The reversibility objection against the Second Law of thermodynamics viewed,and avoided,from a logical point of view

In this paper we offer a formal-logical analysis of the famous reversibility objection against the Second Law of thermodynamics. We reconstruct the objection as a deductive argument leading to a contradiction, employing resources of standard quantified modal logic and thereby highlighting explicit and implicit assumptions with respect to possibility, identity, and their interaction. We then describe an alternative framework, case-intensional first order logic, that has greater expressive resources than standard quantified modal logic. We show that in that framework we can account for the role of sortals in possibility judgments. This allows us to formalize the relevant truths involved in the reversibility objection in such a way that no contradiction ensues. We claim that this analysis helps to understand in which way the Second Law is, specifically, a law of thermodynamics, but not of systems of particles in general.     

Knowledge transfer across scientific disciplines

Thomas Kuhn suggested that symbolic generalizations are applied to concrete systems by a process involving exemplars and analogical reasoning. Using the related concepts of theoretical and formal templates, I argue that the process of applying templates can in some cases be made explicit and that we do not need to rely on similarity relations and tacit knowledge. In so doing I show how some formal models can be transferred from one scientific field to another. Examples include scale-free networks, the Lotka-Volterra model from biology, and the Goodwin model in economics. I also argue that this explicit approach has advantages over the more psychologically oriented approach of Kuhn and explain the sense in which templates do and do not produce unification.     

On value-laden science

Philosophical work on values in science is held back by widespread ambiguity about how values bear on scientific choices. Here, I disambiguate several ways in which a choice can be value-laden and show that this disambiguation has the potential to solve and dissolve philosophical problems about values in science. First, I characterize four ways in which values relate to choices: values can motivate, justify, cause, or be impacted by the choices we make. Next, I put my proposed taxonomy to work, using it to clarify one version of the argument from inductive risk. The claim that non-epistemic values must play a role in scientific choices that run inductive risk makes most sense as a claim about values being needed to justify such choices. The argument from inductive risk is not unique: many philosophical arguments about values in science can be more clearly understood and assessed by paying close attention to how values and choices are related.     

Animal deception and the content of signals

In cases of animal mimicry, the receiver of the signal learns the truth that he is either dealing with the real thing or with a mimic. Thus, despite being a prototypical example of animal deception, mimicry does not seem to qualify as deception on the traditional definition, since the receiver is not actually misled. We offer a new account of propositional content in sender-receiver games that explains how the receiver is misled (and deceived) by mimicry. We show that previous accounts of deception, and of propositional content, give incorrect results about whether certain signals are deceptive.     

The Replication of Hertz's Cathode Ray Experiments

I reappraise in detail Hertz's cathode ray experiments. I show that, contrary to Buchwald's (1995) evaluation, the core experiment establishing the electrostatic properties of the rays was successfully replicated by Perrin (probably) and Thomson (certainly). Buchwald's discussion of ‘current purification’ is shown to be a red herring. My investigation of the origin of Buchwald's misinterpretation of this episode reveals that he was led astray by a focus on what Hertz ‘could do’—his experimental resources. I argue that one should focus instead on what Hertz wanted to achieve—his experimental goals. Focusing on these goals, I find that his explicit and implicit requirements for a successful investigation of the rays’ properties are met by Perrin and Thomson. Thus, even by Hertz's standards, they did indeed replicate his experiment.     

The concept of “character” in Dirichlet’s theorem on primes in an arithmetic progression

In 1837, Dirichlet proved that there are infinitely many primes in any arithmetic progression in which the terms do not all share a common factor. We survey implicit and explicit uses of Dirichlet characters in presentations of Dirichlet’s proof in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with an eye toward understanding some of the pragmatic pressures that shaped the evolution of modern mathematical method.     

