Making sense of absolute measurement: James Clerk Maxwell,William Thomson,Fleeming Jenkin,and the invention of the dimensional formula

During the 1860s, the Committee on Electrical Standards convened by the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) attempted to articulate, refine, and realize a system of absolute electrical measurement. I describe how this context led to the invention of the dimensional formula by James Clerk Maxwell and subsequently shaped its interpretation, in particular through the attempts of William Thomson and Fleeming Jenkin to make absolute electrical measurement intelligible to telegraph engineers. I identify unit conversion as the canonical purpose for dimensional formulae during the remainder of the nineteenth century and go on to explain how an operational interpretation was developed by the French physicist Gabriel Lippmann. The focus on the dimensional formula reveals how various conceptual, theoretical, and material aspects of absolute electrical measurement were taken up or resisted in experimental physics, telegraphic engineering, and electrical practice more broadly, which leads to the conclusion that the integration of electrical theory and telegraphic practice was far harder to achieve and maintain than historians have previously thought. This ultimately left a confusing legacy of dimensional concepts and practices in physics.     

Theoretical construction in physics – The role of Leibniz for Weyl's ‘Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft’

This paper aims at closing a gap in recent Weyl research by investigating the role played by Leibniz for the development and consolidation of Weyl's notion of theoretical (symbolic) construction. For Weyl, just as for Leibniz, mathematics was not simply an accompanying tool when doing physics—for him it meant the ability to engage in well-guided speculations about a general framework of reality and experience. The paper first introduces some of the background of Weyl's notion of theoretical construction and then discusses particular Leibnizian inheritances in Weyl's ‘Philosophie der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft’, such as the general appreciation of the principles of sufficient reason and of continuity. Afterwards the paper focuses on three themes: first, Leibniz's primary quality phenomenalism, which according to Weyl marked the decisive step in realizing that physical qualities are never apprehended directly; second, the conceptual relation between continuity and freedom; and third, Leibniz's notion of ‘expression’, which allows for a certain type of (surrogative) reasoning by structural analogy and which gave rise to Weyl's optimism regarding the scope of theoretical construction.     

No actual measurement … was required: Maxwell and Cavendish's null method for the inverse square law of electrostatics

In 1877 James Clerk Maxwell and his student Donald MacAlister refined Henry Cavendish's 1773 null experiment demonstrating the absence of electricity inside a charged conductor. This null result was a mathematical prediction of the inverse square law of electrostatics, and both Cavendish and Maxwell took the experiment as verifying the law. However, Maxwell had already expressed absolute conviction in the law, based on results of Michael Faraday's. So, what was the value to him of repeating Cavendish's experiment? After assessing whether the law was as secure as he claimed, this paper explores its central importance to the electrical programme that Maxwell was pursuing. It traces the historical and conceptual re-orderings through which Maxwell established the law by constructing a tradition of null tests and asserting the superior accuracy of the method. Maxwell drew on his developing ‘doctrine of method’ to identify Cavendish's experiment as a member of a wider class of null methods. By doing so, he appealed to the null practices of telegraph engineers, diverted attention from the flawed logic of the method, and sought to localise issues around the mapping of numbers onto instrumental indications, on the grounds that ‘no actual measurement … was required’.     

British Acoustics and its Transformation from the 1860s to the 1910s

Between the 1860s and the 1910s, British acoustics was transformed from an area of empirical research into a mathematically organized field. Musical motives—improving musical scales and temperaments, making better musical instruments, and understanding the nature of musical tones—were among the major driving forces of acoustical researchers in nineteenth-century Britain. The German acoustician, Helmholtz, had a major impact on British acousticians who also had extensive interactions with American and French acousticians. Rayleigh's acoustics, reflecting all these features, bore remarkable fruit in his treatise The Theory of Sound, which successfully subjected empirical acoustics to analytical mathematics. His accomplishments made British acoustics a subfield of physics, thus distinguishing it from the ‘new acoustics’ in early twentieth-century America.     

