Explaining Leibniz equivalence as difference of non-inertial appearances: Dis-solution of the Hole Argument and physical individuation of point-events

“The last remnant of physical objectivity of space–time” is disclosed in the case of a continuous family of spatially non-compact models of general relativity (GR). The physical individuation of point-events is furnished by the autonomous degrees of freedom of the gravitational field (viz., the Dirac observables) which represent—as it were—the ontic part of the metric field. The physical role of the epistemic part (viz. the gauge variables) is likewise clarified as embodying the unavoidable non-inertial aspects of GR. At the end the philosophical import of the Hole Argument is substantially weakened and in fact the Argument itself dissolved, while a specific four-dimensional holistic and structuralist view of space–time (called point-structuralism) emerges, including elements common to the tradition of both substantivalism and relationism. The observables of our models undergo real temporal change: this gives new evidence to the fact that statements like the frozen-time character of evolution, as other ontological claims about GR, are model dependent.     

Untersuchungen über die Tumorbildung beim amphidiploiden Bastard vonNicotiana langsdorffii undNicotiana glauca

Summary The occurrence of tumours of the amphidiploid hybrid ofNicotiana glauca andN. langsdorfii can — as was found in organculture — be connected with the specific formation of callus ofN. glauca. Those factors ofN. glauca which hinder callus growth, are obviously disturbed by the hybridization withN. langsdorffii, so thatN. glauca's potency in forming callus can manifest itself uninhibitedly and thus produce tumours.

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Den Herren Prof. Dr.G. de Lattin (Zoologisches Institut der Universität des Saarlandes) und Prof. Dr.F. Anders (Genetisches Institut der Justus Liebig-Universität, Giessen) bin ich für die Förderung dieser Arbeit zu grösstem Dank verpflichtet.     

Holism and structuralism in U(1) gauge theory

After decades of neglect philosophers of physics have discovered gauge theories—arguably the paradigm of modern field physics—as a genuine topic for foundational and philosophical research. Incidentally, in the last couple of years interest from the philosophy of physics in structural realism—in the eyes of its proponents the best suited realist position towards modern physics—has also raised. This paper tries to connect both topics and aims to show that structural realism gains further credence from an ontological analysis of gauge theories—in particular U(1) gauge theory. In the first part of the paper the framework of fiber bundle gauge theories is briefly presented and the interpretation of local gauge symmetry will be examined. In the second part, an ontological underdetermination of gauge theories is carved out by considering the various kinds of non-locality involved in such typical effects as the Aharonov–Bohm effect. The analysis shows that the peculiar form of non-separability figuring in gauge theories is a variant of spatiotemporal holism and can be distinguished from quantum theoretic holism. In the last part of the paper the arguments for a gauge theoretic support of structural realism are laid out and discussed.     

A philosophical study of the transition from the caloric theory of heat to thermodynamics: Resisting the pessimistic meta-induction

I began this study with Laudan's argument from the pessimistic induction and I promised to show that the caloric theory of heat cannot be used to support the premisses of the meta-induction on past scientific theories. I tried to show that the laws of experimental calorimetry, adiabatic change and Carnot's theory of the motive power of heat were (i) independent of the assumption that heat is a material substance, (ii) approximately true, (iii) deducible and accounted for within thermodynamics.I stressed that results (i) and (ii) were known to most theorists of the caloric theory and that result (iii) was put forward by the founders of the new thermodynamics. In other words, the truth-content of the caloric theory was located, selected carefully, and preserved by the founders of thermodynamics.However, the reader might think that even if I have succeeded in showing that laudan is wrong about the caloric theory, I have not shown how the strategy followed in this paper can be generalised against the pessimistic meta-induction. I think that the general strategy against Laudan's argument suggested in this paper is this: the empirical success of a mature scientific theory suggests that there are respects and degrees in which this theory is true. The difficulty for — and and real challenge to — philosophers of science is to suggest ways in which this truth-content can be located and shown to be preserved — if at all — to subsequent theories. In particular, the empirical success of a theory does not, automatically, suggest that all theoretical terms of the theory refer. On the contrary, judgments of referential success depend on which theoretical claims are well-supported by the evidence. This is a matter of specific investigation. Generally, one would expect that claims about theoretical entities which are not strongly supported by the evidence or turn out to be independent of the evidence at hand, are not compelling. For simply, if the evidence does not make it likely that our beliefs about putative theoretical entities are approximately correct, a belief in those entities would be ill-founded and unjustified. Theoretical extrapolations in science are indespensable , but they are not arbitrary. If the evidence does not warrant them I do not see why someone should commit herself to them. In a sense, the problem with empricist philisophers is not that they demand that theoretical beliefs must be warranted by evidence. Rather, it is that they claim that no evidence can warrant theorretical beliefs. A realist philosopher of science would not disagree on the first, but she has good grounds to deny the second.I argued that claims about theoretical entities which are not strongly supported by the evidence must not be taken as belief-worthy. But can one sustaon the more ambitious view that loosely supported parts of a theory tend to be just those that include non-referring terms? There is an obvious excess risk in such a generalisation. For there are well-known cases in which a theoretical claim was initially weakly supported by the evidence     