On the structure of explanatory unification: the case of geographical economics

A newly emerged field within economics, known as geographical economics, claims to have provided a unified approach to the study of spatial agglomerations at different spatial scales by showing how these can be traced back to the same basic economic mechanisms. We analyse this contemporary episode of explanatory unification in relation to major philosophical accounts of unification. In particular, we examine the role of argument patterns in unifying derivations, the role of ontological convictions and mathematical structures in shaping unification, the distinction between derivational and ontological unification, the issue of how explanation and unification relate, and finally the idea that unification comes in degrees.     

An anthropic myth: Fred Hoyle’s carbon-12 resonance level

The case of Fred Hoyle’s prediction of a resonance state in carbon-12, unknown in 1953 when it was predicted, is often mentioned as an example of anthropic prediction. However, an investigation of the historical circumstances of the prediction and its subsequent experimental confirmation shows that Hoyle and his contemporaries did not associate the level in the carbon nucleus with life. Only in the 1980s, after the emergence of the anthropic principle, did it become common to see Hoyle’s prediction as anthropically significant. At about the same time mythical accounts of the prediction and its history began to abound. Not only has the anthropic myth no basis in historical fact, it is also doubtful if the excited levels in carbon-12 and other atomic nuclei can be used as an argument for the predictive power of the anthropic principle.     

狭义相对论与丁格尔时钟悖论 --对一场著名争论的回顾与再认识

1967年10月14日《自然》杂志发表了H 丁格尔教授反对狭义相对论的论证和W．H．麦克利教授对丁格尔论证的批评。本文指出麦克利对丁格尔的批评是不能成立的,因为麦克利为反对丁格尔观点而画出的时空图恰恰是支持丁格尔的,提出：丁格尔的论证就其反对爱因斯坦从狭义相对论引出的结论——“运动的钟比静止时走得慢”——是成立的,就其反对狭义相对论是不成立的：狭义相对论自身在逻辑上是无矛盾和完备的,而爱因斯坦从狭义相对论中得出“运动的钟变慢”的结论是不对的。文章阐明了狭义相对论与“钟慢效应实验证据”的正确关系。     

Kant,causation and laws of nature

In the Second Analogy, Kant argues that every event has a cause. It remains disputed what this conclusion amounts to. Does Kant argue only for the Weak Causal Principle that every event has some cause, or for the Strong Causal Principle that every event is produced according to a universal causal law? Existing interpretations have assumed that, by Kant’s lights, there is a substantive difference between the two. I argue that this is false. Kant holds that the concept of cause contains the notion of lawful connection, so it is analytic that causes operate according to universal laws. He is explicit about this commitment, not least in his derivation of the Categorical Imperative in Groundwork III. Consequently, Kant’s move from causal rules to universal laws is much simpler than previously assumed. Given his commitments, establishing the Strong Causal Principle requires no more argument than establishing the Weak Causal Principle.     

Experimentation in the cosmic laboratory

It might seem impossible to apply Ian Hacking's experimental argument for scientific realism to astrophysical objects; indeed Hacking himself expressed scepticism about extragalactic entities. Such astrophysical antirealism has been the subject of intense debate and is usually seen as an undesired consequence of experimental realism. In this paper, I claim that it is possible to recast the experimental argument by reference to James Woodward's non-anthropocentric account of experimentation so as to apply it to astrophysical entities, such as gravitational lenses. I also argue that this new formulation of the experimental argument solves several problems with Hacking's original version.     

How to be rational about empirical success in ongoing science: The case of the quantum nose and its critics

Empirical success is a central criterion for scientific decision-making. Yet its understanding in philosophical studies of science deserves renewed attention: Should philosophers think differently about the advancement of science when they deal with the uncertainty of outcome in ongoing research in comparison with historical episodes? This paper argues that normative appeals to empirical success in the evaluation of competing scientific explanations can result in unreliable conclusions, especially when we are looking at the changeability of direction in unsettled investigations. The challenges we encounter arise from the inherent dynamics of disciplinary and experimental objectives in research practice. In this paper we discuss how these dynamics inform the evaluation of empirical success by analyzing three of its requirements: data accommodation, instrumental reliability, and predictive power. We conclude that the assessment of empirical success in developing inquiry is set against the background of a model's interactive success and prospective value in an experimental context. Our argument is exemplified by the analysis of an apparent controversy surrounding the model of a quantum nose in research on olfaction. Notably, the public narrative of this controversy rests on a distorted perspective on measures of empirical success.     

