Evolutionary game analysis of low-carbon behavior credit supervision of logistics enterprises |
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| Authors: | Yu Dong Rui Zhen Tingting Yang |
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| Affiliation: | School of Management, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei 230026, China |
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| Abstract: | Based on the low-carbon obligation fulfillment of Chinese logistics enterprises, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionary process of the interaction between the local government, logistics enterprises and the public in the process of low-carbon behavior credit supervision. Then using Netlogo software, a parameter simulation experiment is conducted to determine the optimal policy for improving the effect of supervision. The results are as follows: ① The combined influence of the local government and the public can effectively change the strategic choice of enterprises and promote the low-carbon behavior of enterprises. ② In terms of improving the effect of supervision, reducing the cost of government supervision would have a highly significant effect, and reducing the cost of the public would be counterproductive. ③ Increasing the government subsidies to enterprises and the government’s fines to enterprises both have a significant effect, and the effect of improving the former is better. However, increasing the severity of higher-level governments punishing local governments will reduce the stability of the system. ④ Supervision can be more effective by increasing the public’s impact on enterprises’ earnings rather than by increasing government subsidies to the public. |
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| Keywords: | low-carbon behavior logistics enterprises collaborative governance evolutionary game |
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