are increasingly arguing for and addressing the need to do work that is socially and scientifically engaged. However, we currently lack well-developed frameworks for thinking about how we should engage other expert communities and what the epistemic benefits are of doing so. In this paper, I draw on Collins and Evans' concept of ‘interactional expertise’ – the ability to speak the language of a discipline in the absence of an ability to practice – to consider the epistemic benefits that can arise when philosophers engage scientific communities. As Collins and Evans argue, becoming an interactional expert requires that one ‘hang out’ with members of the relevant expert community in order to learn crucial tacit knowledge needed to speak the language. Building on this work, I argue that acquiring interactional expertise not only leads to linguistic fluency, but it also confers several ‘socio-epistemic’ benefits such as the opportunity to cultivate trust with scientific communities. These benefits can improve philosophical work and facilitate the broader uptake of philosophers' ideas, enabling philosophers to meet a variety of epistemic goals. As a result, having at least some philosophers of science acquire interactional expertise via engagement will likely enhance the diversity of epistemic capacities for philosophy of science as a whole. For some philosophers of science, moreover, the socio-epistemic benefits identified here may be more important than the ability to speak the language of a discipline, suggesting the need for a broader analysis of interactional expertise, which this paper also advances.     

English engineer John Smeaton's experimental method(s): Optimisation,hypothesis testing and exploratory experimentation

In this paper I provide a detailed account of eighteenth-century engineer John Smeaton's experimental methods, with the aim of bringing our understanding of his work into line with recent research in the history and philosophy of science. Starting from his use of the technique of parameter variation, I identify three distinct methodological aims in the research he carried out on waterwheels, windmills and hydraulic mortars. These aims are: optimisation, hypothesis testing and maxim generation. The main claim of this paper is that Smeaton did more than merely improve engineering methods by systematising earlier artisanal approaches, which is the classic view of Smeaton's method developed by historians of technology in the 1990s. I argue instead that his approach bridged the divide between science and technology, by integrating both hypothesis testing and exploratory experimentation. This is borne out, in particular, by the way that Smeaton emphasised the exploratory side of the work he published in the Philosophical Transactions, in contrast to his account of the construction of the Eddystone lighthouse, which was aimed at a broader, non-specialist public. I contribute to recent research on exploratory experimentation by showing – in line with other work on this topic – that exploratory experimentation is not incompatible with hypothesis testing. This new perspective on Smeaton's method will hopefully lead to further research and new insights into the relation between science and technology at the start of the Industrial Revolution.     

Animal culture: But of which kind?

Is animal culture a real entity or is it rather just in the eye of the beholder? The concept of culture began to be increasingly used in the context of animal behaviour research around the 1960s. Despite its success, it is not clear that it represents what philosophers have traditionally thought to be a natural kind. In this article I will show, however, how conceiving of animal culture in this fashion has played a role in the “culture wars”, and what lessons we can draw from this. First, an analysis of the epistemological landscape of author keywords related to the concept of animal cultures is presented, thus vindicating the centrality of the concept in describing a broad range of findings. A minimal definition that encompasses the multiple strands of research incorporating the notion of culture is proposed. I then systematically enumerate the ways in which culture thus conceived cannot be considered a natural kind in the study of animal behaviour. This is accomplished by reviewing the efforts and possibilities of anchoring the elusive idea in specific mechanisms, homologies, selection pressures, homeostatic property clusters, or alternatively, its reduction or elimination. Finally, a plausible interpretation of the scientific status of the animal culture concept is suggested that is compatible with both its well established use in animal behaviour research and its inferential limitations. Culture plays the role of a well-established epistemic kind, a node that connects different areas of research on common themes.     

Scientific heritage: Reflections on its nature and new approaches to preservation,study and access

Scientific heritage can be found in every teaching and research institution, large or small, from universities to museums, from hospitals to secondary schools, from scientific societies to research laboratories. It is generally dispersed and vulnerable. Typically, these institutions lack the awareness, internal procedures, policies, or qualified staff to provide for its selection, preservation, and accessibility. Moreover, legislation that protects cultural heritage does not generally apply to the heritage of science. In this paper we analyse the main problems that make scientific heritage preservation so difficult to address. We discuss the concept and present existing preservation tools, including recent surveys, legislation, policies, and innovative institutional approaches. We briefly analyse two recent initiatives for the preservation of scientific heritage, at the Universities of Lisbon and Cambridge.     