Books received

R. P. de Lamanon was trained in theology and philosophy, but he chose the career of a self-taught geologist/naturalist, later adding experimental physics to his skills. Recommended by Condorcet, Secretary to the Académie Royale des Sciences, for the post of ‘Naturaliste’ on La Pérouse's expedition, he carried out delicate measurements at sea requested by the Académie and made two important discoveries: the barometric tide at the equator, and the variation of magnetic intensity with latitude. Killed by natives of Samoa in 1787, his reports were long delayed in publication, inadequately presented, and some even lost. Except for brief recognition by von Humboldt many years later, Lamanon's pioneering measurements have been largely ignored or forgotten. This paper revives his memory.     

De-anthropomorphizing energy and energy conservation: The case of Max Planck and Ernst Mach

Discussions on the relation between Mach and Planck usually focus on their famous controversy, a conflict between ‘instrumentalist’ and realist philosophies of science that revolved around the specific issue of the existence of atoms. This article approaches their relation from a different perspective, comparing their analyses of energy and energy conservation. It is argued that this reveals a number of striking similarities and differences. Both Mach and Planck agreed that the law was valid, and they sought to purge energy of its anthropomorphic elements. They did so in radically different ways, however, illustrating the differences between Mach's ‘historical’ and Planck's ‘rationalistic’ accounts of knowledge. Planck's attempt to de-anthropomorphize energy was part of his attempt to demarcate theoretical physics from other disciplines. Mach's attempt to de-anthropomorphize energy is placed in the context of fin-de-siècle Vienna. By doing so, this article also proposes a new interpretation of Mach as a philosopher, historian and sociologist of science.     

The story of ‘Scientist: The Story of a Word’

This examination of an important paper by Sydney Ross is the first in a projected series of occasional reflections on ‘Annals of Science Classic Papers’ that have had enduring utility within the field of history of science and beyond. First the messages of the paper are examined, some well known but others, particularly Ross's own contemporary concerns about the use of the word ‘scientist’, less so. The varied uses made of the paper by scholars are then traced before Ross's biography is examined in order to try to understand how a figure professionally marginal to the field of history of science came to write such a significant piece. Ross’s interest in the topic appears to have been informed by a romantically tinged scientific progressivism and a deep concern with the importance of linguistic precision in science and in public affairs. The inspirations of the author and the interests of his audience have been only partially aligned, but the paper's insights remain of broad historical interest and have wider ramifications since the denotation ‘scientist’ and its proper application are much debated today in contests over the authority of science.     

What's nu? A re-examination of Maxwell's ‘ratio-of-units’ argument,from the mechanical theory of the electromagnetic field to ‘On the elementary relations between electrical measurements’

This re-examination of the earliest version of Maxwell's most important argument for the electromagnetic theory of light—the equality between the speed of wave propagation in the electromagnetic ether and the ratio of electrostatic to electromagnetic measures of electrical quantity—establishes unforeseen connections between Maxwell's theoretical electrical metrology and his mechanical theory of the electromagnetic field. Electrical metrology was not neutral with respect to field-theoretic versus action-at-a-distance conceptions of electro-magnetic interaction. Mutual accommodation between these conceptions was reached by Maxwell on the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) Committee on Electrical Standards by exploiting the measurement of the medium parameters—electric inductive capacity and magnetic permeability—on an arbitrary scale. While he always worked within this constraint in developing the ‘ratio-of-units’ argument mathematically, I maintain that Maxwell came to conceive of the ratio ‘as a velocity’ by treating the medium parameters as physical quantities that could be measured absolutely, which was only possible via the correspondences between electrical and mechanical quantities established in the mechanical theory. I thereby correct two closely-related misconceptions of the ratio-of-units argument—the counterintuitive but widespread notion that the ratio is naturally a speed, and the supposition that Maxwell either inferred or proved this from its dimensional formula.     