Correspondence principle versus Planck-type theory of the atom

This article examines the problem of the origins of the correspondence principle formulated by Bohr in 1920 and intends to test the correctness of the argument that the essential elements of that principle were already present in the 1913 “trilogy”. In contrast to this point of view, moreover widely shared in the literature, this article argues that it is possible to find a connection between the formulation of the correspondence principle and the assessment that led Bohr to abandon the search for a Planck-type theory. In fact, a thorough examination of Bohr’s works shows that the birth of this principle coincided with the depletion of a research program whose origins may date back to Bohr’s stay at the Rutherford’s laboratory (summer 1912). Finally, this article argues that original program of research was abandoned when it became clear that Planck’s quantum hypothesis for the harmonic oscillator was not an adequate support for the theoretical architecture of atomic physics; namely, there was evidence enough to justify a most drastic conclusion, according to Bohr: “I do not think that a theory of the Planck type can be made logical consistent”.     

The roots of the silver tree: Boyle,alchemy, and teleology

Though Robert Boyle called final causes one of the most important subjects for a natural philosopher to study, his own treatise on the subject, the Disquisition about Final Causes, has received comparatively little scholarly attention. In this paper, I explicate Boyle's complex argument against the use of teleological explanations for inanimate bodies, such as metals. The central object of this argument is a mysterious allusion to a silver plant. I claim that the silver plant is best understood as a reference to alchemical product: the Arbor Dianae, an offshoot of George Starkey's recipe for the Philosophers' Stone. Then, I show how the context of alchemy not only clarifies Boyle's argument but also places it within a wider dialectic about matter and teleology. I then contrast the parallel arguments of Boyle and John Ray on the question of whether metals have divine purposes and show that the difference is explained by Boyle's belief in the transmutation of metals.     

Abstract considerations: disciplines and the incoherence of Newton’s natural philosophy

Historians have long sought putative connections between different areas of Newton’s scientific work, while recently scholars have argued that there were causal links between even more disparate fields of his intellectual activity. In this paper I take an opposite approach, and attempt to account for certain tensions in Newton’s ‘scientific’ work by examining his great sensitivity to the disciplinary divisions that both conditioned and facilitated his early investigations in science and mathematics. These momentous undertakings, exemplified by research that he wrote up in two separate notebooks, obey strict distinctions between approaches appropriate to both new and old ‘natural philosophy’ and those appropriate to the mixed mathematical sciences. He retained a fairly rigid demarcation between them until the early eighteenth century. At the same time as Newton presented the ‘mathematical principles’ of natural philosophy in his magnum opus of 1687, he remained equally committed to a separate and more private world or ontology that he publicly denigrated as hypothetical or conjectural. This is to say nothing of the worlds implicit in his work on mathematics and alchemy. He did not lurch from one overarching ontological commitment to the next (for example, moving tout court from radical aetherial explanations to strictly vacuist accounts) but instead simultaneously—and often radically—developed generically distinct concepts and ontologies that were appropriate to specific settings and locations (for example, private, qualitative, causal natural philosophy versus public quantitative mixed mathematics) as well as to relevant styles of argument. Accordingly I argue that the concepts used by Newton throughout his career were intimately bound up with these appropriate generic or quasi-disciplinary ‘structures’. His later efforts to bring together active principles, aethers and voids in various works were not failures that resulted from his ‘confusion’ but were bold attempts to meld together concepts or ontologies that belonged to distinct enquiries. His analysis could not be ‘coherent’ because the structures in which they appeared were fundamentally incompatible.     

