| 考虑事故发生率的燃气安全监管演化博弈模型与仿真分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 王循庆,刘昆,孙晓羽,钟锦林.考虑事故发生率的燃气安全监管演化博弈模型与仿真分析[J].上海大学学报(自然科学版),2022,28(6):932-945. |
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| 作者姓名： | 王循庆 刘昆 孙晓羽 钟锦林 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.山东工商学院 公共管理学院, 山东 烟台 2640052.烟台市特种设备检验研究院, 山东 烟台 265500 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71603109);山东省自然科学基金资助项目(ZR2021MG025) |
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| 摘 要： | 燃气安全关乎公众健康、公共安全和社会稳定, 加强燃气安全监管不仅涉及安全生产, 也是维系社会安全的重要环节. 本工作考虑了燃气事故发生的概率, 建立了燃气企业与政府监管部门的演化博弈模型. 基于演化博弈理论研究了两博弈主体策略选择的演化过程, 并对比分析了燃气企业与政府监管部门行为策略的演化稳定均衡, 基于数值仿真对模型进行了有效分析. 结果表明: ①燃气企业与监管部门的演化稳定策略与燃气事故发生概率有关联, 当燃气事故发生的概率大于安全投入到位收益和安全投入不足赔偿之和比值时, 燃气企业将会采取安全投入不足策略; ②在政府奖惩机制下, 提高政府的惩罚和奖励力度, 均会促使燃气企业采取安全投入到位行为, 但增大惩罚力度比奖励对燃气企业安全投入到位行为影响更显著, 同时对惩罚和奖励力度的增大会抑制政府严格监管行为; ③上级政府对地方政府监管部门监管失责的处罚力度大于政府部门监管成本时, 会促使地方政府监管部门最终选择严格监管; ④随着上级政府的处罚力度的增大, 对地方政府监管部门行为策略选择影响显著, 而对燃气企业行为策略选择影响并不显著. 此研究结论为政府部门有效监管燃气安全生产提供了重要决策支持.
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| 关 键 词： | 燃气企业 安全监管 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 公共安全 |
| 收稿时间： | 2022-06-20 |
Evolutionary game model and simulation analysis of gas safety supervision considering the incidence of accidents |
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| WANG Xunqing,LIU Kun,SUN Xiaoyu,ZHONG Jinlin.Evolutionary game model and simulation analysis of gas safety supervision considering the incidence of accidents[J].Journal of Shanghai University(Natural Science),2022,28(6):932-945. |
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| Authors: | WANG Xunqing LIU Kun SUN Xiaoyu ZHONG Jinlin |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Public Administration, Shandong Technology and Business University, Yantai 264005, Shandong, China2. Yantai Special Equipment Inspection Institute, Yantai 265500, Shandong, China |
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| Abstract: | Gas safety is related to public health, public safety and social stability, and strengthening gas safety supervision not only involves safe production, but also is an important part of maintaining social safety. This paper considers the probability of gas accidents and establishes an evolutionary game model between gas companies and government regulatory departments. Based on evolutionary game theory, the evolutionary process of the choice of the main strategy of the two game players is studied, and the evolutionary stable equilibrium of the behavior strategy of gas enterprises and government regulatory departments is compared and analyzed, and the model is effectively analyzed based on numerical simulation. The results show that: ① The evolutionary stability strategy between gas enterprises and regulatory departments is related to the probability of gas accidents, and when the probability of gas accidents is greater than the sum ratio of full investment income and insufficient safety investment compensation, gas enterprises will adopt the safety investment strategy; ② Under the government reward and punishment mechanism, increasing the government's punishment and reward will prompt gas enterprises to adopt safe investment behavior, but increasing the punishment has a more significant impact on the safety investment behavior of gas enterprises than the reward, and at the same time, the increase in punishment and reward strength inhibits the government's strict supervision behavior; ③ When the penalty imposed by the higher level government on the supervision and responsibility of the local government supervision department is greater than the cost of the government department's supervision, it will prompt the local government supervision department to finally choose strict supervision; ④ With the increase of penalties imposed by higher-level governments, the impact on the choice of behavior strategies of local government regulatory departments is significant, but the impact on the choice of behavior strategies of gas enterprises is not significant. The research conclusions provide important decision-making support for government departments to effectively supervise gas safety production. |
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| Keywords: | wildlife safety regulation evolutionary game evolutionary stability strategy public safety |
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