Altruistic punishment in humans.

Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.     

社会认可与群体规则的激励涵义

分析了被传统经济学理论所忽略的社会认可动机的激励涵义,指出是否能够获得社会认可取决于是否遵从群体规则,并且将社会认可动机融人到企业经理层激励约束问题的经济分析中,引入激励的动机管理来表征对规则的短期均衡的影响,引入改变规则内容的涵义管理来表征对规则的长期动态的影响,建立了一个转轨时期国企领导班子内群体规则的演化模型,显示了规则的动机管理和规则的涵义管理诱发群体规则变迁的效果．     

Group Similarity and Social Influence Analysis in Online Communities

A fundamental open question in the analysis of social networks was to understand the evolution between similarity and group social ties.In general,two groups are similar for two distinct reasons:first,they grow to change their behaviors to the same group due to social influence;second,they tend to merge a group due to similar behaviors,where a process often is termed selection by sociologists.It was important to understand why two groups could merge and what led to high similarities for members in a group,influence or selection.In this paper,the techniques for identifying and modeling interactions between social influence and selection for different groups were developed.Different similarities were computed in three phases where groups came into being,before or after according to the number of common edits in Wikipedia.Experimental results showed selection played a more important role in two group merging.     

A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks

A fundamental aspect of all biological systems is cooperation. Cooperative interactions are required for many levels of biological organization ranging from single cells to groups of animals. Human society is based to a large extent on mechanisms that promote cooperation. It is well known that in unstructured populations, natural selection favours defectors over cooperators. There is much current interest, however, in studying evolutionary games in structured populations and on graphs. These efforts recognize the fact that who-meets-whom is not random, but determined by spatial relationships or social networks. Here we describe a surprisingly simple rule that is a good approximation for all graphs that we have analysed, including cycles, spatial lattices, random regular graphs, random graphs and scale-free networks: natural selection favours cooperation, if the benefit of the altruistic act, b, divided by the cost, c, exceeds the average number of neighbours, k, which means b/c > k. In this case, cooperation can evolve as a consequence of 'social viscosity' even in the absence of reputation effects or strategic complexity.     

Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish mutualism

Humans are highly social animals and often help unrelated individuals that may never reciprocate the altruist's favour. This apparent evolutionary puzzle may be explained by the altruist's gain in social image: image-scoring bystanders, also known as eavesdroppers, notice the altruistic act and therefore are more likely to help the altruist in the future. Such complex indirect reciprocity based on altruistic acts may evolve only after simple indirect reciprocity has been established, which requires two steps. First, image scoring evolves when bystanders gain personal benefits from information gathered, for example, by finding cooperative partners. Second, altruistic behaviour in the presence of such bystanders may evolve if altruists benefit from access to the bystanders. Here, we provide experimental evidence for both of the requirements in a cleaning mutualism involving the cleaner fish Labroides dimidiatus. These cleaners may cooperate and remove ectoparasites from clients or they may cheat by feeding on client mucus. As mucus may be preferred over typical client ectoparasites, clients must make cleaners feed against their preference to obtain a cooperative service. We found that eavesdropping clients spent more time next to 'cooperative' than 'unknown cooperative level' cleaners, which shows that clients engage in image-scoring behaviour. Furthermore, trained cleaners learned to feed more cooperatively when in an 'image-scoring' than in a 'non-image-scoring' situation.     

合作进化模型综述

作者综述了合作进化模型的最新研究成果。合作进化模型以“囚徒困境”博弈模型为基础, 为合作中的个体提供了一种与个体本身无关的策略优化机制, 以此探讨合作策略能够稳定进化的条件。基于直接或间接互惠理论的合作进化模型验证了在小规模社会中建立声誉机制有助于实现稳定的互惠合作; 互惠可以看做是对合作行为的奖赏, 开放的社会网络有助于实现较大范围内的合作; 对非合作行为实施惩罚有助于实现多人合作, 在一定条件下, 由非合作者实施惩罚时的合作进化相较于由合作者实施时更稳定; 群组竞争有利于合作文化或制度的传播, 但无法解释群组融合后的合作问题。     