结构动力方程另类显式逐步积分格式研究

现有显式积分格式的稳定性与计算结果的取信度均远逊于常用的隐式积分格式,这是制约现有显式积分格式在大型结构动力分析软件以及其它相关软件中广泛应用的瓶颈.以解决这一瓶颈问题为研究目标,通过结合采用精确法和平均常加速度法的基本假定,推导建立了基于双重基本假定的另类显式积分格式,提出了相关的体系另类振动周期等新概念.基于另类振...     

The electrons of the dinosaurs and the center of the Earth: comments on D.D. Turner’s ‘The past vs. the tiny: historical science and the abductive arguments for realism’

Turner [The past vs. the tiny: Historical science and the abductive arguments for realism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 35A (2004) 1] claims that the arguments in favor of realism do not support with the same force both classes of realism, since they supply stronger reasons for experimental realism than for historical realism. I would like to make two comments, which should be seen as amplifications inspired by his proposal, rather than as a criticism. First, it is important to highlight that Turner’s distinction between ‘tiny’ and ‘past unobservables’ is neither excluding nor exhaustive. Second, even if we agreed with everything that Turner says regarding the arguments for realism and their relative weight in order to justify the experimental or historical version, there is an aspect that Turner does not consider and that renders historical realism less problematic than experimental realism.     

Duncan F. Gregory,William Walton and the development of British algebra: ‘algebraical geometry’, ‘geometrical algebra’, abstraction

This paper provides a detailed account of the period of the complex history of British algebra and geometry between the publication of George Peacock's Treatise on Algebra in 1830 and William Rowan Hamilton's paper on quaternions of 1843. During these years, Duncan Farquharson Gregory and William Walton published several contributions on ‘algebraical geometry’ and ‘geometrical algebra’ in the Cambridge Mathematical Journal. These contributions enabled them not only to generalize Peacock's symbolical algebra on the basis of geometrical considerations, but also to initiate the attempts to question the status of Euclidean space as the arbiter of valid geometrical interpretations. At the same time, Gregory and Walton were bound by the limits of symbolical algebra that they themselves made explicit; their work was not and could not be the ‘abstract algebra’ and ‘abstract geometry’ of figures such as Hamilton and Cayley. The central argument of the paper is that an understanding of the contributions to ‘algebraical geometry’ and ‘geometrical algebra’ of the second generation of ‘scientific’ symbolical algebraists is essential for a satisfactory explanation of the radical transition from symbolical to abstract algebra that took place in British mathematics in the 1830s–1840s.     

Forecasting with growth curves: the effect of error structure

"The main theme of this paper is an investigation into the importance of error structure as a determinant of the forecasting accuracy of the logistic model. The relationship between the variance of the disturbance term and forecasting accuracy is examined empirically. A general local logistic model is developed as a vehicle to be used in this investigation. Some brief comments are made on the assumptions about error structure, implicit or explicit, in the literature." The results suggest that "the variance of the disturbance term, when using the logistic to forecast human populations, is proportional to at least the square of population size."     

Remote viewing

Summary Remote viewing is the supposed faculty which enables a percipient, sited in a closed room, to describe the perceptions of a remote agent visiting an unknown target site. To provide convincing demonstration of such a faculty poses a range of experimental and practical problems, especially if feedback to the percipient is allowed after each trial. The precautions needed are elaborate and troublesome; many potential loopholes have to be plugged and there will be strong temptations to relax standards, requiring exceptional discipline and dedication by the experimenters. Most reports of remote viewing experiments are rather superficial and do not permit assessment of the experimental procedures with confidence; in many cases there is clear evidence of particular loopholes left unclosed. Any serious appraisal of the evidence would have to go beyond the reports. Meanwhile the published evidence is far from compelling, and certainly insufficient to justify overthrow of well-established scientific principles.