How uncertainty can save measurement from circularity and holism

Measurement results depend upon assumptions, and some of those assumptions are theoretical in character. This paper examines particle physics measurements in which a measurement result depends upon a type of assumption for which that very same result may be evidentially relevant, thus raising a worry about potential circularity in argumentation. We demonstrate how the practice of evaluating measurement uncertainty serves to render any such evidential circularity epistemically benign. Our analysis shows how the evaluation and deployment of uncertainty evaluation constitutes an in practice solution to a particular form of Duhemian underdetermination that improves upon Duhem's vague notion of “good sense,” avoids holism, and reconciles theory dependence of measurement with piecemeal hypothesis testing.     

The Instrument That Never Was: Inventing,Manufacturing, and Branding Réaumur's Thermometer During the Enlightenment

At the beginning of the 1730s René Antoine Ferchault de Réaumur published two long memoirs on a new type of thermometer equipped with a specially calibrated scale — known ever since as the Réaumur scale. It became one of the most common ‘standardized’ thermometers in Europe until the late nineteenth century. What made this thermometer so successful? What was it specifically? I will first argue that the real Réaumur thermometer as an instrument was a fiction, a ghost — an idealized instrument. On paper, it was theoretically flawless. In reality, the standardized Réaumur thermometer was most likely never achieved. This article shows that its success was essentially due to a recontextualisation from theoretical natural philosophy — Réaumur's principle of uniformity — to: 1) the context of artisanal knowledge and practices and 2) the context of making and reporting in the Mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences actual measurements done in the field (in Paris at the Observatory, in Provincial France, in the Colonies, and in the rest of Europe). Réaumur's thermometer was essentially a theoretical method to which was associated a particular scale. It was the instrument's reification for market consumption and fieldwork that gave this specific type of thermometer materiality and authority. Although most Réaumur thermometers ever made were strikingly different from one another, over time the thermomètre de Réaumur designation became a brand, a seal of approval born from customary artisanal practices and cultural habitudes.     

Pluralism and anarchism in quantum physics: Paul Feyerabend's writings on quantum physics in relation to his general philosophy of science

This paper aims to show that the development of Feyerabend's philosophical ideas in the 1950s and 1960s largely took place in the context of debates on quantum mechanics.In particular, he developed his influential arguments for pluralism in science in discussions with the quantum physicist David Bohm, who had developed an alternative approach to quantum physics which (in Feyerabend's perception) was met with a dogmatic dismissal by some of the leading quantum physicists. I argue that Feyerabend's arguments for theoretical pluralism and for challenging established theories were connected to his objections to the dogmatism and conservatism he observed in quantum physics.However, as Feyerabend gained insight into the physical details and historical complexities which led to the development of quantum mechanics, he gradually became more modest in his criticisms. His writings on quantum mechanics especially engaged with Niels Bohr; initially, he was critical of Bohr's work in quantum mechanics, but in the late 1960s, he completely withdrew his criticism and even praised Bohr as a model scientist. He became convinced that however puzzling quantum mechanics seemed, it was methodologically unobjectionable – and this was crucial for his move towards ‘anarchism’ in philosophy of science.     

Introduction to the special issue Hermann Weyl and the philosophy of the ‘New Physics’

This Special Issue Hermann Weyl and the Philosophy of the ‘New Physics’ has two main objectives: first, to shed fresh light on the relevance of Weyl's work for modern physics and, second, to evaluate the importance of Weyl's work and ideas for contemporary philosophy of physics. Regarding the first objective, this Special Issue emphasizes aspects of Weyl's work (e.g. his work on spinors in n dimensions) whose importance has recently been emerging in research fields across both mathematical and experimental physics, as well as in the history and philosophy of physics. Regarding the second objective, this Special Issue addresses the relevance of Weyl's ideas regarding important open problems in the philosophy of physics, such as the problem of characterizing scientific objectivity and the problem of providing a satisfactory interpretation of fundamental symmetries in gauge theories and quantum mechanics. In this Introduction, we sketch the state of the art in Weyl studies and we summarize the content of the contributions to the present volume.     