Scientists as experts: A distinct role?

The role of scientists as experts is crucial to public policymaking. However, the expert role is contested and unsettled in both public and scholarly discourse. In this paper, I provide a systematic account of the role of scientists as experts in policymaking by examining whether there are any normatively relevant differences between this role and the role of scientists as researchers. Two different interpretations can be given of how the two roles relate to each other. The separability view states that there is a normatively relevant difference between the two roles, whereas the inseparability view denies that there is such a difference. Based on a systematic analysis of the central aspects of the role of scientists as experts – that is, its aim, context, mode of output, and standards, I propose a moderate version of the separability view. Whereas the aim of scientific research is typically to produce new knowledge through the use of scientific method for evaluation and dissemination in internal settings, the aim of the expert is to provide policymakers and the public with relevant and applicable knowledge that can premise political reasoning and deliberation.     

Existential risk,creativity & well-adapted science

Existential risks, particularly those arising from emerging technologies, are a complex, obstinate challenge for scientific study. This should motivate studying how the relevant scientific communities might be made more amenable to studying such risks. I offer an account of scientific creativity suitable for thinking about scientific communities, and provide reasons for thinking contemporary science doesn't incentivise creativity in this specified sense. I'll argue that a successful science of existential risk will be creative in my sense. So, if we want to make progress on those questions we should consider how to shift scientific incentives to encourage creativity. The analysis also has lessons for philosophical approaches to understanding the social structure of science. I introduce the notion of a ‘well-adapted’ science: one in which the incentive structure is tailored to the epistemic situation at hand.     

Animal experiments, vital forces and courtrooms: Mateu Orfila, François Magendie and the study of poisons in nineteenth-century France

The paper follows the lives of Mateu Orfila and Fran?ois Magendie in early nineteenth-century Paris, focusing on their common interest in poisons. The first part deals with the striking similarities of their early careers: their medical training, their popular private lectures, and their first publications. The next section explores their experimental work on poisons by analyzing their views on physical and vital forces in living organisms and their ideas about the significance of animal experiments in medicine. The last part describes their contrasting research on the absorption of poisons and the divergences in their approaches, methods, aims, standards of proof, and intended audiences. The analysis highlights the connections between nineteenth-century courtrooms and experimental laboratories, and shows how forensic practice not only prompted animal experimentation but also provided a substantial body of information and new research methods for dealing with major theoretical issues like the absorption of poisons.     

Edge cases in animal research law: Constituting the regulatory borderlands of the UK's Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act

This paper explores how the boundaries of the UK's Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (A(SP)A) are constituted, as illustrative of the rising importance of legal procedures around animal research and how these are continuously being challenged and questioned. Drawing on empirical work in animal research communities, we consider how it is decided whether activities are undertaken for an “experimental or other scientific purpose”. We do this by focusing on “edge cases”, where debates occur about whether to include an activity within A(SP)A's remit. We demonstrate that the boundaries of animal research regulation in the UK are products of past and present decisions, dependencies, and social relationships. Boundaries are therefore not clear-cut and fixed, but rather flexible and changing borderlands. We particularly highlight the roles of: historical precedent; the management of risk, workload, and cost; institutional and professional identities; and research design in constituting A(SP)A's edges. In doing so, we demonstrate the importance of paying attention to how, in practice, animal law requires a careful balance between adhering to legal paragraphs and allowing for discretion. This in turn has real-world implications for what and how science is done, who does it, and how animals are used in its service.     

Reflections on the preservation of recent scientific heritage in dispersed university collections

The bulk of the significant recent scientific heritage of universities is not to be found in accredited science museums or collections employed in research. Rather it is located in a wide variety of more informal collections, assemblages and accumulations. The selection and documentation of such materials is very often unsystematic and many of them are vulnerable to changes of staff, relocation and, above all, shortage of space. Following a survey of views on the values of the recent material heritage of the sciences, I consider the many advantages—for teaching, engagement with wider communities, enhancement of institutional identity and work experience, celebration of scientific achievements, study of the recent history of the practices and fruits of the sciences, etc.—of “multi-site museums” formed through the coordination of such varied and scattered collections. I go on to reflect on ways in which the preservation and display of scientific heritage in dispersed collections may be enhanced and protected through institutional recognition and through provision of guidance and assistance in selection, documentation and digitisation, preservation and conservation, and display. The importance of adequate documentation of the contexts of production and use of objects is stressed, as are the benefits that can result from involvement of student “taskforces” and heritage-concerned scientists.     

