理论确证的分析真与整体论——从逻辑经验主义到格莱莫尔

自逻辑经验主义的确证理论产生以来，尤其是亨普尔的《确证逻辑研究》发表之后，确证逻辑所涉及的分析真与整体论等问题引起了许多逻辑哲学家的关注，以亨普尔为代表的观点受到了奎因的反驳，而80年代前后格莱莫尔等人又提出了批评与修正。...     

科学实在论的稳健性论证

稳健性论证运用新的术语重新表述了证据对假说的支持问题。得到不同形式证据支持的假说是可靠的,此时称假说是稳健的。稳健性论证是一种常见的科学实在论论证方式,它主张若假说是稳健的,则更可能是真的。斯德真格指出了一般稳健性论证的缺陷,并依据贝叶斯网理论给出了理想稳健性论证。理想稳健性论证并不能使人们确知假说是否为真,只具有提高人们对假说信任程度的认识论价值。     

辩护与确证:证据问题研究

证据问题研究是当代认识论和科学哲学中的重要研究内容。文章将证据问题作为关注焦点和研究核心,首先分析了证据概念的本质,在此基础上探讨了认识论中的证据研究,特别是经验作为证据与辩护的关系,分别讨论了基础主义、融贯主义和经验主义的解决方案。其次,分析了科学哲学中的证据关系研究,主要关注了证据在贝叶斯理论、概率理论和悖论问题中发挥的确证作用。最后揭示了证据研究之于认识论与科学哲学的意义,阐明了证据研究的理论价值。     

贝叶斯检验与库恩范式

库恩的范式理论揭示了常规科学和科学革命交替进行的发展模式,但是他对科学检验在其中的作用过于轻视,原因在于他心目中只有假设-演绎检验模式,而没有贝叶斯检验模式.本文应用贝叶斯检验模型重新审视库恩的范式理论,展示其中的逻辑成分或理性成分,进而说明逻辑与信念、理性与非理性在科学革命过程中的张力结构.     

解决迪昂-奎因问题的两种贝叶斯方案之比较

迪昂-奎因问题是从整体论的立场提出的，它论述的问题是：既然一个证据只能反驳一组假设，那么一个证据反驳某一单个假设如何可能？这一问题引起普遍关注，成为当代科学哲学争论的主题之一。本文对解决此问题的两种不同的贝叶斯方案即豪森—厄巴赫方案和斯特赖文方案进行分析和比较，提出前者较为合理和令人满意。     

旧证据问题及Garber型学习策略探析

由格莱莫尔(Clark Glymour)于1980年提出的旧证据问题,是对贝叶斯确证理论合理性的质疑。自旧证据问题提出以来,多种解决方案被相继提出,最具代表性的是豪森(Colin Howson)的反事实策略和盖贝尔(Daniel Garber)的学习策略。文章通过分析旧证据问题产生的可能原因,从逻辑全能认知的角度和学习策略入手,来梳理Garber型学习策略这类消解方案,探究这类消解方案在哪一层面、何种程度上达到消解旧证据问题的目的。学界对这类方案存在的异议或赞许纷争始终未能达成一致,从而并未实现从根本上消除旧证据问题同时保留贝叶斯理论中的合理成分的目标。对Garber型学习策略的探析或许能为更彻底地解决旧证据问题提供一定的启示作用。     

先验概率问题及其解决

由于主观贝叶斯主义主张，只要不违反一致性规范，一个理性的认知主体对一个假说的先验概率的赋值不再受其它限制。其批评者认为科学的客观性会因此被遗失。这就是主观贝叶斯主义面临的最大问题——先验概率问题。回应此批评的方案可分为两种：（1）先验概率的确不体现科学的客观性，但是随着经验证据的累积，不同认知主体后验概率的收敛则体现了科学的客观性。（2）用主体间概率代替主观概率。科学共同体的主体间概率是客观性的体现。在分析上述回应方案面临的困难后，尝试提出共同体概率，用共同体概率代替主观概率，以期解决先验概率问题。     

查莫斯理想化先验可解读性观点的问题探讨

在《构建世界》中,查莫斯提出了一种基于PQTI假设和贝叶斯论证的先验可解读性理论。本研究对PQTI假设和贝叶斯论证都做出质疑与否定。PQTI假设预设了日常主体认知能力的理想化特点,而这一点实际上并不能够为日常主体满足,且该假设具有不完全和不一致的缺陷。因此,贝叶斯原则被误用且先验可解读性的观点是无效的。本文核心观点是意义并非先验可解读的。查莫斯的理论并不能够正确地维护语义三角关系。     