Between Kepler and Newton: Hooke’s ‘principles of congruity and incongruity’ and the naturalization of mathematics

ABSTRACT

Robert Hooke’s development of the theory of matter-as-vibration provides coherence to a career in natural philosophy which is commonly perceived as scattered and haphazard. It also highlights aspects of his work for which he is rarely credited: besides the creative speculative imagination and practical-instrumental ingenuity for which he is known, it displays lucid and consistent theoretical thought and mathematical skills. Most generally and importantly, however, Hooke’s ‘Principles?…?of Congruity and Incongruity of bodies’ represent a uniquely powerful approach to the most pressing challenge of the New Science: legitimizing the application of mathematics to the study of nature. This challenge required reshaping the mathematical practices and procedures; an epistemological framework supporting these practices; and a metaphysics which could make sense of this epistemology. Hooke’s ‘Uniform Geometrical or Mechanical Method’ was a bold attempt to answer the three challenges together, by interweaving mathematics through physics into metaphysics and epistemology. Mathematics, in his rendition, was neither an abstract and ideal structure (as it was for Kepler), nor a wholly-flexible, artificial human tool (as it was for Newton). It drew its power from being contingent on the particularities of the material world.     

From successful measurement to the birth of a law: Disentangling coordination in Ohm's scientific practice

In this paper, I argue for a distinction between two scales of coordination in scientific inquiry, through which I reassess Georg Simon Ohm's work on conductivity and resistance. Firstly, I propose to distinguish between measurement coordination, which refers to the specific problem of how to justify the attribution of values to a quantity by using a certain measurement procedure, and general coordination, which refers to the broader issue of justifying the representation of an empirical regularity by means of abstract mathematical tools. Secondly, I argue that the development of Ohm's measurement practice between the first and the second experimental phase of his work involved the change of the measurement coordination on which he relied to express his empirical results. By showing how Ohm relied on different calibration assumptions and practices across the two phases, I demonstrate that the concurrent change of both Ohm's experimental apparatus and the variable that Ohm measured should be viewed based on the different form of measurement coordination. Finally, I argue that Ohm's assumption that tension is equally distributed in the circuit is best understood as part of the general coordination between Ohm's law and the empirical regularity that it expresses, rather than measurement coordination.     

Marcelin Berthelot's first publication in 1850, on the subjection of liquids to tension

The famous French chemist, Marcelin Berthelot, published his first scientific paper in 1850. However, reference to this paper has been largely ignored in the various accounts of his lasting contributions to chemistry. The probable reason for this is that this paper is concerned with a method of subjecting a liquid to tension, and it is more appropriate to regard it as a paper on physics rather than on chemistry. In the work described in this largely-forgotten paper, written whilst he was still a young research student, Berthelot showed that liquids contained in his ‘Berthelot tube’ could withstand a considerable tension; and he is the first person to have observed cavitation, a phenomenon which has been studied so widely this century. The next mention in the literature of the Berthelot tube method is at the turn of the present century, after which it again seems to have been forgotten until the 1940s; since then there has been considerable progress using the Berthelot tube technique. In this paper the work described in Berthelot's original paper is discussed in some detail, and the subsequent fruitful development of the method is also traced and assessed.     

James geikie,james croll,and the eventful ice age

James Geikie's Great Ice Age (1874) first presented to the geological public the Pleistocene. modern interpretation of alternating mild and cold periods during the Though it was supported by geological evidence, Geikie's view of the Ice Age was based on a theoretical framework supplied by the climatic physics of James Croll. Mid-nineteenth-century British geologists had encountered great difficulty in making sense out of the varied and complicated glacial deposits, or ‘drift’, and had formulated the ‘iceberg’ theory to account for the apparent chaos of the drift, an explanation which discouraged its stratigraphic study. The reaffirmation of faith in continental glaciation by several Scottish geologists in the 1850s brought with it a belief in an eventful Pleistocene, but it remained difficult to discover the events of Ice Age history from study of the glacial deposits. In 1864 Croll presented a detailed climatic history of the Ice Age deduced from astronomy and physical geography. By 1871 James Geikie was using Croll's scheme of Ice Age history as the basis for his impressive synthesis of Pleistocene data from throughout the world.