Styles of reasoning: A pluralist view

Styles of reasoning are important devices to understand scientific practice. As I use the concept, a style of reasoning is a pattern of inferential relations that are used to select, interpret, and support evidence for scientific results. In this paper, I defend the view that there is a plurality of styles of reasoning: different domains of science often invoke different styles. I argue that this plurality is an important source of disunity in scientific practice, and it provides additional arguments in support of the disunity claim. I also contrast Ian Hacking’s broad characterization of styles of reasoning with a narrow understanding that I favor. Drawing on examples from molecular biology, chemistry and mathematics, I argue that differences in style of reasoning lead to differences in the way the relevant results are obtained and interpreted. The result is a pluralist view about styles of reasoning that is sensitive to nuances of inferential relations in scientific activity.     

Bias and values in scientific research

When interests and preferences of researchers or their sponsors cause bias in experimental design, data interpretation or dissemination of research results, we normally think of it as an epistemic shortcoming. But as a result of the debate on science and values, the idea that all ‘extra-scientific’ influences on research could be singled out and separated from pure science is now widely believed to be an illusion. I argue that nonetheless, there are cases in which research is rightfully regarded as epistemologically deficient due to the influence of preferences on its outcomes. I present examples from biomedical research and offer an analysis in terms of social epistemology.     

Experimentation in the cosmic laboratory

It might seem impossible to apply Ian Hacking's experimental argument for scientific realism to astrophysical objects; indeed Hacking himself expressed scepticism about extragalactic entities. Such astrophysical antirealism has been the subject of intense debate and is usually seen as an undesired consequence of experimental realism. In this paper, I claim that it is possible to recast the experimental argument by reference to James Woodward's non-anthropocentric account of experimentation so as to apply it to astrophysical entities, such as gravitational lenses. I also argue that this new formulation of the experimental argument solves several problems with Hacking's original version.     

生物医学研究热点及意义

生物医学研究是目前发展最快、令人振奋的科技领域。本文概述了生物医学的发展趋势，并对生物医学前沿领域的研究热点，如基因组、蛋白质组、细胞信号转导机制、干细胞研究、神经科学研究、生物信息学等进行了分析。对生物技术领域的研究热点，如生物芯片技术、高效基因转移系统技术、组织工程技术和干细胞定向分化技术、基因敲除和敲入技术、克隆技术等进行了综述。提出研究中应该注意针对研究热点选题，注意多学科交叉和集团作战，同时注意知识产权保护。     

Cardiovascular development: towards biomedical applicability

Research in animal models established that tinman, a key gene in Drosophila dorsal vessel development, is an orthologue of Nkx2-5, a key gene in vertebrate cardiac development. Similarities between the arthropod dorsal vessel and vertebrate hearts are interpreted in light of concepts such as homology or convergence. We discuss this controversy in the context of the evolution of animal circulatory pumps and propose the distinction between peristaltic and chambered pumps as a fundamental parameter for evolutionary comparisons between bilaterian pumps. Neither homology nor convergence is satisfactory to explain the origins of hearts and pumping organs. Instead, we propose that animal pumps derive from parallel improvements of an ancestral, peristaltic design represented by a layer of myocytes at the external walls of primitive vessels. This paradigm unifies disparate views, impacts our understanding of bilaterian evolution and may be helpful to interpret similarities between pumping organs of phylogenetically relevant species and emerging models.     

Taming theory with thought experiments: Understanding and scientific progress

I claim that one way thought experiments contribute to scientific progress is by increasing scientific understanding. Understanding does not have a currently accepted characterization in the philosophical literature, but I argue that we already have ways to test for it. For instance, current pedagogical practice often requires that students demonstrate being in either or both of the following two states: 1) Having grasped the meaning of some relevant theory, concept, law or model, 2) Being able to apply that theory, concept, law or model fruitfully to new instances. Three thought experiments are presented which have been important historically in helping us pass these tests, and two others that cause us to fail. Then I use this operationalization of understanding to clarify the relationships between scientific thought experiments, the understanding they produce, and the progress they enable. I conclude that while no specific instance of understanding (thus conceived) is necessary for scientific progress, understanding in general is.     