Pinyon jays use transitive inference to predict social dominance

Living in large, stable social groups is often considered to favour the evolution of enhanced cognitive abilities, such as recognizing group members, tracking their social status and inferring relationships among them. An individual's place in the social order can be learned through direct interactions with others, but conflicts can be time-consuming and even injurious. Because the number of possible pairwise interactions increases rapidly with group size, members of large social groups will benefit if they can make judgments about relationships on the basis of indirect evidence. Transitive reasoning should therefore be particularly important for social individuals, allowing assessment of relationships from observations of interactions among others. Although a variety of studies have suggested that transitive inference may be used in social settings, the phenomenon has not been demonstrated under controlled conditions in animals. Here we show that highly social pinyon jays (Gymnorhinus cyanocephalus) draw sophisticated inferences about their own dominance status relative to that of strangers that they have observed interacting with known individuals. These results directly demonstrate that animals use transitive inference in social settings and imply that such cognitive capabilities are widespread among social species.     

Chimpanzees are indifferent to the welfare of unrelated group members

Humans are an unusually prosocial species-we vote, give blood, recycle, give tithes and punish violators of social norms. Experimental evidence indicates that people willingly incur costs to help strangers in anonymous one-shot interactions, and that altruistic behaviour is motivated, at least in part, by empathy and concern for the welfare of others (hereafter referred to as other-regarding preferences). In contrast, cooperative behaviour in non-human primates is mainly limited to kin and reciprocating partners, and is virtually never extended to unfamiliar individuals. Here we present experimental tests of the existence of other-regarding preferences in non-human primates, and show that chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) do not take advantage of opportunities to deliver benefits to familiar individuals at no material cost to themselves, suggesting that chimpanzee behaviour is not motivated by other-regarding preferences. Chimpanzees are among the primates most likely to demonstrate prosocial behaviours. They participate in a variety of collective activities, including territorial patrols, coalitionary aggression, cooperative hunting, food sharing and joint mate guarding. Consolation of victims of aggression and anecdotal accounts of solicitous treatment of injured individuals suggest that chimpanzees may feel empathy. Chimpanzees sometimes reject exchanges in which they receive less valuable rewards than others, which may be one element of a 'sense of fairness', but there is no evidence that they are averse to interactions in which they benefit more than others.     

Egalitarianism in young children

Human social interaction is strongly shaped by other-regarding preferences, that is, a concern for the welfare of others. These preferences are important for a unique aspect of human sociality-large scale cooperation with genetic strangers-but little is known about their developmental roots. Here we show that young children's other-regarding preferences assume a particular form, inequality aversion that develops strongly between the ages of 3 and 8. At age 3-4, the overwhelming majority of children behave selfishly, whereas most children at age 7-8 prefer resource allocations that remove advantageous or disadvantageous inequality. Moreover, inequality aversion is strongly shaped by parochialism, a preference for favouring the members of one's own social group. These results indicate that human egalitarianism and parochialism have deep developmental roots, and the simultaneous emergence of altruistic sharing and parochialism during childhood is intriguing in view of recent evolutionary theories which predict that the same evolutionary process jointly drives both human altruism and parochialism.     

Altruism through beard chromodynamics

The evolution of altruism, a behaviour that benefits others at one's own fitness expense, poses a darwinian paradox. The paradox is resolved if many interactions are with related individuals so that the benefits of altruism are reaped by copies of the altruistic gene in other individuals, a mechanism called kin selection. However, recognition of altruists could provide an alternative route towards the evolution of altruism. Arguably the simplest recognition system is a conspicuous, heritable tag, such as a green beard. Despite the fact that such genes have been reported, the 'green beard effect' has often been dismissed because it is unlikely that a single gene can code for altruism and a recognizable tag. Here we model the green beard effect and find that if recognition and altruism are always inherited together, the dynamics are highly unstable, leading to the loss of altruism. In contrast, if the effect is caused by loosely coupled separate genes, altruism is facilitated through beard chromodynamics in which many beard colours co-occur. This allows altruism to persist even in weakly structured populations and implies that the green beard effect, in the form of a fluid association of altruistic traits with a recognition tag, can be much more prevalent than hitherto assumed.     

Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism

The existence of cooperation and social order among genetically unrelated individuals is a fundamental problem in the behavioural sciences. The prevailing approaches in biology and economics view cooperation exclusively as self-interested behaviour--unrelated individuals cooperate only if they face economic rewards or sanctions rendering cooperation a self-interested choice. Whether economic incentives are perceived as just or legitimate does not matter in these theories. Fairness-based altruism is, however, a powerful source of human cooperation. Here we show experimentally that the prevailing self-interest approach has serious shortcomings because it overlooks negative effects of sanctions on human altruism. Sanctions revealing selfish or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact. These findings challenge proximate and ultimate theories of human cooperation that neglect the distinction between fair and unfair sanctions, and they are probably relevant in all domains in which voluntary compliance matters--in relations between spouses, in the education of children, in business relations and organizations as well as in markets.     

Evolution of indirect reciprocity

Natural selection is conventionally assumed to favour the strong and selfish who maximize their own resources at the expense of others. But many biological systems, and especially human societies, are organized around altruistic, cooperative interactions. How can natural selection promote unselfish behaviour? Various mechanisms have been proposed, and a rich analysis of indirect reciprocity has recently emerged: I help you and somebody else helps me. The evolution of cooperation by indirect reciprocity leads to reputation building, morality judgement and complex social interactions with ever-increasing cognitive demands.     

Effective leadership and decision-making in animal groups on the move

For animals that forage or travel in groups, making movement decisions often depends on social interactions among group members. However, in many cases, few individuals have pertinent information, such as knowledge about the location of a food source, or of a migration route. Using a simple model we show how information can be transferred within groups both without signalling and when group members do not know which individuals, if any, have information. We reveal that the larger the group the smaller the proportion of informed individuals needed to guide the group, and that only a very small proportion of informed individuals is required to achieve great accuracy. We also demonstrate how groups can make consensus decisions, even though informed individuals do not know whether they are in a majority or minority, how the quality of their information compares with that of others, or even whether there are any other informed individuals. Our model provides new insights into the mechanisms of effective leadership and decision-making in biological systems.     

预防不良群体行为构建和谐大学校园

不良群体行为具有突发性、情绪化、参与者失去个性化、行为过程不可控等特征，其发生有一定的客观因素与主观因素。应通过积极有效地思想政治工作加强对不良群体行为的预防和控制，以保证社会的稳定和大学校园的和谐。     

Cooperation and competition in pathogenic bacteria

Explaining altruistic cooperation is one of the greatest challenges for evolutionary biology. One solution to this problem is if costly cooperative behaviours are directed towards relatives. This idea of kin selection has been hugely influential and applied widely from microorganisms to vertebrates. However, a problem arises if there is local competition for resources, because this leads to competition between relatives, reducing selection for cooperation. Here we use an experimental evolution approach to test the effect of the scale of competition, and how it interacts with relatedness. The cooperative trait that we examine is the production of siderophores, iron-scavenging agents, in the pathogenic bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. As expected, our results show that higher levels of cooperative siderophore production evolve in the higher relatedness treatments. However, our results also show that more local competition selects for lower levels of siderophore production and that there is a significant interaction between relatedness and the scale of competition, with relatedness having less effect when the scale of competition is more local. More generally, the scale of competition is likely to be of particular importance for the evolution of cooperation in microorganisms, and also the virulence of pathogenic microorganisms, because cooperative traits such as siderophore production have an important role in determining virulence.     