The ‘Popperian Programme’ and mathematics: Part II: From quasi-empiricism to mathematical research Programmes

In the first part of this article I investigated the Popperian roots of Lakatos's Proofs and Refutations, which was an attempt to apply, and thereby to test, Popper's theory of knowledge in a field—mathematics—to which it had not primarily been intended to apply. While Popper's theory of knowledge stood up gloriously to this test, the new application gave rise to new insights into the heuristic of mathematical development, which necessitated further clarification and improvement of some Popperian methodological maxims. In the present part I analyze this second phase in the development of Lakatos's Popperian programme in mathematics, and its connection to the methodology of scientific research programmes.     

Deletion mapping of a new gustatory mutant inDrosophila melanogaster

Summary A gustatory mutant ofDrosophila melanogaster insensitive to the taste of salt has been isolated. Genetic crosses and a deletion mapping analysis show that this mutation, designatedgust-M ₁ is located in the 93C_3–6-93D_6–7 region of the third chromosome.gust-M ₁ is also insensitive to the taste of quinine sulfate. The behavior of this mutant may be explained by assuming thatgust-M ₁ could be a mutation perturbing functions in the central nervous system affecting the responses to both compounds.     

The autonomy of models and explanation: anomalous molecular rearrangements in early twentieth-century physical organic chemistry

During the 1930s and 1940s, American physical organic chemists employed electronic theories of reaction mechanisms to construct models offering explanations of organic reactions. But two molecular rearrangements presented enormous challenges to model construction. The Claisen and Cope rearrangements were predominantly inaccessible to experimental investigation and they confounded explanation in theoretical terms. Drawing on the idea that models can be autonomous agents in the production of scientific knowledge, I argue that one group of models in particular were functionally autonomous from the Hughes–Ingold theory. Cope and Hardy’s models of the Claisen and Cope rearrangements were resources for the exploration of the Hughes–Ingold theory that otherwise lacked explanatory power. By generating ‘how-possibly’ explanations, these models explained how these rearrangements could happen rather than why they did happen. Furthermore, although these models were apparently closely connected to theory in terms of their construction, I argue that partial autonomy issued in extra-logical factors concerning the attitudes of American chemists to the Hughes–Ingold theory. And in the absence of a complete theoretical hegemony, a degree of consensus was reached concerning modelling the Claisen rearrangement mechanism.     

Desiccation in the black dragon,Hagenius brevistylus Selys

Summary Hagenius brevistylus lost mass by evaporation in a moderately desiccating environment at the rate of 20.4 mg h^–1, and died of desiccation in less than 1 day at a body mass of 79.8% of their normally hydrated mass. It was estimated thatHagenius minimally would have to consume the equivalent of 60% of its body mass each day to meet its daily water requirements. This amount of food is equivalent to that necessary to power flight of a dragonfly for 4.6h.This research was financed in part by a grant from the American Philosophical Society to C.R.T., and was conducted at the University of Michigan Biological Station, Douglas Lake (USA).     

Zur Stratigraphie der säugetierführenden Schichten von Java

Summary According to recent geological and paleontological investigations thePithecanthropus-beds of Java are pleistocene in age. The examinations of the fossil mammalian faunæ of the island are of utmost importance for this age-determination and the following faunæ can be recognized:Tji Djolang-fauna: Middle Pliocene.Kali Glagah-fauna: Upper Pliocene.Djetis-fauna withPithecanthropus: Lower Pleistocene.Trinil-fauna withPithecanthropus: Middle Pleistocene.Ngandong-fauna withHomo neanderthalensis soloensis: Upper Pleistocene.Sampoeng-fauna with a primitive type of the Wedda-Dravida-Australoid group: Subrecent. — Micropaleontological examinations of smallerForaminifera from marine equivalents of thePithecanthropus-beds confirm the age-determinations based on mammalia. — Recent field investigations prove that the lower and middle pleistocenePithecanthropus-beds are distinctlyfolded by a post-middle-pleistocene movement; the upper pleistocene Ngandong-terraces are not folded at all.     