Models, scientific realism, the intelligibility of nature, and their cultural significance

In this article, I will view realist and non-realist accounts of scientific models within the larger context of the cultural significance of scientific knowledge. I begin by looking at the historical context and origins of the problem of scientific realism, and claim that it is originally of cultural and not only philosophical, significance. The cultural significance of debates on the epistemological status of scientific models is then related to the question of ‘intelligibility’ and how science, through models, can give us knowledge of the world by presenting us with an ‘intelligible account/picture of the world’, thus fulfilling its cultural-epistemic role. Realists typically assert that science can perform this role, while non-realists deny this. The various strategies adopted by realists and non-realists in making good their respective claims, is then traced to their cultural motivations. Finally I discuss the cultural implications of adopting realist or non-realist views of models through a discussion of the views of Rorty, Gellner, Van Fraassen and Clifford Hooker on the cultural significance of scientific knowledge.     

Coincidence and reproducibility in the EHT black hole experiment

This paper discusses some philosophical aspects related to the recent publication of the experimental results of the 2017 black hole experiment, namely the first image of the supermassive black hole at the center of galaxy M87. In this paper I present a philosophical analysis of the 2017 Event Horizon Telescope (EHT) black hole experiment. I first present Hacking's philosophy of experimentation. Hacking gives his taxonomy of elements of laboratory science and distinguishes a list of elements. I show that the EHT experiment conforms to major elements from Hacking's list. I then describe with the help of Galison's Philosophy of the Shadow how the EHT Collaboration created the famous black hole image. Galison outlines three stages for the reconstruction of the black hole image: Socio-Epistemology, Mechanical Objectivity, after which there is an additional Socio-Epistemology stage. I subsequently present my own interpretation of the reconstruction of the black hole image and I discuss model fitting to data. I suggest that the main method used by the EHT Collaboration to assure trust in the results of the EHT experiment is what philosophers call the Argument from Coincidence. I show that using this method for the above purpose is problematic. I present two versions of the Argument from Coincidence: Hacking's Coincidence and Cartwright's Reproducibility by which I analyse the EHT experiment. The same estimation of the mass of the black hole is reproduced in four different procedures. The EHT Collaboration concludes: the value we have converged upon is robust. I analyse the mass measurements of the black hole with the help of Cartwright's notion of robustness. I show that the EHT Collaboration construe Coincidence/Reproducibility as Technological Agnosticism and I contrast this interpretation with van Fraassen's scientific agnosticism.     

How to put a black box in a showcase: History of science museums and recent heritage

Coping with recent heritage is troublesome for history of science museums, since modern scientific artefacts often suffer from a lack of esthetic and artistic qualities and expressiveness. The traditional object-oriented approach, in which museums collect and present objects as individual showpieces is inadequate to bring recent heritage to life. This paper argues that recent artefacts should be regarded as “key pieces.” In this approach the object derives its meaning not from its intrinsic qualities but from its place in an important historical event or development. The “key pieces” approach involves a more organic way of collecting and displaying, focussing less on the individual object and more on the context in which it functioned and its place in the storyline. Finally, I argue that the “key pieces” approach should not be limited to recent heritage. Using this method as a general guiding principle could be a way for history of science museums to appeal to today’s audiences.     

Normativity,the base-rate fallacy,and some problems for retail realism

Recent literature in the scientific realism debate has been concerned with a particular species of statistical fallacy concerning base-rates, and the worry that no matter how predictively successful our contemporary scientific theories may be, this will tell us absolutely nothing about the likelihood of their truth if our overall sample space contains enough empirically adequate theories that are nevertheless false. In response, both realists and anti-realists have switched their focus from general arguments concerning the reliability and historical track-records of our scientific methodology, to a series of specific arguments and case-studies concerning our reasons to believe individual scientific theories to be true. Such a development however sits in tension with the usual understanding of the scientific realism debate as offering a second-order assessment of our first-order scientific practices, and threatens to undermine the possibility of a distinctive philosophical debate over the approximate truth of our scientific theories. I illustrate this concern with three recent attempts to offer a more localised understanding of the scientific realism debate—due to Stathis Psillos, Juha Saatsi, and Kyle Stanford—and argue that none of these alternatives offer a satisfactory response to the problem.