Quantum Particles as Conceptual Entities: A Possible Explanatory Framework for Quantum Theory

We put forward a possible new interpretation and explanatory framework for quantum theory. The basic hypothesis underlying this new framework is that quantum particles are conceptual entities. More concretely, we propose that quantum particles interact with ordinary matter, nuclei, atoms, molecules, macroscopic material entities, measuring apparatuses,  in a similar way to how human concepts interact with memory structures, human minds or artificial memories. We analyze the most characteristic aspects of quantum theory, i.e. entanglement and non-locality, interference and superposition, identity and individuality in the light of this new interpretation, and we put forward a specific explanation and understanding of these aspects. The basic hypothesis of our framework gives rise in a natural way to a Heisenberg uncertainty principle which introduces an understanding of the general situation of ‘the one and the many’ in quantum physics. A specific view on macro and micro different from the common one follows from the basic hypothesis and leads to an analysis of Schrödinger’s Cat paradox and the measurement problem different from the existing ones. We reflect about the influence of this new quantum interpretation and explanatory framework on the global nature and evolutionary aspects of the world and human worldviews, and point out potential explanations for specific situations, such as the generation problem in particle physics, the confinement of quarks and the existence of dark matter.     

测量问题的新单子论方案与退相干解释

退相干解释的"稳定性判据"被认为是解决测量问题的关键一环。作为该解释的最新发展,量子达尔文主义试图对稳定性判据做出解释。该主义虽然部分地被最新物理实验证据所支持,但仍无法彻底解决测量问题。2016年,测量问题的"新单子论"方案被提出,利用"知觉-能量原理"和"意志-能量原理"解决了测量问题中的明确结果问题和优先基矢问题。本文从新单子论的"知觉-能量原理"出发,在不涉及任何退相干过程的情况下,重新导出了稳定性判据所筛选的优先基矢。这一方面说明新单子论在本质上与量子力学、退相干解释相符相容,另一方面说明新单子论揭示了退相干解释背后更深层的物理学哲学本质。     

Applications of quantum statistics in psychological studies of decision processes

We present a new approach to the old problem of how to incorporate the role of the observer in statistics. We show classical probability theory to be inadequate for this task and take refuge in the epsilon-model, which is the only model known to us caapble of handling situations between quantum and classical statistics. An example is worked out and some problems are discussed as to the new viewpoint that emanates from our approach.Supported by the I UAP-III no. 9.     

The Nature of Light and Twentieth Century Experimental Physics

In the popular literature of physics the electromagnetic field isoften treated as though it has an intrinsic particle nature. When thetheory is examined carefully, quantum theory only makes the weakerrequirement that the emission and absorption of light are restricted todiscrete amounts of energy. There are very few realizable experiments inoptics for which the classical Maxwell theory and the quantum theorymake a different prediction. I discuss some of these experiments with anemphasis on the distinction between what the experiments tell us aboutthe measurement process, and what they tell us about the nature of thelight field.     

从信息传输看量子测量过程

量子测量难题的解决中对于量子测量过程的分析是必不可少的.本文从量子测量过程中的信息传输入手,在区分实在信息与意识信息的基础之上分别分析了测量的实在过程和测量的表征过程,进而认为量子测量是实在信息的转化和传递过程,也是意识信息的转化过程,并从破坏性与非破坏性的统一引出一种客观的信息保持性测量--量子非破坏测量.     

Quantum Theory and the Nature of Consciousness

Our interest focusses on the idea, that consciousness is a powerful acting entity. Up to now there does not exist a scientific concept for this idea. This is not due to problems within the field of psychology or brain research, but rather in resisting theories of modern physics. That is, why we have to search for a solution in the field of physics. A solution can be found in a new understanding of the basics of physical theory. That could be given by abstract and absolute quantum bits of information (AQI bits). To avoid the popular misunderstanding of “information” as “meaningful” it was necessary to find a new word for the free-of-meaning AQI bits: the AQI bits establish a quantum pre-structure termed “Protyposis” (Greek: “pre-formation”), out of which real objects can be formed, starting from energetical and material elementary particles. The Protyposis AQI bits provide a pre-structure for all entities in natural sciences. They are the basic entities, whereof the physical nature of the brain, on the one hand, and the mental nature of consciousness, on the other hand, were formed during the cosmological and the following biological evolution. A deeper understanding of quantum structures may help to overcome the resistance against quantum theory in the field of brain research and consciousness. The key for an understanding is the concept of Protyposis, which means an abstract quantum information free of any definite meaning. With the AQI bits of the Protyposis, both, massless and massive quantum particles can be constructed. Even quantum information with special meanings, in example grammatically formulated thoughts, eventually could be explained. As long as the fundamental basis of quantum theory is misunderstood as being formed by a manifold of some small objects like atoms, quarks, or strings, the problem of understanding consciousness has no solution. If instead we understand quantum theory as based on truly simple quantum structures, there would be no longer fundamental problems for an understanding of consciousness.     