Vernalisation deLinum austriacum L. par ablation des rameaux latéraux

Summary According to these experiments, it appears thatLinum austriacum L. needs vernalisation to bloom. The treatment at low temperature (vernalisation) may be replaced in the course of the first year by a process of mutilation, that is to say, the ablation of all lateral shoots as soon as they appear. The notion of the concentration of tropho-hormonal reserves in the aerial portion of the plant has been considered as a partial explanation of the phenomenon.     

Sur les interactions entre l'axe embryonnaire normal et les formations secondaires produites par la centrifugation de la blastula et de la gastrula chez les Amphibiens

Summary The complexes of organs induced by centrifugation of Amphibia blastulas or gastrulas interfere with the primary axis of the embryo: (a) explantates of centrifugated ectoblast are always poorer in differentiation than the same ectoblast leftin situ; (b) the complexes arising in the ventral part of the embryo have the tendency to elongate parallel to the main axis of the embryo and become connected with the head of the primary embryo; (c) grafts made on Axolotl eggs show that, when the reaction is poor, it cannot express itself except in cases of close contact with the normal organizer; (d) reciprocally, implants of strongly reacting centrifugated ectoblast placed on the ventral part of a normal gastrula of Pleurodeles induce modifications of the primary organs, viz. the transformation of the first somites into chorda.These facts lead to the conclusion that quantitative factors—and not qualitative—are effective in the differentiation of the embryo.     

Realism bit by bit: Part II. Disjunctive partial reference

In this second paper, I continue my discussion of the problem of reference for scientific realism. First, I consider a final objection to Kitcher’s account of reference, which I generalise to other accounts of reference. Such accounts make attributions of reference by appeal to our pretheoretical intuitions about how true statements ought to be distibuted among the scientific utterances of the past. I argue that in the cases that merit discussion, this strategy fails because our intuitions are unstable. The interesting cases are importantly borderline—it really isn’t clear what we ought to say about how those terms referred. I conclude that in many relevant cases, our grounds for thinking that the theoretical terms of the past referred are matched by our grounds for thinking that they failed to refer, in such a way that deciding on either result is arbitrary and bad news for the realist. In response to this problem, in the second part of the paper I expand upon Field’s (1973) account of partial reference to sketch a new way of thinking about the theoretical terms of the past—that they partially referred and partially failed to refer.     

Atomism, Poincaré and Planck

Planck's change in attitude to the question of whether atomic hypotheses were scientifically accessible, is discussed. It is argued contra Holton, that Planck's change in attitude to this question did not signal a methodological shift towards realism. The point of doing this is not just to investigate a significant episode in the history of quantum theory, but also to use the episode as a case study in support of a broader historical thesis. This thesis is that there was a widespread late-nineteenth century methodological tradition which motivated the change in status of certain ontological claims — e.g., that atoms exist — from ‘inaccessible to science’ to ‘scientifically acceptable’ even though those claims were not strictly ‘observable’. This methodological tradition is a hybrid of positivist and realist views. Thus, contrary to one popular view, the fin de siécle triumph of atomism is not to be seen as a triumph for a realist view of science Poincare's views are also used as an illustration.     

The international electrical units: a failure in standardisation?

The ‘international’ electrical units, initially defined by the International Electrical Congress of Chicago in 1893, represented a major step forward in international electrical standardisation. Yet they were flawed both theoretically and technically, were adopted inconsistently in different countries and were soon subject to criticism and revision. This paper addresses the extent to which the international units—notwithstanding their flaws—were in fact adequate for the needs of engineering, commerce and science at the time, and concludes that the practical position was actually very satisfactory. It also addresses how the international electrical units came in to being, in the context of alternative philosophies of the nature of the standardisation process—that it can be essentially central or local. The central influence on the international units was the series of international electrical congresses of the late nineteenth century, which I conclude were a highly unsatisfactory mechanism, responsible for many of the weaknesses in the resulting standards. In contrast, I argue that it was local influences, the networks of scientists and standards laboratories that defined and maintained the standards, which gave them their strength.     

Decision theory and information propagation in quantum physics

In recent papers, Zurek [(2005). Probabilities from entanglement, Born's rule p_k=|ψ_k|² from entanglement. Physical Review A, 71, 052105] has objected to the decision-theoretic approach of Deutsch [(1999) Quantum theory of probability and decisions. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A, 455, 3129–3137] and Wallace [(2003). Everettian rationality: defending Deutsch's approach to probability in the Everett interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34, 415–438] to deriving the Born rule for quantum probabilities on the grounds that it courts circularity. Deutsch and Wallace assume that the many worlds theory is true and that decoherence gives rise to a preferred basis. However, decoherence arguments use the reduced density matrix, which relies upon the partial trace and hence upon the Born rule for its validity. Using the Heisenberg picture and quantum Darwinism—the notion that classical information is quantum information that can proliferate in the environment pioneered in Ollivier et al. [(2004). Objective properties from subjective quantum states: Environment as a witness. Physical Review Letters, 93, 220401 and (2005). Environment as a witness: Selective proliferation of information and emergence of objectivity in a quantum universe. Physical Review A, 72, 042113]—I show that measurement interactions between two systems only create correlations between a specific set of commuting observables of system 1 and a specific set of commuting observables of system 2. This argument picks out a unique basis in which information flows in the correlations between those sets of commuting observables. I then derive the Born rule for both pure and mixed states and answer some other criticisms of the decision theoretic approach to quantum probability.     