基于概率结构的纽康姆难题消解方案

纽康姆难题制造的选择困境极大地挑战了经典决策原则。为了维护贝叶斯决策理论的规范性,有人怀疑甚至否定其存在的合理性。借助贝叶斯网络和概率理论,可以直观地展示决策者的行动和预言家的预测之间的因果关系,并揭示出选择困境的实质:纽康姆难题中存在两种不相容的概率结构。因此,它的一个恰当消解方案就是:用清晰的语言来描述纽康姆难题的选择情境,使其仅具有单一概率结构。     

基于贝叶斯网络方法的说明者信念度相关性模型——科学说明相关性问题的一个解决方案

在科学说明中,说明项与被说明项的相关性问题可谓是当代"经典"的热点问题。本文在评析相关性问题以往解决方案遗留难题的基础上,博采以往解决方案之长,探索一条新的解决相关性疑难的路径,提出基于贝叶斯网络方法的说明者信念度相关性模型。     

默认假定,枢轴承诺与闭合原则

本文聚焦于索萨关于默认假定的理论所存在的一个潜在问题,即索萨所声称的其理论与闭合原则的不相容性。基于索萨的"默认假定"概念与维特根斯坦所提出的"枢轴承诺"概念之间的相似性,本文试图从两种流行的枢轴知识论--怀特的资质论和普理查德的非信念论--中为索萨理论寻找可资借鉴的解决方案。本文主张默认假定属于"接受"这一非信念命题态度,因而索萨可采用非信念论对与闭合原则相容性问题的解决策略,同时又可规避非信念论所面临的理论问题。     

Aristotle’s Difficult Relationship With Modern Economic Theory

This paper reviews Aristotle’s problematic relationship with modern economic theory. It argues that in terms of value and income distribution theory, Aristotle should probably be seen as a precursor to neither classical nor neoclassical economic thought. Indeed, there are strong arguments to be made that Aristotle’s views are completely at odds with all modern economic theory, since, among other things, he was not necessarily concerned with flexible market prices, opposed the use of money to acquire more money, and did not think that the unintended consequences of human activity were generally beneficial. The paper argues however, that this interpretation goes too far. The Benthamite neoclassical theory of choice can be seen as a dumbing down of Aristotle’s theory, applicable to animals, not humans. Adam Smith and Karl Marx were deeply influenced by Aristotle’s work and both started their main economic works with Aristotle: Smith ultimately rejecting, and Marx ultimately developing Aristotle’s views of the use of money to acquire more money. Possibilities for the future development of a new Aristotelian Economics are explored.     

Gould, Hull, and the Individuation of Scientific Theories

When is conceptual change so significant that we should talk about a new theory, not a new version of the same theory? We address this problem here, starting from Gould’s discussion of the individuation of the Darwinian theory. He locates his position between two extremes: ‘minimalist’—a theory should be individuated merely by its insertion in a historical lineage—and ‘maximalist’—exhaustive lists of necessary and sufficient conditions are required for individuation. He imputes the minimalist position to Hull and attempts a reductio: this position leads us to give the same ‘name’ to contradictory theories. Gould’s ‘structuralist’ position requires both ‘conceptual continuity’ and descent for individuation. Hull’s attempt to assimilate into his general selectionist framework Kuhn’s notion of ‘exemplar’ and the ‘semantic’ view of the structure of scientific theories can be used to counter Gould’s reductio, and also to integrate structuralist and population thinking about conceptual change.     

从“天命”到“民主”--论芬伯格的技术变革之路

传统技术理论无论是工具理论还是实体理论,都视技术为一种天命,认为人类无法干预技术,只能"接受它或抛弃它",因此人类无法解决技术问题。在芬伯格看来,任何一种技术都是特定社会的产物,技术具有社会性。技术的社会性决定了技术不是天命,人们完全可以通过对技术的民主转化来变革技术,从而解决技术所存在的问题。芬伯格通过技术的变革来解决技术问题,不仅为我们思考技术的本质和解决技术问题提供了新思路,而且也为技术的未来发展指明了新方向。     

Representation and Truthlikeness

Woosuk Park’s paper “Misrepresentation in Context” is a useful plea for a theory of representation with promising interaction between cognitive science, philosophy of science, and aesthetics. In this paper, I argue that such a unified account is provided by Charles S. Peirce’s semiotics. This theory puts Park’s criticism of Nelson Goodman and Jerry Fodor in context. Some of Park’s pertinent remarks on the problem of misrepresentation can be illuminated by the account of truthlikeness and idealization developed by philosophers of science.     