The Observer Effect

Founding our analysis on the Geneva-Brussels approach to the foundations of physics, we provide a clarification and classification of the key concept of observation. An entity can be observed with or without a scope. In the second case, the observation is a purely non-invasive discovery process; in the first case, it is a purely invasive process, which can involve either creation or destruction aspects. An entity can also be observed with or without a full control over the observational process. In the latter case, the observation can be described by a symmetry breaking mechanism, through which a specific deterministic observational process is selected among a number of potential ones, as explained in Aerts’ hidden measurement approach. This is what is called a product test, or product observation, whose consequences are that outcomes can only be predicted in probabilistic terms, as it is the case in typical quantum measurements. We also show that observations can be about intrinsic (stable) properties of the observed entity, or about relational (ephemeral) properties between the observer and observed entities; also, they can be about intermediate properties, neither purely classical, nor purely quantum. Our analysis allows us to propose a general conceptual characterization of quantum measurements, as observational processes involving three aspects: (1) product observations, (2) pure creation aspects and (3) ephemeral relational properties. We also discuss the important concept of non-spatiality and emphasize some of the differences and similarities between quantum and classical/relativistic observations.     

张宗燧对约束系统量子化的贡献

通过分析论证,说明了中国理论物理学家张宗燧对约束系统的量子化作出了重要的贡献.他于1946年指出了此前的有关约束系统哈密顿正则形式的研究,由于没有正确地处理其中的一个关键问题——不定乘子问题,因此不能用来实现量子化,同时,首先提出了一种解决了这个问题的对于许多约束系统可行的量子化方案.     

Quantum Superpositions and the Representation of Physical Reality Beyond Measurement Outcomes and Mathematical Structures

In this paper we intend to discuss the importance of providing a physical representation of quantum superpositions which goes beyond the mere reference to mathematical structures and measurement outcomes. This proposal goes in the opposite direction to the project present in orthodox contemporary philosophy of physics which attempts to “bridge the gap” between the quantum formalism and common sense “classical reality”—precluding, right from the start, the possibility of interpreting quantum superpositions through non-classical notions. We will argue that in order to restate the problem of interpretation of quantum mechanics in truly ontological terms we require a radical revision of the problems and definitions addressed within the orthodox literature. On the one hand, we will discuss the need of providing a formal redefinition of superpositions which captures explicitly their contextual character. On the other hand, we will attempt to replace the focus on the measurement problem, which concentrates on the justification of measurement outcomes from “weird” superposed states, and introduce the superposition problem which focuses instead on the conceptual representation of superpositions themselves. In this respect, after presenting three necessary conditions for objective physical representation, we will provide arguments which show why the classical (actualist) representation of physics faces severe difficulties to solve the superposition problem. Finally, we will also argue that, if we are willing to abandon the (metaphysical) presupposition according to which ‘Actuality = Reality’, then there is plenty of room to construct a conceptual representation for quantum superpositions.     

多世界解释VS哥本哈根解释

作为相关态解释的自然推论,量子测量的多世界解释理论从诞生以来即被边缘化。半个世纪以后该理论逐渐成为一个倍受争议和关注的理论热点,甚至也被称为新标准解释,这是值得深思的。本文详细探讨多世界解释对于哥本哈根解释的超越,重点分析多世界解释地位确立的原因。     

科学争论中的逻辑推理——量子革命中的爱因斯坦-玻尔论战

爱因斯坦与玻尔之间关于量子力学解释的争论,已经成为20世纪物理学历史中的一个经典案例。通过对爱因斯坦-玻尔关于测不准原理的两次论战以及有关EPR论文所引发的第三次论战的讨论,我们可以发现,涉及重大科学革命的科学争论,背后必定是最根本的哲学问题的争论。而在这种争论中,逻辑推理就成为极为有效的论证方式,它们成为科学家赢得争论的有力武器。尽管科学家在争论中要运用各种修辞论证,但修辞论证必须建立在逻辑推理的基础之上。因此,在逻辑推理与修辞论证之间存在一种必要的张力。     

Ontological Frameworks for Scientific Theories

A close examination of the literature on ontology may strike one with roughly two distinct senses of this word. According to the first of them, which we shall call traditional ontology, ontology is characterized as the a priori study of various “ontological categories”. In a second sense, which may be called naturalized ontology, ontology relies on our best scientific theories and from them it tries to derive the ultimate furniture of the world. From a methodological point of view these two senses of ontology are very far away. Here, we discuss a possible relationship between these senses and argue that they may be made compatible and complement each other. We also examine how logic, understood as a linguistic device dealing with the conceptual framework of a theory and its basic inference patterns must be taken into account in this kind of study. The idea guiding our proposal may be put as follows: naturalized ontology checks for the applicability of the ontological categories proposed by traditional ontology and give substantial feedback for it. The adequate expression of some of the resulting ontological frameworks may require a different logic. We conclude with a discussion of the case of orthodox quantum mechanics, arguing that this theory exemplifies the kind of relationship between the two senses of ontology. We also argue that the view proposed here may throw some light in ontological questions concerning this theory.     