描述性社会规范信息对环保行为决策的干预分析及应用

 描述性社会规范是指由大多数人的实际行为形成的准则。针对目前公众环保意识与环保行为存在知行分离的“环保困境”问题，科学运用信息干预策略，即运用描述性社会规范信息实施对环保行为决策的干预，从而在实质层面解决“环保困境”问题具有重要现实意义和应用价值。本研究通过2个行为决策实验发现，运用描述性社会规范信息可对中国公众低成本、高成本环保行为决策实现有效干预，并且信息可信度在描述性社会规范信息影响环保行为决策过程中起到中介作用。     

An obligate brood parasite trapped in the intraspecific arms race of its hosts

Reciprocal selection pressures often lead to close and adaptive matching of traits in coevolved species. A failure of one species to match the evolutionary trajectories of another is often attributed to evolutionary lags or to differing selection pressures across a geographic mosaic. Here we show that mismatches in adaptation of interacting species--an obligate brood parasitic duck and each of its two main hosts--are best explained by the evolutionary dynamics within the host species. Rejection of the brood parasite's eggs was common by both hosts, despite a lack of detectable cost of parasitism to the hosts. Egg rejection markedly reduced parasite fitness, but egg mimicry experiments revealed no phenotypic natural selection for more mimetic parasitic eggs. These paradoxical results were resolved by the discovery of intraspecific brood parasitism and conspecific egg rejection within the hosts themselves. The apparent arms race between species seems instead to be an incidental by-product of within-species conflict, with little recourse for evolutionary response by the parasite.     

Evolution of an obligate social cheater to a superior cooperator

Obligate relationships have evolved many times and can be parasitic or mutualistic. Obligate organisms rely on others to survive and thus coevolve with their host or partner. An important but little explored question is whether obligate status is an evolutionarily terminal condition or whether obligate lineages can evolve back to an autonomous lifestyle. The bacterium Myxococcus xanthus survives starvation by the social development of spore-bearing fruiting bodies. Some M. xanthus genotypes defective at fruiting body development in isolation can nonetheless exploit proficient genotypes in chimaeric groups. Here we report an evolutionary transition from obligate dependence on an altruistic host to an autonomous mode of social cooperation. This restoration of social independence was caused by a single mutation of large effect that confers fitness superiority over both ancestral genotypes, including immunity from exploitation by the ancestral cheater. Thus, a temporary state of obligate cheating served as an evolutionary stepping-stone to a novel state of autonomous social dominance.     

从编辑视角看学术失范的原因及其危害性

学术失范就是指在特定的学术制度环境下,学术界一些集体和个人在从事学术研究活动中,为了实现自身的利益目标而违背学术共同体所公认的学术规范的行为和结果。学术失范产生的原因,既是社会不良风气影响的结果,也是社会腐败现象和世风日下在学术界的一种现实表现,更是学术体制弊端和学者自律能力下降的直接反映。作为学术期刊编辑,对学术失范的原因及其危害性应该高度重视,对来稿进行选择时要本着公开、公正、公平的原则,关注社会热点,追求社会效益,注重编辑职业道德,构筑防范学术失范的第一道防线,力争杜绝那些粗制滥造的学术文章出版,力争从源头上遏制学术失范。     

Social diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games

Humans often cooperate in public goods games and situations ranging from family issues to global warming. However, evolutionary game theory predicts that the temptation to forgo the public good mostly wins over collective cooperative action, and this is often also seen in economic experiments. Here we show how social diversity provides an escape from this apparent paradox. Up to now, individuals have been treated as equivalent in all respects, in sharp contrast with real-life situations, where diversity is ubiquitous. We introduce social diversity by means of heterogeneous graphs and show that cooperation is promoted by the diversity associated with the number and size of the public goods game in which each individual participates and with the individual contribution to each such game. When social ties follow a scale-free distribution, cooperation is enhanced whenever all individuals are expected to contribute a fixed amount irrespective of the plethora of public goods games in which they engage. Our results may help to explain the emergence of cooperation in the absence of mechanisms based on individual reputation and punishment. Combining social diversity with reputation and punishment will provide instrumental clues on the self-organization of social communities and their economical implications.