Towards a Theory of Mathematical Argument

In this paper, I assume, perhaps controversially, that translation into a language of formal logic is not the method by which mathematicians assess mathematical reasoning. Instead, I argue that the actual practice of analyzing, evaluating and critiquing mathematical reasoning resembles, and perhaps equates with, the practice of informal logic or argumentation theory. It doesn’t matter whether the reasoning is a full-fledged mathematical proof or merely some non-deductive mathematical justification: in either case, the methodology of assessment overlaps to a large extent with argument assessment in non-mathematical contexts. I demonstrate this claim by considering the assessment of axiomatic or deductive proofs, probabilistic evidence, computer-aided proofs, and the acceptance of axioms. I also consider Jody Azzouni’s ‘derivation indicator’ view of proofs because it places derivations—which may be thought to invoke formal logic—at the center of mathematical justificatory practice. However, when the notion of ‘derivation’ at work in Azzouni’s view is clarified, it is seen to accord with, rather than to count against, the informal logical view I support. Finally, I pose several open questions for the development of a theory of mathematical argument.     

The Foundational Role of Ergodic Theory

The foundation of statistical mechanics and the explanation of the success of its methods rest on the fact that the theoretical values of physical quantities (phase averages) may be compared with the results of experimental measurements (infinite time averages). In the 1930s, this problem, called the ergodic problem, was dealt with by ergodic theory that tried to resolve the problem by making reference above all to considerations of a dynamic nature. In the present paper, this solution will be analyzed first, highlighting the fact that its very general nature does not duly consider the specificities of the systems of statistical mechanics. Second, Khinchin’s approach will be presented, that starting with more specific assumptions about the nature of systems, achieves an asymptotic version of the result obtained with ergodic theory. Third, the statistical meaning of Khinchin’s approach will be analyzed and a comparison between this and the point of view of ergodic theory is proposed. It will be demonstrated that the difference consists principally of two different perspectives on the ergodic problem: that of ergodic theory puts the state of equilibrium at the center, while Khinchin’s attempts to generalize the result to non-equilibrium states.     

Misrepresentation in Context

We can witness the recent surge of interest in the interaction between cognitive science, philosophy of science, and aesthetics on the problem of representation. This naturally leads us to rethinking the achievements of Goodman’s monumental book Languages of Art. For, there is no doubt that no one else contributed more than Goodman to throw a light on the cognitive function of art. Ironically, it could be also Goodman who has been the stumbling block for a unified theory of representation. In this paper, I shall contrast the ways how differently misrepresentation has been treated in cognitive science, aesthetics, and philosophy of science. And I shall show that it is Goodman’s unnecessary separation of resemblance and representation in art that made such a difference. As a conclusion, I will indicate some of the most promising projects toward the unified theory of representation the revolt against Goodman’s rejection of resemblance theories might promise to us.     

The Epistemological Functions of Symbolization in Leibniz’s Universal Characteristic

Leibniz’s universal characteristic is a fundamental aspect of his theory of cognition. Without symbols or characters it would be difficult for the human mind to define several concepts and to achieve many demonstrations. In most disciplines, and particularly in mathematics, the mind must then focus on symbols and their combinatorial rules rather than on mental contents. For Leibniz, mental perception is most of the time too confused for attaining distinct notions and valid deductions. In this paper, I argue that the functions of symbolization differ depending upon the kind of concepts that are replaced with characters. In my view, most commentators did not sufficiently underline the distinction between two main functions of formal substitution in Leibniz’s characteristic: either increasing our knowledge or simply structuring it. In the first case, we complete our knowledge because formal substitution makes sensible and imaginary concepts more distinct. In the second case, symbolization helps to organize contents that are already conceived of by reason. Thus the process of substitution is not always identically applicable, for symbols replace different types of concepts.     

关于汤姆森在球调和函数方面的工作之历史探析

汤姆森在球调和函数方面的工作是位势理论中的重要部分。在拉普拉斯、勒让德、傅里叶等人势理论及热的解析理论工作基础上,汤姆森是第一位定义球调和分析,给出球调和函数概念及其性质特征,并将任意函数表示成球面调和函数的线性组合。为拉普拉斯方程求解提供了新的有效方法,并被应用于一系列数学物理问题中。本文基于原始文献及研究文献,对汤姆森在球调和函数方面的数学工作进行探析,追溯其创新方法的思想起源及物理应用过程。