The Construction of Chaos Theory

This paper aims at a logico-mathematical analysis of the concept of chaos from the point of view of a constructivist philosophy of physics. The idea of an internal logic of chaos theory is meant as an alternative to a realist conception of chaos. A brief historical overview of the theory of dynamical systems is provided in order to situate the philosophical problem in the context of probability theory. A finitary probabilistic account of chaos amounts to the theory of measurement in the line of a quantum-theoretical foundational perspective and the paper concludes on the non-classical internal logic of chaos theory. Finally, deterministic chaos points to a philosophy which asserts that chaotic systems are no less measurable than other physical systems where predictable and non–predictable phenomena intermingle in a constructive theory of measurement.

How Research on Microbiomes is Changing Biology: A Discussion on the Concept of the Organism

Multicellular organisms contain numerous symbiotic microorganisms, collectively called microbiomes. Recently, microbiomic research has shown that these microorganisms are responsible for the proper functioning of many of the systems (digestive, immune, nervous, etc.) of multicellular organisms. This has inclined some scholars to argue that it is about time to reconceptualise the organism and to develop a concept that would place the greatest emphasis on the vital role of microorganisms in the life of plants and animals. We believe that, unfortunately, there is a problem with this suggestion, since there is no such thing as a universal concept of the organism which could constitute a basis for all biological sciences. Rather, the opposite is true: numerous alternative definitions exist. Therefore, comprehending how microbiomics is changing our understanding of organisms may be a very complex matter. In this paper we will demonstrate that this pluralism proves that claims about a change in our understanding of organisms can be treated as both true and untrue. Mainly, we assert that the existing concepts differ substantially, and that only some of them have to be reconsidered in order to incorporate the discoveries of microbiomics, while others are already flexible enough to do so. Taking into account the plurality of conceptualisations within different branches of modern biology, we will conduct our discussion using the developmental and the cooperation–conflict concepts of the organism. Then we will explain our results by referring to the recent philosophical debate on the nature of the concept of the organism within biology.     

A Further Review of the Incompatibility between Classical Principles and Quantum Postulates

The traditional “realist” conception of physics, according to which human concepts, laws and theories can grasp the essence of a reality in our absence, seems incompatible with quantum formalism and it most fruitful interpretation. The proof rests on the violation by quantum mechanical formalism of some fundamental principles of the classical ontology. We discuss if the conception behind Einstein’s idea of a reality in our absence, could be still maintained and at which price. We conclude that quantum mechanical formalism is not formulated on those terms, leaving for a separated paper the discussion about the terms in which it could be formulated and the onto-epistemological implications it might have.     

Luddite Interventions: on the Poetics of Catastrophe and the Art of Criticism

As an art theoretician, and as a father, I focus on the social and political consequences of Vanderbeeken’s postmodernist negative theology. I express doubts about the relevance of a poetics of catastrophe that conflates any possible alternative to the alleged technocracy under the sign of the simulacrum. To my opinion, the discourse about the virtual and the real are in a deadlock. Following the lead of American novelist Thomas Pynchon, I rephrase these critical doubts in Luddite terms: should we imagine a counterattack as radical as the alleged dystopian nightmare dreamed up and sketched out by Vanderbeeken? I try to show that this line of thinking risks to result in a bold and speculative logic where ethical nuance collapses and, ultimately, the relationship between art, theory and the social culture is reduced to metaphorical analogy. To make this point I retake a critical, phenomenologically inspired reaction by Vivian Sobchack to Baudrillard’s account of Crash, J.G. Ballard’s controversial novel on techno-fetishism. My argument is that the scar that marks Sobchack’s ‘technobody’ might here stand for an alternative that approaches our technological condition not as a discursive machine but as a social pragmatics with deep ethical implications.     

The Foundational Role of Ergodic Theory

The foundation of statistical mechanics and the explanation of the success of its methods rest on the fact that the theoretical values of physical quantities (phase averages) may be compared with the results of experimental measurements (infinite time averages). In the 1930s, this problem, called the ergodic problem, was dealt with by ergodic theory that tried to resolve the problem by making reference above all to considerations of a dynamic nature. In the present paper, this solution will be analyzed first, highlighting the fact that its very general nature does not duly consider the specificities of the systems of statistical mechanics. Second, Khinchin’s approach will be presented, that starting with more specific assumptions about the nature of systems, achieves an asymptotic version of the result obtained with ergodic theory. Third, the statistical meaning of Khinchin’s approach will be analyzed and a comparison between this and the point of view of ergodic theory is proposed. It will be demonstrated that the difference consists principally of two different perspectives on the ergodic problem: that of ergodic theory puts the state of equilibrium at the center, while Khinchin’s attempts to generalize the result to non-equilibrium states.