The ear-shell (Sulculus diversicolor aquatilis) myoglobin is composed of an unusual 39 kDA polypeptide chain

Summary An unusual myoglobin was isolated from the buccal mass of the ear-shellSulculus diversicolor aquatilis. The myoglobin consists of a 39 kDa polypeptide chain which is about double the size of the usual myoglobin subunit, contains one heme per molecule, and has an unusual spectral property in the oxy-form. On the basis of these properties and partial amino acid sequencing, we propose thatSulculus myoglobin has a didomain structure, and that one of the two domains does not function as an oxygen-binding domain. So far, a myoglobin of this type has not been described in mollusos.     

Weyl’s ‘agens theory’ of matter and the Zurich Fichte

This paper investigates Hermann Weyl’s reception of philosophical concepts stemming from the German Idealist Johann Gottlieb Fichte. In particular, Weyl’s ‘agens theory’ of matter, which he held around 1925, will be looked at. In the extant literature, the—admittedly also important—influence of Husserl on Weyl has mainly been addressed. Thus, apart from investigating some detailed Fichtean inheritances in Weyl’s concepts of causality, chance and continuity, the general difference which Weyl saw between the philosophies of Fichte and Husserl will also be discussed. For Weyl this is above all a difference between an active constructivism and a rather passive phenomenological seeing (Schau). Further, the paper shows in some detail the way Weyl was drawn into a certain reading of Fichte by his Zurich colleague, the philosopher Fritz Medicus. The methodological frame of the paper is that of Konstellationsforschung, a historical and systematic approach which proves to be particularly fruitful when investigating a (broadly speaking) German Idealist context and which allows special attention to be given to the acting subjects within the constellation under investigation. Conversely, Weyl’s agens theory suggests amendments to this methodology.     

Scientific realism bit by bit: part I. Kitcher on reference

In this paper, I consider Kitcher’s (1993) account of reference for the expressions of past science. Kitcher’s case study is of Joseph Priestley and his expression ‘dephlogisticated air’. There is a strong intuitive case that ‘dephlogisticated air’ referred to oxygen, but it was underpinned by very mistaken phlogiston theory, so concluding either that dephlogisticated air referred straightforwardly or that it failed to refer both have unpalatable consequences. Kitcher argues that the reference of such terms is best considered relative to each token—some tokens refer, and others do not. His account thus relies crucially on how this distinction between tokens can be made good—a puzzle I call the discrimination problem. I argue that the discrimination problem cannot be solved. On any reading of Kitcher’s defence of the distinction, the grounds provided are either insufficient or illegitimate. On the first reading, Kitcher violates the principle of humanity by making Priestley’s referential success a matter of the mental contents of modern speakers. The second reading sidesteps the problem of beliefs by appealing to mind-independent facts, but I argue that these are insufficient to achieve reference because of the indeterminacy introduced by the qua problem. On the third and final reading, Priestley’s success is given by what he would say in counterfactual circumstances. I argue that even if there are facts about what Priestley would say, and there is reason for doubt, there is no motivation to think that such facts determine how Priestley referred in the actual world.     

Zur Polymorphie eines Chromosoms innerhalb von Populationen des LaufkäfersCarabus auronitens Fabr

Summary C. auronitens has 26 autosomes (2n), from which one pair — calledA-chromosomes — is relatively long.A-chromosomes consist of an euchromatic and a heterochromatic arm. In 63% of the individuals, theA-chromosomes are intraindividually anisomorph with regard to the length of their heterochromatic arm. According to its length, this arm shows 0–3 secondary constrictions. Hence there are at least 4 different forms of theA-chromosome.     

Response to one point in Gingras’s review of Gravity’s shadow

Yves Gingras says of my book Gravity’s shadow that it is too long, the style is poor, and in its 870 pages there is nothing new that is not to be regretted. Gingras’s purity of vision would be a cause for congratulation were it not for the appalling implications of one of his claims. For the sake of the future of social science—indeed for the sake of the future of civilisation—it is impossible to leave unchallenged the idea that respondents, who don’t like to see their use of data questioned, are to be commended when they withhold those data from public scrutiny.